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ABSTRACT
ADVERTISING AND THE CREATION OF EXCHANGE VALUE
SEPTEMBER 2014
ZOE SHERMAN, B.A., SIMON’S ROCK COLLEGE OF BARD
M.A., UNVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, BOSTON
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerald Friedman
Advertising is a large industry and we feel its presence almost everywhere, but it is not
easy to say what exactly the thousands of people employed in the industry produce and
what exactly advertisers get in exchange for the billions of dollars they spend.
Advertising and the Creation of Exchange Value explores the economics of the industry
and the commodification of communications that characterizes consumer goods
advertising in the U.S. I consider three phases of communications that take on three
distinct commodity forms. First is access to attention, the interception of the audience’s
perception; Chapter One, “The Commodification of Audience Attention in the U.S.,
1865-1920” traces the conversion of audience attention to commodity form as advertising
space/time. Second is content; Chapter Two, “The Value Analytics of Advertising,”
examines the nature of advertising content as a commodified form of speech, produced
on demand for purchasers who wish to disseminate rather than receive it. Third, the sets
of meanings and mental associations we carry around in our brains become brands,
business assets whose value is measured in money. Chapter Three, “The Use Value of
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Advertising,” considers the role of advertising in the branding and sales strategies
pursued by the firms that advertise. I also explore the use of advertising to influence
policy-makers, influence capital markets, or serve as a tool of labor discipline. I conduct
an interdisciplinary historical analysis of the interests driving the construction of these
communicative commodities and the labor processes involved in producing and
exchanging them. I analyze the value flows associated with their trade using tools derived
from Schumpeterian market theory, Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition,
and Marxist value analysis. The concluding essay considers the relevance of my analysis
to our pursuit of the democratic ideal of freedom of expression.
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INTRODUCTION
VALUE: LABOR, SCARCITY, RIVALNESS, EXCLUDABILITY

Advertising is a large industry and we feel its presence almost everywhere, but it
is not easy to say what exactly the thousands of people employed in the industry produce
and what exactly advertisers get in exchange for the billions of dollars they spend.
Advertising and the Creation of Exchange Value explores the economics of the industry
and the commodification of communications that characterizes consumer goods
advertising in the U.S. I consider three phases of communications that take on three
distinct commodity forms. First is access to attention, the interception of the audience’s
perceptual field; Chapter One, “Pricing the Eyes of Passersby: The Commodification of
Audience Attention in U.S. Public Spaces, 1890-1920” traces the conversion of audience
attention to commodity form through the standardization of poster advertising. Second is
the communicative content intended by the speaker or disseminator; Chapter Two, “The
Value Analytics of the Advertising Agency,” examines the nature of advertising content
as a commodified form of speech, produced on demand for purchasers who wish to
disseminate rather than receive it. Third is message reception – in contemporary business
practice and intellectual property law, the sets of meanings and mental associations we
carry around in our brains become brands, business assets whose value is measured in
money. Chapter Three, “The Use Value of Advertising,” considers the wide variety of
ways that an enterprise can deploy advertising to secure its conditions of existence. This
includes the branding and sales strategies pursued by the firms that advertise, and I also
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explore the use of advertising to influence policy-makers, influence capital markets, or
serve as a tool of labor discipline.
I conduct an interdisciplinary historical analysis of the interests driving the
construction of these communicative commodities – advertising space/time, advertising
content, and brands – and the labor processes involved in producing and exchanging
them. I analyze the value flows associated with their trade using tools derived from
Schumpeterian market theory, Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition, and,
centrally, Marxist value analysis as interpreted in the tradition of Stephen Resnick and
Richard Wolff (1987). In the concluding chapter, I consider the relevance of my analysis
to our pursuit of the democratic ideal of freedom of expression unmediated by access to
capital and wealth.

The Stages of Communications
There are three stages of successful communications: The first communicative
1

task is to intercept eyeballs. The second task is to hold the gaze and convey… something
– an impression, some piece of information, an emotion. In the case of communication
originating with an advertiser, the goal is often to convey some sense of familiarity with a
specific product and its use. Lastly, if the first two tasks are achieved, the audience will
have received and retained an impression. A brand identity will have become a social
fact, an element of social communication, even of communications not originating with
the seller. More recently, advertisers and marketers have labeled this impression left by
1

Or ears, though the period for which I study the development of an access-to-attention
market lies in the interim between the decline of street crying and the rise of radio
broadcast, so ears were less targeted than eyes. Now access to ears, and sometimes even
noses, is part of the attention market.
2

communications “mindshare.” Clearly, audiences do not passively receive messages.
Audiences are co-creators of meaning. For purposes of this study, however, everything
that occurs at the receiving end of commercial messages – the interpretation, retention,
and reproduction of the symbolic meanings of goods – can be folded into one phase of
communications. As always, there is an element of the artificial in drawing category
boundaries. The placement and content of an ad both contribute to the meaning produced
and retained in the mind of the recipient. Production of advertising content is always built
around predictions about reception. Nevertheless, the distinctions are analytically useful.
All three stages of communications were transformed into commodified forms
during the period between 1865 and 1920. The market for newspaper, magazine,
billboard, and streetcar advertising space matured, giving us a commodity version of the
first part of the communications task. When access to attention exists in commodity form,
it is what Karl Polanyi calls a fictitious commodity (Polanyi 1957). That is, attention is
not produced for sale – its existence is inherent in the existence of the human population
– and yet it comes to be sold in a market. The emergence of specialized professional
advertising copywriters and artists whose site of labor was in advertising agencies gave
us a commodity version of the second part, content creation. Advertising content was
produced for sale and so was in that sense an ordinary commodity, not a fictitious one –
although commodifying communicative content presents some challenges that differ
from the challenges of commodifying material goods that come in discrete units. The
reform of trademark laws made brand identities into salable business assets, giving us a
commodity version of the third stage of communication, retained impressions or
mindshare. The commodity form of communications reception is the brand.

3

What Makes a Commodity a Commodity
For anything to be a commodity and for there to be a market in that commodity,
there must be a recognized right of private property ownership in that thing and market
institutions that allow for those ownership rights to be transferred. (Note that there are
two uses of the word commodity: one use is to identify things traded in markets as
distinct from those things that are not marketed. That is the use I intend. But there is also
a use of the word commodity to identify undifferentiated products, often raw material
inputs such as corn or petroleum, as distinct from branded or otherwise differentiated
goods.) The rights of private ownership may be a de facto social practice or they may be
de jure rights recognized and enforced by governmental authority. The private property
rights must be alienable: the initial owner may relinquish the right of ownership to
2

another. And the property must be considered fungible: commensurable with and
exchangeable for something else, namely money.
The commodity status of things that have long been commodified and the
structures and practices of market exchange come to seem natural and obvious to market
participants. Economic theory rarely asks what lies behind the supply and demand model
of a market, rarely asks whether and when it makes sense to think about a particular good
in those terms. (When contemporary applied economists do ask the question, it is most
often in the context of development economics. Some development economists promote

2

A core principle of the market is that exchanges are supposed to be voluntary. However,
Marx’s analysis of primitive accumulation reminds us that the initial creation of private
property for market exchange requires forcible dispossession. And Rosa Luxemburg
shows that primitive accumulation is ongoing; sustaining a market involves continuing
forcible dispossession.
4

secure property rights as a high priority government policy goal to foster market
development. In fact, however, most historical examples of market development go the
other way: the social practices of private ownership and exchange develop first even
without government’s approval. The legal structure to strengthen property rights emerges
later.) But the initial commodification of a good is generally a struggle. There is struggle
over what should be privately owned and by whom. There is struggle over what should
be alienable. There is struggle over fungibility – the question of whether relinquishing
one’s rights can earn the initial owner rights to something else in exchange and, if so,
what sorts of exchanges should be allowed. What is commeasurable with what? Once the
commodity status and market practices pass into the realm of normalized, unquestioned
social practice, the story of market exchange can be told as a story of freely chosen
(within the constraints of existing circumstance), mutually beneficial exchanges. But
establishing private property rights and commeasurability in the market always involves
an exercise of power.
For the three phases of communication – access to attention, the content of
advertising speech (broadly construed to include nonverbal content), and goodwill (to use
the old-fashioned term) or mindshare (in modern parlance) – to become marketable
commodities required the creation of new forms of property and institutional mechanisms
to establish excludability, alienability and commeasurability. The boundaries of the
property rights and the mechanisms of market exchange were hotly contested. The stories
of these struggles are told in the three chapters to follow.

5
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Basics of the Labor Theory of Value

Once a private-property-exchanged-on-a-market regime is set, everything that is
marketable is considered commeasurable with everything else. In Marx’s terms, the
market measures all marketed things against one another in units of exchange value. This
exchange value makes possible comparisons among goods in all their infinite and often
unsubstitutable variety of use values. Value exists as a category of analysis because of the
articulation between the realms of production and circulation. The market is a mechanism
that allows for exchange, and in doing so it measures the private production practices of
every market participant against every other. Whereas private production for use is
measured only by sufficiency (or not), private production for the market is measured by
efficiency relative to other producers.
Marx borrowed from the tradition of classical English political economy, going
back to Locke, Hume, Smith, and Ricardo, the notion that value is determined by the
quantity of labor necessary to produce the good in question. He called this quantitative,
value-producing aspect of labor abstract labor. Just as exchange value makes possible
comparisons of unlike goods, abstract labor makes possible comparisons of unlike
concrete labor processes and hence makes the products of unlike labor commeasurable.
The labor theory of value rests on the rivalness of labor time. Labor time
expended on the production of this is not expended on the production of that;
consequently, in the absence of other price distortions, this and that will exchange in
proportion to the amount of time it took to make them. In contrast to the neoclassical
textbook definition of economics, which posits a global premise that economics studies

3

This section is drawn from Capital Volume I.
6

the allocation of scarce resources to competing ends, the labor theory of value centers the
4

allocation of finite and rival labor time to competing ends. The logic of the labor theory
of value in its most basic form rests, too, on the finiteness and rivalness of the things
produced. The supposition that exchange ratios will approximate labor time ratios only
makes sense if the good is rival and fully alienable: once sold, the seller must have
relinquished the good and cannot sell the very same good again.
The labor value of a good can be disaggregated: Marx’s magnificent contribution
to the labor theory of value was to disaggregate the total labor time embodied in a
commodity into three categories: constant capital + variable capital + surplus. The
constant capital (c) accounts for the past labor embodied in inputs and capital equipment
consumed in new production, and the value of the past labor is passed on to the good
produced. To this dead labor is added living labor. The living labor is further
disaggregated into the value of labor power (variable capital, v) and surplus (s). The
value of labor power is the value produced by the workers and also received by the
workers as wages in order to enable the reproduction of labor power, while surplus (s) is
the value retained by the capitalist.
Marx’s purpose in disaggregating value into the categories of c+v+s was to make
class visible. It makes visible the workers’ alienation as their collective past labor
confronts them in the form of a power wielded over them: c. It makes visible their

4

This interpretation of the labor theory of value is in some ways similar to Graeber’s
“idiosyncratic” (his adjective) interpretation of Marx’s theory of value in Toward an
Anthropological Theory of Value (2001). He calls the labor value of an object a measure
of its social importance because it is a measure of how much time has been committed to
its production. However in doing so he is failing to make two distinctions: between
commodified labor time and non-commodified time, and between labor directed toward
the production of commodities and labor directed toward other ends.
7

exploitation: they produce a value of v+s but receive only v. Their surplus never belongs
to them and they have no say in how the surplus is to be used. Alienation and exploitation
work in reciprocal concert with one another. Alienation enables exploitation. The surplus
obtained through exploitation is used (in part) to reproduce alienation.

Requirements for the Realization of Value
The conditions necessary for the production of value are not sufficient to
guarantee the realization of value. To start with, the realization of value depends on
someone wanting the use value produced. If the use value is not sufficiently useful to
enough potential buyers, the goods will sit unsold and the value will remain unrealized.
The realization of value also requires excludability – the item need not necessarily
be rare, but for its sale to realize value it cannot easily be directly appropriated from
nature, or from non-economic social realms, or otherwise acquired by non-monetary
means. You can’t sell oxygen to most people, though divers, mountaineers, and
emphysema patients will buy it. Although many people will buy apples and eggs, you
cannot so easily sell apples to a person with an apple tree growing in her front yard or
eggs to a person with chickens in his back yard. No matter how much labor went into the
bottling of oxygen, harvesting of apples, or collection of eggs, and no matter how useful
breathers and eaters find oxygen, apples, and eggs to be, it will be hard to realize the
embodied value in the absence of excludability.
Conversely, the conditions necessary for the realization value may be met where
the prior production of value did not take place. Excludability can create the conditions
for the realization of value even in the absence of labor. Ground rent is a classic example

8

– a value flow secured through ownership of land, the supply of which cannot (in
5

general) increase. Merchant fees also realize value where it was not produced. Imperfect
information and the frictions, inconveniences, and transaction costs of accomplishing
exchanges open the space for merchant fees. Merchants collect a fee by interposing
themselves between the producer and the ultimate buyer and charging a fee for access.
(Sometimes the increased efficiency of accomplishing exchanges more than justifies the
fee; sometimes not.) Ground rent and merchant fees secure a value flow without any
production of labor value, but a single transaction can encompass realization of both
embodied labor value and rent. This is the case with monopoly pricing. A monopolist can
charge a price greater than value because there are not other options for getting the good.
The monopolist can restrict output so it is lower than would be needed to meet demand at
P = V and collect a fee on the restricted number of units sold. Rents may also be collected
on natural resources. There is abstract labor involved in natural resource extraction but
there may also be monopoly rents if the resource is in short supply or the industry is not
competitive, as in the case of OPEC. These rents may dwarf the labor value.
The conditions for the realization of value, including excludability, may be met
for nonrival goods. The rivalness condition needed for the labor theory of value to be
applicable in its simplest form is clearly met by material goods (e.g. shoes and sheds) and
personal services (e.g. haircuts and housecleaning). Not everything that is traded as a
commodity meets this condition, however. Information, for example, is nonrival: easily
replicable and not easily alienable. Property rights in information are more easily

5

At least not by much. The land area of what now lies within the Boston city limits
increased by about a third over the last two hundred years through the use of landfill, but
over the next two hundred years rising seas will likely take it all back.
9

multiplied than transferred – you don’t necessarily forget or lose access to the
information you share with me.

Market Prices and Deviation from Labor Value
If it were the case that goods traded in proportion to their labor values, the
analysis of price could end with the basics of the labor theory of value. But because the
conditions necessary to realize value do not correspond perfectly to the conditions
necessary to produce value, price and value need not match. Even for a normal good –
rival, excludable, at least as scarce as a dismal economist would expect – price need not
be simply proportional to labor value. Although production and circulation together make
value a meaningful category of analysis, the quantity of value embodied in a good is
determined in the production process whereas price is determined in the market. Many
phenomena in the realm of circulation influence price.
For economists who reject the labor theory of value, value can be identified with
price as a feature of the market. Part of what makes neoclassical economics neo is the
rejection of the labor theory of value employed by classical forbearers. For neoclassical
economists following in the tradition first comprehensively codified by Marshall, value is
the intersection of upward sloping supply and downward sloping demand. Endowments,
preferences, and technology are given; perfectly competitive markets are assumed. Price
can still deviate from value, but for reasons that differ from the transformation problem
that pertains to the labor theory of value. The deviation of actual prices from values
comes, in this view, from the regrettable imperfection of actual markets, the
inconvenience of inflations and deflations that make the unit of measure unstable, and
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other messy matters. During the 1930s, Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin both
developed analyses that agreed with the identification of value with market price. They
preferred, however, to theorize at a lower level of abstraction and with greater immediate
applicability than Marshall’s economic theory could manage. They both rejected the
definition of value as the ideal price that would hold in an ideal purely competitive
market. Instead, they sought to theorize markets that more nearly resembled real world
markets.
Robinson in The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933) and Chamberlin in
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (first edition 1933) both sought to divorce the
theory of value from the assumption of perfect, pure competition. Though there are clear
distinctions between their approaches, both explicitly identified their work as a
fundamental challenge to the dominant value theory. (Chamberlin’s book is subtitled A
Re-Orientation of the Theory of Value.) Both sought to do away with the more absurd
assumptions of perfect competition. In place of many small-scale producers who must all
take market conditions as given, they build their theories on producers whose actions
determine market conditions. Robinson’s theory retains neoclassical theory’s multiple
producers producing indistinguishable commodities, but allows them some price-setting
power. Chamberlin, on the other hand, posits that all producers are monopolists in the
production of their own output. The question of price competition in the market for a
given commodity disappears and competition between producers instead becomes a
question of the degree of substitutability between the product of one monopolist and
another. The lower the degree of substitutability, the greater the monopoly pricing power
of the producer.

11

If we wish to retain the labor theory of value for the many analytic insights it
enables, then we will find ourselves (as Keynes said about the distance between
neoclassical value theory and price theory) “sometimes on the one side of the moon and
sometimes on the other” (Keynes 1964, p.292). Instead of eliminating one side of the
moon from analysis, however, we have the option of laying out a theoretical route to
connect the two. How can we journey from labor value to price and back again? Stephen
Resnick and Richard Wolff’s (1987) interpretation of Marxian value theory is flexible
enough to fully describe price, including the components of price determined in highly
imperfect markets, and to do so in a way that retains the sharp focus on class and surplus.
In their approach, price can be understood as a summation of different types of value
flows. Production is where the fundamental capitalist class process of surplus generation
and exploitation plays out. But that is only a piece of a bigger and more complicated
economic process. To the labor value categories c+v+s, they add two more value
categories to represent economic processes that are not directly captured in the analysis
of value created in production.
As a result of the capitalist class process, the capitalist receives a surplus. The
capitalist then has a choice regarding how to spend the surplus. (A choice shaped, as are
all choices, by compulsions and constraints.) They name the distribution of the surplus
the subsumed class process. Much of the surplus must be spent in ways that will secure
the conditions of existence for the continuation of the fundamental capitalist class
process: on supervisory labor, for example, or on the maintenance of a state that encodes
and enforces a legal structure that sustains capitalist class relations. The first distribution
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of the surplus as it is recycled back into circulation is a subsumed class payment (SC) for
the capitalist who pays it out.
Someone who provides a condition of existence for the appropriation of surplus
and receives a first distribution of surplus in exchange occupies a subsumed class
position and the value flow received by occupying that position is a subsumed class
revenue (SCR). The occupant of the subsumed class position, meanwhile, will need to
make distributions in turn in order to secure the flow of subsumed class revenues.
Resnick and Wolff use the letter X to label the distributions needed to secure subsumed
class revenues. Although class matters, and class is the entry point for this value analysis,
the economy encompasses more value flows than class alone can account for. Value
flows received as a result of non-class processes are non-class revenues (NCR). They
label the distributions needed to secure non-class revenues with the letter Y.
The market price of a good, therefore can be described by the class characteristics
of the value flows that enter into the price: the embodied labor value consisting of
constant capital, variable capital, and surplus (c+v+s), the value flows secured from
capitalists’ distribution of the surplus (SCR), and all value flows more than one step
removed from the fundamental capitalist class process (NCR).
Some examples:
•

A producer of shoes selling an undifferentiated product in a perfectly
competitive market supplied by equally efficient producers receives the
value of the shoes sold: c+v+s.

•

A producer of shoes selling an undifferentiated product in a perfectly
competitive market but producing with more-than-average efficiency
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receives the value of the shoes sold plus superprofit resulting from a
redistribution of surplus in the industry: c+v+s+SCRsuperprofit. (This
efficient producer pulls down the social average of the socially necessary
abstract labor time somewhat, but the average is still above the efficient
producer’s private labor time. The less-efficient producers must sell below
their private labor time, and so fail to realize their entire surplus, which
flows to the efficient producer instead.)
•

A producer of shoes selling in a monopolized market with no competitors
receives the value of the shoes sold plus a monopoly rent:
c+v+s+NCRmonopoly.

•

A producer of shoes selling a differentiated product to consumers willing
to pay a price premium receives the labor value of the shoes plus the brand
price premium: c+v+s+NCRprice premium.

•

Several of these things can happen at once. A producer of shoes who
produces at lower cost and sells at a price premium could receive
c+v+s+SCRsuperprofit+NCRprice premium.

What this means for commodified communications and the associated flows of value
Information and communications have long been monetized in capitalism. Some
of the monetization of information occurs in the realm of circulation: market
intermediaries solve the information problem of matching buyers and sellers (merchants)
or lenders and borrowers (bankers), and collect a fee for their efforts. Communications
commodities also emerged in the realm of production early in the development of
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capitalism – theaters and printing houses were early sites of the capitalist class process in
England. Notably, though, the first communications to become commodified were
communications that came in finite units/vessels and it was the physical vessel, a rival
good, rather than the non-rival content that was commodified. A play is performed at a
particular time in a theater with a finite capacity from which non-payers could be
excluded. Once the house was full, access to the play could only be sold again by
performing it again, requiring more productive labor. Physical books were sold as
capitalist commodities, and a particular physical book is rival, excludable, and alienable
from the seller.
We are now in a phase of capitalism in which more and more of what is sold is
immaterial, informational, communicative – and more and more of what is immaterial,
informational, and communicative is sold in commodity form (Hardt and Negri 2000).
Looking through the lens of scarcity (or abundance), rivalness, and excludability will
help us discover where value is produced and how it is circulated in this setting. A variety
of the forms of value Marx delineated exist in this immaterial realm, as they did in the
industrial realm his theory of value was initially developed to explain. Analyzing the
value flows of informational capitalism requires us to determine where production
confronts the rivalness of abstract labor time and new value is generated and where, by
contrast, the realization of value has become untethered from its production.
The production of new speech, information, knowledge, affect requires labor –
with more than seven billion thinking, talking, emoting people in the world perhaps we
are not really facing a scarcity, but labor time devoted to the production of speech and
affect is finite and rival. In particular, communicative, affective, discursive labor time
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performed as capitalist wage labor is subject to constraints and trade-offs. Someone
writing a script for a Coca-Cola TV ad is not and cannot be simultaneously writing a
script for a Geico TV ad. A lobbyist speaking to Senator Schumer on behalf of the
investment banks is not and cannot be simultaneously speaking to Senator Schumer (and
even less to Senator Boxer) about the Farm Bill. The activity of speaking-on-behalf-of,
when sold as a commodity, is not too dissimilar from a personal service sold as a
commodity. So when speech is produced for sale, as in the case of lobbyists or
advertising creatives, that production is subject to the labor time trade off and new
exchange value is being produced by the abstract labor expended. When such speech is
produced under capitalist relations of production, a portion of that exchange value is
capitalist surplus.

Attention, too, is rival. We can only attend to so many stimuli, so much
information, so many pitches and pleas. Most (perhaps all) concrete labor contains a
component of paying attention to the task at hand, and a great deal of concrete labor
requires paying attention to a particular person or people. But aside from the market trade
in attention that comes included in the labor power package, there is also a large scale
market trade in attention that is not sold by those attending, but is instead sold by third
parties – the sale of advertising space/time is the sale of access to the attention of an
audience.
In this case, the capacity to attend is not labor power, but a social resource.
Attracting, packaging, and selling attention is analogous to extracting, processing, and
selling a natural resource. Since audience attention is appropriated rather than produced
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by the sellers, the ability of sellers to derive revenues from their access to audience
attention depends not only on their ability to share access with buyers of the audience
attention commodity, but also on the ability to restrict non-buyers’ access. Labor power is
expended on the attraction (or extraction) process and so new exchange value may be
created, but there is also a vast potential for securing rents. As the usefulness of
advertising space/time has everything to do with the audience attention captured and
nothing to do with the quantity of abstract labor time used to capture it, rents are by far
the more consequential component of the market price of audience attention (Weiner
2002). Those who can command the most attention at the lowest cost can be dizzyingly
profitable. This is the story of Google.
The difficulties of commodifying labor power are familiar – labor power comes
attached to people who are often resistant to the uses the purchaser wishes to make of it.
And in fact, labor power is incompletely commodified (Radin 1996). The transfer of
property rights in labor power from seller to buyer is only partial. As a result of ongoing
struggle – and with the result that wage labor has become somewhat more socially and
psychologically sustainable than it might otherwise be – there are limitations on what the
purchaser can do with the labor power purchased. There are, in the U.S., OSHA safety
standards. There are prohibitions on requiring sexual services as a condition of
employment. The boundaries of the property rights transferred in the sale of labor power
are continually contested, but the boundaries are there.
Commodification of attention (apart from attention as a component of labor
power) runs into somewhat different difficulties than does the commodification of labor
power. Resistance from the people to whom the commodity is attached can be just as
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fierce – and as they are not the sellers of the commodity in question there is no legitimate
power to compel them to attend. Attention is rival – we can attend to only one thing at a
6

time. We often resist uninvited intrusions on our attention and we frequently face
simultaneous competing attempts to attract it. Attention is excludable only with
significant effort and the right context. (As, in a nonmarket context, any parent
attempting to speak on the phone in the presence of a child knows well.) Commodifying
attention depends on achieving some measure of compulsion and some degree of
excludability. As explored in Chapter 1, the modernization of the outdoor advertising
industry around the turn of the twentieth century was largely a story about establishing
the conditions to make attention excludable. Billposters also developed techniques and
harnessed new possibilities for compulsion – placing billboards where the flow of traffic
through new urban infrastructure would force the poster into travelers’ line of sight, for
example.
As attention is highly rival but excludable to only a very limited extent, it is an
open access resource, vulnerable to what Garrett Hardin, in his much-cited 1968 article,
called the tragedy of the commons. Attention is much in demand, and our capacity to
attend is stretched ever thinner while those seeking our attention go to ever-greater
lengths to attain it. (As we have learned from later work on common pool resources, the
commons need not be tragic (Ostrom 1990). But an ungoverned open access resource is
indeed vulnerable to depletion.) Any number of how-to advertising books promise that
any reader who takes the recommendations to heart can get their message heard. The
authors and promoters of these books seem untroubled by the logical incoherence of the
6

All the neurological research confirms that multitasking is a delusion. The best we can
do is switch tasks quickly, not process two tasks simultaneously in parallel.
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claim. If every advertiser followed the advice in the book, we the audience could not
attend to any larger a percentage of them than we already do, at least not by much.
An alternative approach to the value analysis of the audience attention commodity
is developed in Sut Jhally and Bill Livant’s article “Watching as Working” (Jhally 2006).
Instead of drawing on the analogy of a natural resource, they draw an analogy between
the watching activity of (for example) a television audience and the performance of wage
labor. In this analysis, the source of value is the watching labor performed by the
audience – this after all is the activity that directly produces audience attention and
audience attention is the good being sold. The audience is paid in kind, with
entertainment, rather than in money wages. The media generates a surplus by generating
revenues through the sale of advertising space/time that exceed the cost of generating the
content that attracted the audience. Watching enough minutes of advertising to cover the
cost of the programming is necessary labor, watching more advertising than that is
surplus labor.
Ultimately, the natural resource analogy is a more consistent and convincing
means of integrating the audience attention commodity into a Marxian value analysis.
However, the watching as working approach generates important insights about media
capital’s pursuit of profit. Just as an employer seeks to maximize the difference between
the value produced by labor and the wages paid to labor, a media outlet seeks to
maximize the difference between revenues from the sale of audience attention and the
cost of producing content that will attract audience attention. The drive to maximize this
profitable difference encourages outcomes analogous to the outcomes for wage labor that
Marx was observing when he defined absolute and relative surplus in wage labor. As
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when a wage worker works more hours and generates more absolute surplus, the trend
has been to show audiences more minutes of advertising per hour of television
programming. Like an intensification of the work process generating more relative
surplus, those minutes of advertising have been subdivided into smaller units – two
fifteen-second spots generate more revenue than one thirty-second spot. The weakest part
of the argument is its attempt to find a power relationship that can sustain this
exploitation, to identify some kind of compulsion that keeps audiences watching (Jhally
2006).

Information is, in contrast to attention, nonrival. It is excludable only with great
effort and aggressively crafted and enforced intellectual property rights. Some
information is more useful when held by only a few – a monopoly on information can be
a source of power or competitive advantage – as demonstrated by the willingness of some
to pay significant fees to gain access to the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan
index of consumer sentiment report two seconds sooner than everyone else. (Thomson
Reuters discontinued the early release service in July 2013 when New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman began an investigation into whether the practice violated
insider trading laws (McLaughlin 2013).) In these cases the seller can have some
confidence that the buyer will collaborate in sustaining the excludability of the
information sold. Indeed the information is valuable to the buyers only because nonbuyers are excluded. Some low-budget advertising relies on stock images or stock music.
In this case the seller of the stock material sometimes offers the material itself at one
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price and exclusion of other advertisers from use of the same material (in a given region,
for a given time period) for an additional fee.
Some information is neutral or even positively made more useful by being widely
shared. A great deal of the use value of The Sopranos for viewers was being able to
discuss it with others. Sports fans pouring into the streets to celebrate their team’s victory
would get far less use from knowing the game’s outcome if no one else knew. In these
cases, buyers cannot be trusted to help sustain excludability and must be policed.
Information is not only nonrival, it is abundant. Although bandwidth is finite, we
can already transmit far more than we can attend to. The scarcity of attention relative to
information enables the monetization of attention through rents. But, paradoxically, rents
are also generated through control of information. Information rents are not enabled by a
natural scarcity, but extracted through an imposed scarcity. The ease with which much
information can be replicated requires restriction of access in order to realize any value at
all. The marginal cost of replicating and distributing information is so nearly zero that
without monopoly rents, the price would be driven to zero (Teixera and Rotta 2012).
Despite the abundance of information in general, certain information has few or no
substitutes. The code that lets your computer communication with my computer could be
replicated at near-zero cost, but you probably paid for it. The reams of information that
data mining companies have about each of us could also be replicated at near-zero cost,
but the advertisers selecting their targets pay for it.
Given how easily replicable most information is these restrictions can be very
difficult to maintain. Some sellers give up on maintaining the excludability of the
information and instead pursue a line extension. Some of the same people who watch
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pirated movies will pay for toys, t-shirts, and Happy Meals featuring licensed characters.
The music industry has in the MP3 age found it difficult to restrict access to recorded
music (though not for lack of trying) and instead generates more revenues through
concert tickets than through sales of recordings – the reverse of the situation in the vinyl
record, cassette tape, and even CD ages.
The third phase of communications – reception or mindshare – sits at the
intersection of information and attention: Brands are information that has successfully
commanded attention. A brand is an exceptionally strange form of property – it resides in
our brains. Defending a brand (in and of itself a large and growing business and law
enforcement activity) means restricting the production of meanings that might intrude
upon the protected discursive territory while actively encouraging the production and
reproduction of advantageous meanings. Arvidsson (2006) describes a brand as a
structured arena of action in which consumer activity continually reproduces the brand. It
is a property produced by a mostly volunteer labor force. It is the enclosure of a
communicative commons.
The position of brands on the rival/excludable axes is ambiguous. The attention
component is rival. The information component is, according to the characteristics of
information, non-rival, but the usefulness of the brand to its owner depends on
excludability. The boundaries of the brand as property have expanded over time. Brandowner’s fears of running up against the rivalness and scarcity of audience attention have
intensified, and they have responded by broadening the reach of the excludability
conferred by the brand. The standards for showing trademark infringement circa 1900
were based on confusion – trademark infringement occurred when one firm sold a good
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packaged and promoted in such a way as to raise a reasonable concern that buyers might
mistakenly purchase that good believing it to be a different trademarked (but infringedupon) good. In recent decades the standard for establishing trademark infringement has
drifted toward a standard of trademark dilution. This change is contested and incomplete,
but there are instances in which the outcomes of legislation and litigation have found that
trademark infringement has occurred even with no reasonable fear of confusion. Instead,
diluting, damaging, or making competing use of the set of associations and meanings
embodied in a brand is sufficient. For example, a man named Victor was blocked from
using his own name in the name of the adult novelty store he owned and operated with
his wife. Victoria’s Secret successfully sued, claiming that the use of the name “Victor’s
Little Secret” to sell pornography and dildos damaged their brand identity (Barrouquere
2010).
For competing brands, the rivalness of attention dominates their assessment of the
rivalness of brand identity and they jealously guard their discursive turf from intrusions
by competitors and counterfeiters. But non-competing brands can be complimentary. Far
from being rival, they can become more valuable when they stake out discursive
territory-in-common. This is the phenomenon of co-branding. Star Wars is a valuable
brand. LEGO is a valuable brand. Star Wars-themed LEGO sets help LEGO hold off the
competitive threat of Mega blocks while keeping Star Wars always before the eyes of
construction toy enthusiasts, even before they are old enough to comprehend the movies
(Joffe-Walt 2012). The movie tie-ins of Happy Meal toys accomplish something similar.
In the case of co-branding the non-rivalness of information and the scarcity of attention
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make sharing meanings advantageous. Linking one brand to another can give each an
entering wedge into the mental space of certain desired consumers.
The price premium enjoyed by sellers of branded goods represents a rent, which is
not a direct monetization of attention – the attention is not being sold – but is enabled by
command of attention. The command of attention that leads to the command of a rent can
be monetized directly when the brand itself is priced. Despite disagreements over the
precise monetary equivalent of specific brands (see Table 3.1), there is a broad consensus
among those in the business of measuring brand values that the value of a brand is the
present value of future revenues that can be attributed to the brand. That is, first you
measure the price premium of the branded good as compared to an unbranded alternative.
(This is easier for goods that have an unbranded commodity alternative, e.g. Quaker oats
vs. oats in the bulk bin. But there are plenty of goods that do not have unbranded
versions, in which case there is a much wider variation in subjective assessment.) Then
you predict future sales. The present value of the component of those future revenues that
you identified in step one as attributable to the brand, rather than to the inherent qualities
the good would still display if stripped of its label, is the assessed value of the brand.
The pricing of brands happens at a far remove from value resulting directly from
embodied labor time. Brands are priced according to the present value of an expected
future revenue stream, and are therefore best understood as fictitious value. As with the
sale of a financial asset, the sale of a brand asset allows value to flow now even though it
has not yet been generated. Fictitious values are fragile; there is always a risk that the
future productive labor that would validate a fictitious value may not materialize.
Another part of the fragility of fictitious values is that the projected future revenue stream

24

may not be the future realization of exchange value rooted in productive labor. The
currently traded fictitious value may be a based on a future revenue stream resulting from
interest or rent. Fictitious values therefore can easily multiply beyond the volume of
future productive labor that would be needed for all currently traded fictitious values to
be validated. When it becomes clear that a fictitious value will not be validated, it
evaporates.
In the case of brands, the predicted future revenue flow on which the present
value is based is a rent, not the realization of embodied labor. Even without a Marxist
labor theory of value, some have been moved to wonder whether there is a brand bubble
(Lindemann 2010, p.27). The brand fictitious value is occasionally converted into money
by being traded; a brand, usually in conjunction with other business assets, can be sold.
But brands are assessed more often than they are traded. (The fact that the market for
brands is so inactive is part of why assessments vary so widely. There are so few market
transactions that no market price emerges.) Far more often the brand fictitious value is
converted into money capital through the stock market. A significant and growing portion
of the stock market’s valuation of publicly traded firms cannot be attributed to any
physical assets, and a large portion of this is good will, or the brand value.

The stage is set
I analytically divided communication into three phases: intercept gaze, insert
content, and achieve mindshare. Each phase exists in commodity form. In this study I
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specifically examine: advertising space/time, advertising content, and brand. Each
communication commodity has a story of origins worth telling. The transition from not-acommodity to now-a-commodity is never seamless, often interesting.
Each communication commodity requires a different value analysis. We can find
in the information economy the same range of value forms as the industrial economy –
including exchange value directly rooted in abstract labor, rents, and fictitious value.
Only the creation of custom-made advertising content, a variety of speech-for-sale, is
productive of new exchange value. Some advertising content is licensed stock material,
typically images or music. Revenues from sales of stock material are rents on restrictedaccess information, which rely on an imposed scarcity. The sale of access to audience
attention secures a rent resulting from natural scarcity. The value of a brand is a fictitious
value: the present value of a future revenue stream.
In the chapters that follow I will analyze the institutions and practices that sustain
private property rights and enable market exchanges for each of these commodities.
Lastly, the conclusion shifts from descriptive to normative and asks what the large and
growing presence of commodified communications mean for the democratic ideal of
freedom of expression.

7

Consumer product advertising is not the only realm in which commodified
communications matter. The realm of political communications is also increasingly
commodified and is worthy of another study. There is overlap: campaign advertising is a
big business. But lobbying is a separate matter. For a long time the purchase of
interception of perceptual field and insertion of content were sold as a package. In What
Money Can’t Buy, Michael Sandel draws attention to the new phenomenon of paid linestanding services. Rather than using their own employees’ highly paid time to stand in
lines to see elected officials, lobbying firms now buy a position in line from specialized
line-standing firms who hire very low-cost labor, often from homeless people, whose
participation in the political process is that of a paid, voiceless placeholder (Sandel 2012).
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CHAPTER 1
PRICING THE EYES OF PASSERSBY: THE COMMODIFICATION OF
AUDIENCE ATTENTION IN U.S. PUBLIC SPACES, 1890-1920

Introduction
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, advertisers and the advertising
8

professionals who served them successfully pushed the transformation of audience
attention into a form of tradable property. At the beginning of this period, getting
advertisements before the eyes of the public was a haphazard affair. By the end of the
period, advertising in periodical media, outdoor advertising such as billboards, and direct
mail marketing had all gone through a process of standardization, allowing advertisers to,
with a reasonably high degree of specificity and confidence, purchase access to the
attention of desired audiences. The standardization emerged from the interaction of
advertisers’ and advertising professionals’ desires. Advertisers wanted reliable access to
audience attention for use in their own competitive strategies. While providing reliable
access to audiences, advertising professionals wanted to capture a healthy share of
advertisers’ selling costs. In the outdoor advertising field in particular, the billposters’
aggressive pursuit of monopoly contributed to achieving both ends.
For advertisers, advertising was a critical component of their competitive strategy,
both in horizontal competition against other sellers of similar goods and in vertical
competition against others in the consumer good distribution chain. In horizontal
8

A note on terminology: Advertisers are the sellers of advertised goods. I am using the
term “advertising professionals” to refer to the array of people involved in providing
advertising services, including characters such as advertising agents, copywriters and
illustrators, billposters, lithographers, and distributors.
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competition, advertising was a tool used to pursue high market share at steady, profitable
retail prices. In vertical competition, advertising was a tool used to try to capture the
largest possible share of the difference between the retail price and the manufacturer’s
cost of producing the goods – that pool of surplus out of which everyone in the
distribution chain must carve their profits (Chandler 2002, Strasser 1989, Laird 1998).
Readily available, predictable, measurable access to audience attention was a necessary
prerequisite for advertisers to carry out their strategies and this prerequisite was achieved
by making attention a purchasable good.
The ability to buy and sell attention depends on establishing property rights in
attention so that there is something to be traded, and on establishing rules for market
engagement so that there is some way to carry out the trade. Advertisers and the suppliers
of attention both enlisted the state in the definition and defense of the necessary new
property rights. They struggled over how to carry out the exchanges and a new market
infrastructure was forged in the heat of their battles. Given the necessary property rights
and market infrastructure, attention can be traded. It can be attracted or intercepted for the
purpose of trade, but it cannot be newly produced to meet demand. It is in this sense like
a privatized natural resource.
To sell attention is to offer those who pay the fee preferential access to the eyes of
audiences. The ability to sell preferential access to some depends on the ability to exclude
others. State-sanctioned property rights in attention therefore represent a degree of statesanctioned monopoly in the sense of the term used by Edward Chamberlin in The Theory
of Monopolistic Competition (1962) – every producer has a monopoly on their own
individual output. In the outdoor advertising field, the billposters only achieved
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monopoly in Chamberlin’s more expansive sense of the word in conjunction with
monopoly in the more traditional sense of the word, as exclusive sellers of a particular
class of goods with a high degree of price-setting power.
Both the horizontal and vertical competitive struggles taking place amongst the
advertising industry’s clients had analogs within the advertising industry. Newspaper
publishers competed horizontally against other publishers for advertisers’ business, which
in part meant competing for readers whose attention they could sell. Likewise, billposters
competed against other billposters for advertisers’ business, which in part meant
competing for the most visible billboard locations – though to a great extent billposters
resolved this competition by securing local monopolies. Competition spilled across
sectors: publishers competed against billposters (and billposters against publishers) over
their respective shares of sellers’ advertising appropriations. Advertising agents and
solicitors acted as intermediaries between the attention sellers and the advertisers who
were the final buyers. In vertical competition, publishers and billposters struggled with
the agents and solicitors over the size of their commissions.
In what follows, I establish the characteristics of audience attention as a fictitious
commodity in the sense defined by Karl Polanyi. I then outline the historical development
of the outdoor advertising sector of what became a nationally integrated market in
audience attention with a focus on how contradictions and competitive struggles over the
surplus shaped the market.
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How Big Was the Business
The scale of the access to attention market grew considerably in the late
nineteenth century. It is hard to be more precise than this because the data for this period
are so unreliable. The best aggregate data are for the print media sector, which grew from
$39.1 million in advertising revenues in 1880 to $95.9 million in 1900. Rough but
reasonable estimates judged print media advertising to constitute approximately half of
all advertising expenditures (Waldron 1903, p.158; Pope 1983, p.26). Data for an
important alternative medium, poster advertising, are all but nonexistent. We know,
however, that it grew from a medium used exclusively by traveling circuses, local theater,
and patent medicines to a major advertising venue for large-scale respectable retailers and
national manufacturers of branded goods. Billposting businesses detailed in the
billposters’ leading professional journal are a sampling, not an aggregate, but they are
suggestive. In the summer of 1900, the northern California outdoor advertising firm of
Owens, Varney, and Green was posting approximately 150,000 sheets per month. They
had boards in San Francisco (population 340,000), where they charged 12¢ per sheet per
month and also in Oakland and a handful of small nearby towns where they charged from
5 to 7¢ per sheet, which would yield yearly revenues on the order of $150,000 to
$200,000. There were approximately 40 cities of at least 100,000 population in which a
billposter belonging to the Associated Billposters was at work, most of them charging at
least 12¢ per sheet. A second tier of more than a hundred mid-sized plants in smaller
cities would have been doing business in the tens of thousands of dollars yearly and 500
smaller-scale members of the national association were doing business on the order of
several hundred to several thousand dollars a year (The Billposter-Display Advertising
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July 1900, pp.17, 28). In 1900, the American Tobacco Company spent $600,000 on
billboard advertising of cigars alone (Sherman 1900, p.134). This indicates that circa
1900 the total revenues of the billposting industry were in the tens of millions of dollars a
year, though smaller than publishers’ advertising revenues. The distributing business was
also considerable. In Newark, New Jersey the distribution arm of the Newark Bill Posting
Co. moved an average of a half a million pieces per month in 1902 and in November of
that year A. Van Beuren distributed 1.1 million pieces in New York City. In total,
distributors moved billions of fliers, product samples, and advertising ephemera into
people’s homes every year at prices that typically ranged from $1.50 to $3.00 per
thousand (The Billposter-Display Advertising February 1902, p.9; March 1902, p.9;
January 1903, p.18).
Though the growth was notable, the effects of changes in the advertising industry
are only partially captured by a dollar-and-cents accounting of its growth. We know that
manufacturers and merchants were spending more on advertising and more people were
exposed to more advertising messages. This growth in advertising was related, as both
cause and effect, to the growing sales of branded packaged goods. The growth in
advertising also contributed to both quantitative and qualitative changes in the
relationships between consumers and purchased goods, consumers and retailers, retailers
and manufacturers.

Audience attention as a fictitious commodity
Markets are always embedded in a society that also includes non-market realms;
what happens within the market depends in part on what happens without (and vice
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versa). Karl Polanyi argued that ours is a market society in which the market realm has a
tendency to expand into more and more areas of social life, but this process of market
expansion runs into contradictions. The self-regulating market ideal requires that every
element of industry must be treated as a commodity, “subject to the supply-and-demand
mechanism interacting with price.” However, industry’s needs include land and labor,
which are “no other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists
and the natural surroundings in which it exists.” That is, they are not produced for the
purpose of market exchange and yet they become subject to market exchange. Polanyi
calls such items, those that are traded in markets although they are not produced
specifically for sale on the market, “fictitious commodities.” He identified three: land,
labor, and money (Polanyi 1957, p.71-73).
Audience attention is not produced for the purpose of market exchange – like
labor, it is inherent in the existence of a human population. Unlike labor, which is sold by
those laboring, attention was not (and is not) sold by those attending; it was (and is) sold
9

by third parties. In their horizontal fight for market share and their vertical fight for a cut
of the surplus, sellers’ strategies leaned more and more heavily on access to audience
attention. This created a pressure for audience attention to take on a commodity form and
the advertising industry was born to profit from the situation. A new market in audience
attention arose, interconnected with all other markets in the larger market economy. In
short, audience attention became a fictitious commodity.
9

There is often an implicit exchange with audiences – the news is our compensation for
exposure to newspaper ads; the TV show is our compensation for watching the TV ads.
Some advertising is an even less disguised exchange, as in the offer of a DVD player in
exchange for your time spent listening to a sales pitch for a time share on a vacation
condo. I do not know, however, of anyone being paid an hourly money wage to sit and
watch advertisements.
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Though the gains from the sale of audience attention are privately enjoyed, the
construction of attention as a salable good requires collaborative and state action. The
growing ranks of advertising professionals created and benefited from new institutions.
Their professional organizations established standards of conduct and mechanisms of
enforcement that successfully convinced advertisers to trust them as sellers of attention
while also maintaining prices high enough to be profitable. Advertisers and advertising
professionals overcame opposing interests, most notably Progressive reformers, to
harness the power of government to their cause: they successfully pushed the state to
recognize and enforce contracts related to the trade in audience attention, thereby
establishing new forms of property, including rights to information about consumers.
Those with the opportunity and ability to attract and hold audience attention found an
expanding economic niche and increasing economic rewards.

Commodified access to attention: Intercepting eyeballs
There were three main avenues for the interception of eyeballs outside of places
10

that were already considered places of commerce. One was to gather audience attention
in the virtual spaces of the media. The second was to gather audience attention in public
spaces. The third was house-to-house delivery of advertising materials seeking to
intercept people’s attention in the private space of their homes. I focus here on
appropriating attention in public spaces.

10

Though important, for purposes of this study, I’m leaving aside in-store displays and
promotions. These practices changed in this period as the relationships between retailers,
wholesalers, and manufacturers changed, but point-of-sale marketing was still within the
range of merchant activities and did not represent a new form of economic activity
centered around the exchange of commodified audience attention.
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Public Spaces: Pricing the Eyes of Passersby
The Outdoor Advertising Supply Chain
To serve advertisers’ pursuit of eyeballs in public spaces, the outdoor advertising
industry professionalized in the late nineteenth century. What had been an arena of
lawless, no-guarantees attempts to grab attention developed into a much more
standardized, predictable mode of doing business. The earlier state of affairs had
advertisers order broadsides from a printer and then hire a billposter to paste them up.
The billposter was equipped with a bucket of paste and a brush, but neither owned nor
leased nor otherwise secured exclusive rights to any display space. Rather, he
(billposters were so far as we know all men) pasted the broadsides on any convenient
surface, at which point his obligation to the advertiser had been fulfilled. The owner of
the fence or wall might tear the poster down, or another billposter might paste over it, but
that was of no concern to the billposter. Alternatively, he could paste a few posters where
the advertiser would be likely to see them, dump the rest in the river, and claim to have
fulfilled his obligation. It would be hard for the advertiser to know the difference.
Beginning in a small way in the 1870s and in a large way by the 1890s, billposters
took on responsibility not only for applying the advertisers’ posters to vertical surfaces,
but for supplying the surfaces and maintaining the display for an agreed-upon period of
time. The billposter’s obligation no longer began with the receipt of the broadsides and
ended when the last sheet was affixed to fence, wall, or earlier poster. Instead, the
billposter’s work began with leasing space (land, walls, or rooftops) from landowners and
erecting a billboard on that space. Billposters referred to their collection of billboards as
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their “plant” and sought to entice advertisers by touting the size and quality of their plant.
The advertiser could then contract with the billposter for the posters to be displayed in
particular locations for a specified period of time. Following the long-familiar paste and
11

brush portion of the process,

the billposter took responsibility for inspecting the

displays regularly, repairing any that were damaged, and neither pasting over nor
allowing others to paste over the poster until the length of display in the contract was
fulfilled. This was known as listed and protected service – listed because the billposter
supplied to the advertiser a list of locations where the posters had been hung which made
verification far easier, and protected because the display was protected for the length of
the contract (Display Advertising Sept. 1897, pp.10-11). The fee an advertiser paid to a
billposter had in an earlier era been a payment for a task – the task of hanging posters.
With listed and protected service, it became a payment for access to audience attention.
Audience attention had always been the aim and the hope, but now there was something
far closer to a guarantee.
The content component of the poster advertising process changed with the rise of
billboards and the dramatic development of lithography technique. The printing industry
was split into two major sectors: lithographers producing color images usually with little
text and traditional printers of usually minimally illustrated text; they used different tools
and different techniques and specialized in different products. Lithographers rather than
job printers became the primary suppliers of posters. As they did for trade cards, in-store
11

As billposting businesses grew, billposters no longer actually posted bills – their
employees did. As proprietors of billposting plants absented themselves from the physical
work of posting bills, a handful of women, most often the widows of the previous
proprietors, entered the field. See, for example, the death notice in the February 1902
issue of The Billposter-Display Advertising: Mr. Lodwick of Portsmouth, Ohio died, but
“Mrs. Lodwick has announced her determination to continue the business” (p.7).
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display materials, and all manner of advertising ephemera, lithographers had a large
catalog of stock images for advertising posters so that advertisers without the budget to
design or commission an original poster could select an already-extant image and
customize it with their business’s name and address. This was the largest component of
the lithographers’ business, although as early as the 1870s national brands began
collaborating with lithographers to design custom-made, brand-specific posters (Laird
1998, p.79).
The development of a market in outdoor advertising space-over-time operated in a
reciprocal relationship with the development of the lithographers’ art. Poster design
shifted quickly to emphasize colorful images over black block text. Posters got larger and
a standardized selection of sizes emerged from the interplay between poster production
and board construction. Billboards were sized to fit the standard posters and posters were
sized to fit the standard billboards (The Poster January 1920, p.53). A standard sheet of
poster paper was 28 inches high by 42 inches wide, a poster’s size was designated by the
number of sheets, and billposting services were priced per sheet for a month’s display
(The Billposter-Display Advertising Aug. 1900, p.13).
Just as newspaper advertising agents like George Rowell integrated the national
market for the attention of newspaper readers, agents specializing in mediating billboard
space transactions – known as solicitors in this sector of the attention market – integrated
the national market in the attention of pedestrians, streetcar riders, and (later) motorists.
Some billposters, such as O.J. Gude of New York developed their businesses to a
regional scale, but national placements still required contracting with many billposters.
Solicitors allowed national advertisers to purchase placements all over the nation in one
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transaction. (Gude was both a solicitor and a billposter.) For those who still wanted to
deal directly with the billposters, the leading professional organization cut the
information-gathering portion of the task to nearly nil by publishing a national list of
member billposters. The published list started as just a list of names and towns, but grew
12

to include additional information such as town populations and prices.

Monopoly
Monopoly was critical to the modernization of the outdoor advertising industry.
For billposters, establishing and sustaining local monopoly, in the sense of being the sole
seller of billboard space in a particular geographic range, was an indispensable
component of converting access to attention into salable property, that is, achieving
monopoly in Chamberlin’s sense of the word. In fact, until it was successfully
suppressed, competition among billposters slowed innovation. The development of the
billposting industry provides a case study in Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of monopoly as
a facilitator of dynamic innovation. Although Schumpeter was thinking of the
development of new manufactured products, monopoly facilitated the creation of this
new fictitious commodity, as well.
Schumpeter vigorously dissented from the economic orthodoxy that gives highly
competitive markets all the credit for fostering efficiency. That analysis, he charged, was
a static analysis. At any given moment using existing technology, price competition will
indeed force producers to adopt the lowest-cost methods of production. But in a dynamic
12

I read the complete run of Display Advertising from 1897-1898 and The BillposterDisplay Advertising from 1899-1903. I also read The Billposter and Distributor 19051906 and sampled extensively from The Poster 1910-1920. This description is drawn
from those sources.
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analysis, intense price competition ceases to look so conducive to productivity gains.
Producers facing intense price competition are compelled to cut all costs not associated
with short-term survival. They do not have the luxury of investing in product or process
innovation. New product development and efficiency gains resulting from new
technology are best developed over time when price competition is muted either by
monopoly power or by an oligopolistic accord amongst producers. Far from being an
enemy of modernization and progress, monopoly can facilitate innovation. In
Schumpeter’s model, market competition disciplines producers not through competitors’
incremental increases in productivity but through the ever-present threat of a product or
process innovation that will shake the market to its foundations (Schumpeter 1942).
Sclerotic monopolies can and do exist, but survive only as long as they retain sufficient
power to suppress the threat of new entries or product substitutes. The market discipline
driving outdoor advertising innovation came from the presence of media advertising
space as a substitute for billposting rather than from competition among billposters.
Competition hampered the transformation of billposting from a service with
uncertain outcomes to the sale of access to attention in two ways. Both of the obstacles
resulting from competition had to do not as much with the rules of competition as they
had to do with the ease of breaking the rules and the pressure to do so. Competing
billposters had no reason to respect one another’s postings. In the early stages of the
business none of them had property rights in the surfaces on which they posted and they
freely and frequently posted over one another’s posters, if the property owners did not
tear the poster down first. The lack of property rights in surfaces left postings unprotected
while the lack of respect for postings did nothing to encourage a willingness to invest in
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specially designated poster surfaces. Just as competition gave billposters little regard for
one another, competitive pressures also strained trust and respect between billposter and
advertiser. Billposting presents a classic principal agent conflict. It was difficult for
advertisers to know whether billposters really had pasted up all the posters and where
they were hung. “It used to be that quite a large proportion of paper given to billposters to
post found its way into sewers and furnaces,” admitted Display Advertising. Since they
had so little confidence in the service, advertisers’ willingness to pay was low, and the
lower the price the less willing and able billposters were to provide meticulous service
13

consistent with the interests of the advertiser (December 1897, pp.20-21).

Monopoly provided an opportunity to overcome both of these problems. A
monopolist billposter could charge higher prices and use the higher revenues for
investment in product and process improvements, as Schumpeter’s model predicts. With
a monopolist’s financial wherewithal and absence of competitors, the sole billposter in
town could invest in billposting surfaces without worrying too much about theft of space
or vandalism by a competitor. Or, if investment in space came first, the quality-ofservice-based competitive advantage of having a large plant helped to secure a larger
share of local business, leading to monopoly. Monopoly clearly eliminated conflicts
among billposters by eliminating all but one billposter in a given geographic area.
Monopoly also made it possible to ease principle-agent conflicts. Property rights in
display spaces enabled billposters to guarantee unobstructed display for a contracted
13

Although I do not adopt exactly the language and methodology developed by Douglass
North, portions of this case study in the coevolution of institutions (e.g. the property
rights regime) and organizations (e.g. billposting firms) could be translated into the
framework developed in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(1990). Note in particular his disavowal of the claim in his earlier work with Robert
Thomas that institutions would tend to evolve toward greater efficiency (p.7).
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period of time. Advertisers and billposters could agree in advance on locations of display
and the billposter could then send confirmation to the advertiser when the posting was
completed, making it easier for advertisers to inspect the work. Without competitors
posting over the posters, billposters had to worry then only about defacement by weather
and teenagers and their more capacious operating budgets allowed them to regularly
inspect and repair the posters they hung until the end of the display contract.
Billposting is intrinsically a very place-bound business, but billposters found
regional and national organization to be a useful tool in sustaining local monopoly. This
was the impetus behind the formation of the Associated Billposters’ Association of the
14

U.S. and Canada. The Association was formed in 1891 in a reorganization of the earlier
International Billposters’ Association of North America, which had been in existence
since 1872. In 1906, the Associated Billposters’ Association merged with some affiliated
organizations, including the publisher of the association’s journal, and with a national
association of distributors forming the Associated Billposters and Distributors of the
United States and Canada. In 1912 the organization was renamed the Poster Advertising
Association. Later, another name change made it the Outdoor Advertising Association of
America, which is still in operation (Fisk undated).
Protecting the shared interests of Association members generally required the
Association to strictly police members’ behavior. The Association held members to
14

As the scale of billposting enterprises increased from a sole operator with a paste
bucket and brush to an entrepreneur employing dozens of men with paste buckets and
brushes, intraindustry conflict became class conflict rather than market competition.
Members of the Billposters’ Association looked very favorably on their own organization
to defend their interests, but far less favorably on their employees’ organization. The
Association’s journal occasionally carried accounts of strikes or other labor unrest, and
the actions of organized workers were always reported in a mocking, dismissive tone.
(See, for example, May 1899, p.12, January 1900, p.26, December 1902, p.6)
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nationally set pricing standards and quality of service standards – at least until a Federal
Court ruled in 1916 that the price-fixing policy was illegal (Printers’ Ink April 6, 1922).
The two were inseparable: quality service could not be provided at cut rates and high
rates could not be justified without quality service. Local monopoly was an ironclad
principle. The Association would admit only one member per town. If two billposters
from the same town sought membership, the Association would assess both their
applications and accept only one – if, indeed, they accepted either. Complete coverage of
the U.S. by Association billposters was an unwavering goal. The journal periodically
printed a list of towns without a billposter and encouraged members to establish plants
there. Expanding the Association’s reach also involved eliminating non-members from
the field. Towns where a billposter who was not an Association member was at work
were also considered open towns. The Association’s appeals for members to establish
billposting plants in those towns meant going into business in opposition to existing nonmember billposters with the clear goal of driving them out of business. The Association
was strict with members and ruthless toward competitors. An Association member
typically put his membership at risk if he engaged in price-cutting. However, the national
office was willing to grant special dispensation for temporary rate cuts to meet
competitors’ prices until the competitors were driven out of business (Associated
Billposters and Distributors 1906, p.19).
Manufacturers of nationally branded goods increased their advertising spending
rapidly during the late nineteenth century, faster than did local retailers (Laird 1998,
p.221). For outdoor advertising to be a part of campaigns conducted at a national scale –
and national campaigns were a rising share of total advertising expenditure – billposters
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needed a mechanism of geographic market integration. For print media, the integration
was accomplished by nationally distributed magazines and by advertising agents
mediating contact between a relatively small number of national advertisers and a very
large number of newspapers with local distribution. The Associated Billposters addressed
the challenges of national integration for poster advertising. Their membership lists made
it easier for advertisers who wished to deal directly with billposters while posting in
many cities. For cases where the advertiser wished to use a single solicitor to manage the
dozens of local contracts needed for a national advertising campaign, designation of
official solicitors and an insistence on standard, fixed prices and commissions helped
protect billposters’ interests when in conflict with the interests of solicitors. The
formation of the Associated Billposters’ Protective Company in 1900 to handle national
poster placement contracts strengthened the billposters’ control and bargaining strength
in negotiations with advertisers and intermediaries (The Billposter-Display Advertising
February 1900, p.14; April 1900, p.9).
In the Associated Billposters’ drive to dominate outdoor advertising, their strategy
of national integration was complemented by aggressive geographic expansion.
Following U.S. territorial conquests, billposters wrote to the association journal from
Indian Territory, the Philippines, and Cuba, celebrating newfound business opportunities.
According to an article in the May 1902 issue of The Billposter-Display Advertising the
opportunity presented by Indian Territory depended on the growing number of white
settlers – “Do you know that there are more white people in the Indian Territory than in
Oklahoma?” – and on the suppression of American Indian cultural difference – “Do you
know that there are good Indians who are not dead? … Do you know that there are blue-
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eyed, blond-haired Indians who teach music and art?” (p.16) The following month, The
Billposter-Display Advertising reprinted an article from Printers’ Ink describing
billposting conditions in Havana and seeking to put to rest fears that Cubans were
racially, linguistically, or otherwise unfit audiences for U.S. commercial
communications. Many of them could not read English or could not read at all, but they
showed great interest in posters, the article insisted, and the posters’ clear graphics and
limited text made it easy for Spanish-speaking Cubans to receive the message across the
language and literacy divide (p.14). The next year, an article describing billposting in
Manila opened, “Whether the constitution should follow the flag or not is a controversial
subject for statesmen to determine, but what is more important for advertisers, perhaps, is
the fact that the billposter, with his brush, nerve, bundle of bills and a bucket of paste, is
bound to follow close in the wake of a conquering column of Uncle Sam’s warriors”
(September 1903, p.5).
Their aggressive expansion reached inward, too, as more and more small towns
and country routes came within the reach of some billposter’s plant, typically by a
billposter in a larger nearby town expanding his plant rather than by a newly established
plant. Associated Billposter Association members were exhorted to expand into any asyet unclaimed towns. “Every city of 1,000 population should have a billposting plant,” a
1900 article opined. The volume of work would not make it a full-time job, but the profit
rate would make it “worth the attention of a share of the time of a good man.” Part of
what made small towns potentially profitable was the low cost of space: “Locations can
be obtained for a song.” (A song, to be precise, was estimated to be equal to $100
maximum (September 1900, p.13).) Just as George Rowell had been able to interest
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Boston merchants in newspaper placements in the hinterlands in the 1860s (Rowell
1906), F.E. Fitch of Albany found in the 1900s that centrally located retailers were
interested in his country route billposting service (The Billposter-Display Advertising
May 1902, p.8), a discovery also made by other billposters in other places (ibid. January
1903, p.75). National manufacturers could also be persuaded to buy space on country
route billboards, although developing country route services required billposters to
advertise themselves to both regional and national advertisers so that potential clients
would know that the service they wanted could now in fact be had (February 1902, p.6;
May 1902, p.8). Billposters characterized country consumers to advertisers as curious and
eager, their capacity to pay attention to advertising appeals not yet stretched so thin as
that of city residents (March 1900, p.23). Country route expansions challenged the
association’s local monopoly policy: as town billposters expanded, the territory they
claimed sometimes overlapped and in 1900 the national association called upon the statelevel associations to establish firm geographic boundaries (May 1900, p.17). Four months
later only Indiana’s state association had taken up this disciplinary/regulatory task,
triggering a chiding commentary in the journal (September 1900, p.13). But at the same
time that two billposters were vying for some towns, other towns were still left
uncovered, and the Association’s exhortations to expand continued.
Through national integration and the pooling of resources the Association could
promote billboards as an advertising medium. From the beginning, their publications
were intended to function as promotional literature for potential clients. In 1909 the
Association established a national promotions bureau, devoting even more resources and
focused attention to attracting national business and providing technical assistance to
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billposters seeking to increase their volume of local business. They established a separate
journal dedicated specifically to addressing advertisers, separating that function from the
association governance function of the organization’s official journal (which by that time
had been renamed The Poster) (“A Chat with the Billposter” October 1909).
The Association was so confident in the justification for monopoly that they made
no effort to dissemble about their purposes. Until 1909, the same journal that functioned
as the main avenue of national-level internal communications doubled as a piece of
promotional literature designed to persuade advertisers to use billboards. “Nothing will
encourage your local merchants to adopt billposting more than a good knowledge of the
medium. Let him read THE BILLPOSTER; it will give him the necessary information,”
encouraged the association in the September 1900 issue of the journal (p.13). There were
as many articles concerned with touting the benefits of outdoor advertising as there were
articles dealing with organization politics, technical issues of running a billposting
business, and so on. This meant that the sales pitch to potential clients came bound
between the same covers as diatribes against rate-cutters. In effect, Association members
promised potential customers that they would charge them more. The promise also, of
course, included the clause that the higher price was worth it because the quality of the
product was higher.
Their shamelessness was notable as the Association’s regulation of prices was
clearly an instance of price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Yet for
years they got away with it. Though membership in the Association grew, making it
harder and harder to post bills without Association membership, an opposition did exist.
Billposters opposed to the Association were sufficiently numerous and organized to
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publish their own journal, Billboard, in opposition to the Association’s journal and the
Association considered this enough of a threat that members found to subscribe to the
opposition journal would be disciplined and solicitors found advertising in Billboard
would be barred from doing business with association members (November 1899, pp.910). The Association was finally called to task in 1916 when Judge Landis of the United
States district court in Chicago decreed that their price agreements and limitations on the
number of entrants into the industry were illegal and the Association was enjoined from
persisting in such practices. The (now renamed) Poster Advertising Association argued
that the organization was necessary for the welfare of the industry, and even as he ruled
against them, Landis admitted that this had been the case. The Association appealed the
decision, but in 1922 when the Supreme Court had not yet taken up the case, they decided
to withdraw the appeal to avoid potential bad publicity and Judge Landis’s decree was
allowed to stand (Printers’ Ink April 6, 1922). Price regulation had been central to the
Association’s mission, so Landis’s decree prompted some rethinking of the mission and
justification of the Association. By this time their activities were sufficiently diverse that
the organization survived the blow and continued to exist as a professional development,
promotional, lobbying and legal aid organization (Poster Advertising Association 1919;
see The Poster August 1910, p.29 for evidence of intensified lobbying and legal aid work
before the decision).
Attaining a monopoly on the provision of billposting services fostered the
attainment of a monopoly on audience attention. Attention is rival and advertisers
perceived it to be increasingly scarce – as early as the 1890s advertisers and advertising
professionals were expressing concern about the difficulty of getting their messages
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through the overwhelming clutter of commercial communications. By attaining a
capitalist monopoly of the billposting business, billposters made attention sufficiently
excludable that they were able to collect a monopoly rent from advertisers for access to
the eyes of passersby.
The usefulness of outdoor advertising to the advertiser was entirely tied to the
number of gazes. In the absence of price competition driving prices down to the cost of
providing the service, Association billposting rates were based primarily on that number
of intercepted gazes, not cost. (Similarly, the sale of streetcar riders’ attention was
dominated by a few large firms who charged rates calculated on the basis of the length of
the contract and the number of passengers carried (Sherman 1900, p.127).) In 1906, for
example, Association rates started at 7¢ per sheet for four weeks’ display in the smallest
cities and towns and increased with population (see table 1.1). In the more populous
cities, more people would pass by a given display, and billposters could charge more for
15

those additional eyes.

The minimum rate for a single week’s initial display or for

“chance may offer” postings, meaning the posters would be hung if billboard space were
available with no guaranteed start date or length of display and no inspection or repairs,
was 4¢ per sheet. Member billposters were allowed to charge more than the Association
minimum for a town of their size, but not less. Members quoting or working for rates
lower than the Association minimum could be fined, suspended, or expelled from the
organization (Associated Billposters and Distributors 1906, pp.15-17).

15

Outdoor advertisers talked about the circulation value of specific locations within a
city, but reliable independent audits at that fine-grained level of detail were not
consistently performed until the Traffic Audit Bureau was established in 1933.
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Some small town billposters complained that the minimum rate was too low to
meet their costs of operation (The Billposter-Display Advertising October 1903, p.21);
others argued that it was sufficient. W.C. Tirrill of Lima, Ohio wrote into the journal to
chide other country members for their whining and to explain how he operated a small
town business profitably on Association minimum rates (The Billposter-Display
Advertising April 1899, p.10); his detailed cost accounting and instructions for erecting
billboards with salvaged lumber are oddly reminiscent of Thoreau’s account of building
his cabin at Walden Pond. The chance may offer minimum is a reasonable approximation
of the cost of the initial poster hanging. Small town minimum rates, which appeared
ample to some and insufficient to others, would seem on average to make a fair
approximation of the billposters’ cost per sheet for four weeks’ display, including the
regular inspections and possible repairs required after the initial hanging. Price
increments in excess of minimum rates are monopoly rents charged for access to a larger
(or for some reason more desirable) audience. The billposters’ costs were highest at the
beginning of the period of display when posters had to be pasted to the boards. In smaller
cities, a single week’s display cost at least half as much as a full four week display. In
large cities, however, the monopoly rent was such a large component of the total price
that even the second and third weeks of display, when the billposter incurred few
additional costs, cost the advertiser as much as the first week.
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Table 1.1 Associated Billposters and Distributors of the United States and Canada
minimum billposting rates, 1906.
Population price per rates for less
the
second third
fourth
sheet for than four weeks: first
week
week
week
four
if the four-week week
weeks
rate is
costs
< 50,000

7¢

50,000 100,000

9¢

7¢
8¢
9¢

4
4
4

2
2
3

1
1
1

0
1
1

10¢
4
3
2
1
100,000 - 12¢
12¢
4
4
3
1
500,000
500,000 - 14¢
14¢
4
4
4
2
2,000,000
>
16¢
16¢
5
4
4
3
2,000,000
source: Associated Billposters and Distributors of the United States and Canada, 1906,
Constitution and By-Laws.
During the 1910s the billposters’ product descriptions, that is, their
characterizations of the local population, became more focused on quality claims in
addition to basic population numbers. The advertisers’ ultimate goal, of course, was to
sell more goods, so they cared not only about the number of eyes but the disposable
incomes of the bearers of those eyes and billposters learned to address those concerns
directly. Billposters’ own advertisements began to look a lot like local boosterism and
featured economic data such as per capita income, occupational distribution, and major
employers. For a less biased account that than offered by billposters, advertisers could
consult Mahin’s Advertising Data Book, published in the 1900s and 1910s, which
reported economic data on populations in cities and towns nationwide using a standard
format for all towns. Although not promoting a particular locality, Mahin, a Chicagobased advertising agent who was also an official solicitor for the Associated Billposters,
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was in agreement with the self-promoting billposters’ basic premise. The advertisers are
interested in spending power, not just eyes.

Efficiency Gains: Lowering the Cost Per Gaze
Audience Compulsion
Urbanization was a boon to outdoor advertising. A billboard in a city street was
seen by many more people than the painted side of a barn on a rural road. City dwellers
were more dependent on purchased goods sooner than were rural folk, so they were an
audience that many manufacturers very much wanted to reach. And urban people traveled
daily between home and workplace, home and store, home and location of leisure, so
there were many more opportunities to intercept their gaze than there were opportunities
to catch the eyes of a farm family whose workplace was their home and surrounding
fields. Too, the overall trend throughout this period was for people to travel farther and
farther in their daily rounds. The development of transportation facilitated the geographic
expansion of the city beyond the earlier dimensions of the walking city (Chudacoff and
Smith 1994, pp.77-107).
Urbanization accelerated in the late nineteenth century and by 1920 the U.S. had
reach a tipping point: half the population now lived in cities. Billposters did not create the
newly emerging spatial patterns of residence, work, and shopping, but they harnessed
these new patterns to their own profitable ends. Billposters’ pitch to advertisers rested
heavily on the degree of compulsion they could exercise over audiences. An
advertisement on a printed page could be easily flipped past, but a large poster on a hightraffic street is guaranteed to enter the field of vision of all passersby. Daily commuters

50

would be compelled to see that poster every day as long as it was displayed (The
Billposter-Display Advertising March 1900, p.11).
While addressing the problem of local transportation, streetcars effectively
channeled the population on the move through concentrated routes (Chudacoff and Smith
1994, pp.82-90). Billposters with placements along streetcar routes to offer trumpeted the
predictably high concentration of eyes passing by. Shoppers traveling by trolley, they
crowed, could be compelled to see the advertisers’ poster while on their way to the stores,
already in a shopping frame of mind! Viewers of a newspaper ad sitting in their living
rooms at home, by contrast, might easily forget the ad by the time they head out to shop
hours or days later. (Specialists in advertising placements on the streetcars themselves
could make the additional claim that streetcar riders would be sitting with the
advertisement in their field of vision with little competition for their attention with
“ample time” to study it (Fowler 1900, pp.190-192).)
Automobiles opened up new possibilities for compelled viewing. Although not
restricted to preset streetcar routes, they expanded the geographic range of travel, making
more billboard placements possible. All passengers were compelled by the design of the
automobile to sit facing forward and the driver was required by the nature of his (or, less
often, her) task to look forward. A 1916 article in The Poster (as the journal had been
renamed when the association became the Poster Advertising Association) hailed the
automobile as an ally of poster advertising because, they crowed, recreational motoring
was displacing reading at home as a leisure activity. An analysis done in 1918 figured
that a billboard placed at a curve in the road would occupy car drivers’ and riders’ field
of vision for a full four seconds apiece, a guarantee no newspaper or magazine could
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make, at a cost of one-fifteenth of one cent per day per automobile (The Poster April
1918, p.31).
Complementing the compelled viewing time achieved by effective placements
was extended viewing time achieved by illumination. The outdoor advertising industry
was an early and enthusiastic adopter of electricity. Electric illumination allowed
billposters and sign painters to tap into previously inaccessible hours of audience
attention. By 1914 the R.C. Maxwell Company, a large sign-painting enterprise in New
Jersey with a large share of the responsibility for transforming the Atlantic City
boardwalk into a site of commercial cacophony, considered electric illumination to be so
central to their business that they purchased an interest in the C & B Electric Sign
Company. In 1920 R.C. Maxwell purchased the entire capital stock and in 1924 dissolved
C & B as a separate business (R.C. Maxwell Collection, Box 1, Hartman Center). There
is an element of compelled viewing to the illumination, as well, as illumination made
advertisements among the most easily visible features of the nighttime streetscape.

Material Inputs
Management of audiences was a form of efficiency gain. Increased population
density and the increase in frequency and length of travel over predictable routes allowed
a well-placed poster to enter the field of vision of many more people much more often
16

than had been possible in the more agrarian recent past. (The field of psychology and
the language and attitudes of scientific management sought efficiency in the design of
16

What was efficient for the attention-selling billposter was a new cost for the advertisers
whose increasingly far-flung potential customers had to be reached through advertising
rather than through costless proximity – though the larger volume of business made it
worth the advertisers’ while.
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advertising content, too.) But refinement of audience wrangling technique was not the
only means of increasing efficiency.
Although the commodity in question, attention, is immaterial, the means of
appropriating it still relied on material inputs, some acquired through private investment,
others through access to public infrastructure. Billposters making private investments in
their firms experimented with billboard construction and paste production, and made
significant plant and equipment improvements. Starch paste displaced flour paste (The
Billposter-Display Advertising February 1899, p.11). Billposters hailed the introduction
of iron billboards, finding that posters hung on iron needed far less maintenance than
those hung on wood, reducing the need for replacement paper and labor time devoted to
repair. Mr. Simmons of Duluth, Minnesota wrote that the higher initial construction cost
was easily recovered through lower maintenance costs (The Billposter-Display
Advertising June 1903, p.15). At an earlier link in the poster advertising supply chain,
technological improvements in paper production and lithography also offered increased
quality and decreased cost. Advertisers rather than billposters paid for the posters
directly, but both stood to gain.
The substitution of cars for wagons improved efficiency for billposters with
geographically dispersed plants, but this private investment was only beneficial when
complemented by public investment in infrastructure. At the turn of the twentieth
century, rural roads were impassable for portions of the year, meaning that country route
billposting was a seasonal business. Road improvements could therefore extend the
country route billboard’s useful season (The Billposter-Display Advertising February
1902, p.6, January 1903, p.37). Meanwhile, illumination extended the poster’s working
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day by several hours, especially in the winter. Lighting a billboard in a northern city from
4:30 until 10:30 pm adds six extra hours of visibility to the nine daylight hours an unlit
billboard could offer. But, like the investment in a car, investment in illuminating a
particular billboard was dependent on infrastructure beyond the individual billposter’s
direct control – in this case an electrical power grid.
Cost savings could also be squeezed from the support activities surrounding and
sustaining the core business of pasting posters on surfaces in people’s line of sight.
Standardized, streamlined business practices included improved bookkeeping practices
and pre-printed, clearly formatted blanks for documenting listed and protected service,
for invoicing customers, and for paying property owners. The specialized business
communications of a good solicitor lowered transactions costs enough to offset the
solicitor’s commission.
Under the Associated Billposters’ regime of administered prices, cost savings for
the billposter were not motivated by the need to keep up with price competition. Neither
did efficiency gains follow the arms-race dynamic of a price war. Instead, efficiency
improvements widened billposters’ profit margins and enabled them to increase the scale
of their business. Locations that had been marginal could now be brought under
cultivation; cities already within the Associated Billposters’ territory became ever-moredensely papered and ever more country routes came into the Associated Billposters’
reach.
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Sequential Rents in Outdoor Advertising
Poster lithographers, billposters, and landowners all carved their incomes out of
manufacturers’ and retailers’ outdoor advertising appropriations. Each needed the others
to secure a share of that advertising appropriation, but all competed over the size of the
slice each would receive. Their relationships were simultaneously complementary and
conflictual.
In the early period, billposters acted outside the dictates and directives of property
law. They paid no rent for posting surfaces; without the rights secured by rent payments,
they could make no credible claims to advertisers regarding the number of gazes
intercepted, and therefore they collected no rent on access to eyeballs. Paying rent to
urban property owners and erecting billboards allowed billposters to establish a
monopoly on a billboard-sized slice of the field of vision of passersby. Charging a
monopoly rent to advertisers for the fictitious (and immaterial) commodity of audience
attention allowed billposters to meet the rents charged by landowners for the fictitious
(and material) commodity of land. Billposters lived in the margin between two fictitious
commodity prices: the going rate for eyes and the going rate for land. The market value
of urban land depended in part on its proximity to passersby, but it took the work of the
billposters to fully realize that value. The billposters’ ability to collect rents on access to
attention required the payment of rents to landowners. Neither could realize their rents
without the other; they were complementary. But the share retained by each necessarily
came at the expense of the other; they were contradictory.
Similarly, neither poster lithographers nor billposters could get anything without
the other getting something, but they had to share advertisers’ expenditures between
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them. More for one meant less for the other. When iron billboards and starch paste
lowered the need for replacement paper to maintain a display over the length of the
contract, the saved expense enjoyed by billposters and advertisers was lost revenue for
lithographers.
Everyone realizing revenues from any phase of advertising was taking a share of
the selling cost away from jobbers and retailers. They might do so indirectly, as when
manufacturers substituted consumer advertising spending for other distribution costs. Or
they might do so directly, as when retailers funded their own advertising.

Competition Across Sectors of the Audience Attention Market
The maturing of an audience attention market put a collection of dissimilar
activities into competition with one another. Streetcars and billboards competed with
newspapers and magazines. On the face of it, these appear to be completely distinct
businesses, but they all sold access to audiences’ eyes and advertisers made decisions
about the allocation of their advertising among all those options. Kodak at first declined
to use streetcars and billboards at all because they believed the “better class” of
consumers they targeted could be better reached through magazines (Strasser 1989,
p.102). (Later on, Kodak did include outdoor advertising in their sales strategy.) By
contrast, the makers of Sapolio household cleaners thought their target audience, which
included domestic workers, could regularly be found on the streets and on the streetcars
and their campaign focused predominantly on these public space placements from the
get-go (Laird 1998, p.180).
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In this formative stage, competition among sellers of gazes for advertisers’
business took place at two levels simultaneously. Billposters along with the solicitors
specializing in outdoor advertising and publishers along with the agents specializing in
periodical placements competed within the structures of the market as they existed at any
given moment, and they also battled over the construction of market infrastructure and
the rules of play.
Within the market structure at a given moment, purveyors of gazes competed on
price and quality of product. Billposters were fond of price-per-gaze comparisons as they
had the edge by that measure. A modest number of well-placed posters could intercept
the eyes of just about every resident of a given city at rates considerably lower than the
rates necessary to place a newspaper advertisement in periodicals with a similar reach.
For example, in 1900 The Billposter-Display Advertising ran an article explaining that an
advertising expenditure of $3,000 would buy the advertiser a full-page color ad inserted
into the three largest New York City daily newspapers for one day; the same $3,000
would purchase a billboard display reaching at least the same proportion of the New York
City population, and probably greater, for thirty days (September 1900, p.5). Billposters
also frequently questioned the reliability of newspaper circulation as a measure of how
many readers really saw the advertisements. Not only were publishers known to pad their
reported circulation numbers before the Audit Bureau of Circulation was established, but
even actual readers who were not figments of publishers’ faulty accounting could easily
skip over the page on which an advertisement was printed without ever seeing it. It is
much harder for a pedestrian or streetcar passenger to avert her eyes from a large
billboard at a busy intersection. Periodical publishers and advertising agents so
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specialized denigrated outdoor advertising and touted their own virtues as an advertising
medium in turn. They claimed (though this was hard to demonstrate rigorously) that
newspaper advertisements were more effective, making the selling cost lower. They
promoted periodicals’ ability to sort audiences by social class and interest. They
contrasted the long detailed copy newspaper advertisements could accommodate with the
extremely simple sales pitches required by the poster medium.
At the same time, the rules of the advertising game were continuously contested.
Outdoor advertising’s greatest arena of action was newly burgeoning cities. City residents
and their municipal governments were engaged in a continual rear-guard struggle to solve
the problems of urban life. What activities could be accommodated and where? As sites
of production, sites of household provisioning, and sites of residence became increasingly
separated, how would people move through urban agglomerations to get from one site to
another on a regular basis? One of the fiercely fought battles over the uses of urban space
was over outdoor advertising. Professionalizing billposters and sign painters wanted to
establish property rights that would recognize their right to construct, maintain, and place
advertising on billboards and painted signs and their right to restrict anyone else from
posting over or defacing their legitimate ads. They needed government action to
accomplish this. Progressive reformers wanted a different kind of government action, not
so compatible with the interests of the billposters. They wanted sharp restrictions on size,
placement, and content of billboards, or even the outright elimination of outdoor
advertising altogether. Newspapers fearing a loss of market share were eager allies.
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Billposters saw the nefarious influence of periodical publishers behind all
restrictive efforts. According to their power analysis, periodical publishers felt threatened
by billposters’ potential to attract advertising expenditure away from the page and onto
the billboard. Municipal leaders feared the ability of the newspapers to shape public
opinion and so felt compelled to work in the newspapers’ interests by restricting
billboards. (This argument implicitly agrees that newspapers are persuasive in the realm
of political opinion, even as it claims that newspapers are no more and probably less
persuasive as a sales tool.) They accused some purported citizens’ groups of being fronts
for the publishers’ interests – an accusation of what we would now call astroturfing. They
were probably at least partially right, though not entirely.
The competition between billposters and periodicals did eventually soften from
both sides. A number of developments contributed to the détente. Newspapers found they
could successfully advertise themselves in the outdoor medium. Although the
competition over advertising dollars remained, the newspapers’ need to advertise
themselves forced them to retreat from attempts to totally discredit outdoor advertising –
the high visibility of their own posters damaged the persuasiveness of their claim that
other advertisers should use newspapers exclusively (The Billposter-Display Advertising
January 1903, p.31). A growing number of advertising agents made placements in both
periodicals and on billboards for their clients. The N.W. Ayer and Son agency was
already one of the most famous and prosperous media advertising agencies in the U.S.
when they expanded their business into billposting contracts and became an official
solicitor for the Associated Billposters in 1899. Within a few years they were actively
pushing a both-and message to clients rather pushing an either-or choice regarding
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billposting and periodical media (The Billposter-Display Advertising March 1902, p.3).
(Charles Austin Bates, another famous media advertising agent of the day, was also an
early official solicitor for the Associated Billposters. His designation did not last long,
though. Whereas Ayer was widely respected, Bates was a polarizing figure. Over the
course of his career he experimented with turning audience attention into personal
income every which way and when he tried to monetize his attention-gathering
experience by selling a directory of outdoor advertisers in direct competition with the
Associated Billposters’ own official “big list”, he was dropped from the list of official
solicitors (The Billposter-Display Advertising April 1902, p.26; June 1902, p.17).) The
publishers and billposters needed the agents’ intermediation to get business and the
agents’ ability to intermediate was damaged by the vocal and vicious attacks, so
competing suppliers of gazes eventually found it to be in their best interests to tone it
down. Also, the cumulative precedent-setting effect of all the prior hard-fought
legislative actions, judicial decisions, and business practices was to make rules of the
game clearer and more settled. When the rules were up for debate, there was always a
chance that a small temporary advantage could be leveraged into a large permanent tilt in
the playing field. Once it was clear that neither combatant would permanently vanquish
the other, the stakes were not so high and hyperbole gave way to more measured pitches.
Indeed, there were even gestures toward an alliance. The Milwaukee Sentinel put
up posters with the slogan, “Advertising of all sorts helps all sorts of advertising,” and as
a result the Associated Billposters held up the Sentinel as an example of a good
newspaper. It may not be necessary to choose sides between billposting and newspaper
advertising, billposters and publishers concluded; both may be on the same side. Rather
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than battling over shares of a fixed pie, newspapers and billposters could act on a shared
interest in increasing the volume of all sorts of advertising (The Billposter-Display
Advertising October 1903, p.16; January 1903, p.39).

Entanglement of Cross-Sector Competition with Other Battles Over the Public
Sphere
The competition across sectors of the audience attention market took place, as
Polanyi taught us to expect, in a larger context that spilled over into non-market realms
and included non-pecuniary concerns. Billposters and publishers battling over shares of
the audience attention market at least shared an interest in expanding the market, but a
committed corps of reform-minded citizens opposed the expansion of the audience
attention market. The reach of advertising was one piece, the centerpiece for some
particularly passionate and focused advocates, of a larger debate over the appropriate
extent of the market sphere, over what should be governed by the laws of private property
and what should instead hold the status of a public or common good.

Urbanization and the Governance of Public Space
As a newly urbanized population sought to solve the problem of city living,
government at the state and municipal levels was drawn into regulation of urban spaces,
including the use of urban spaces for outdoor advertising. Billboards were private
property, but their utility was bound to their being publicly visible. This put them in the
clash zone of several conflicting interests. By definition, the actions of the private
property owners who leased space to billposters and the billposters who erected
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billboards and pasted posters affected neighboring property owners and passersby on
public streets – affecting neighbors and passersby was the entire purpose of the exercise.
The erection of billboards could lower the aesthetic and monetary value of neighboring
property or, possibly, increase its value, as the billposters were fond of arguing with
illustrations of derelict empty lots hidden from view by billboards (cf. Poster Advertising
Association 1922). Conversely, property owners’ ability to realize rents from the lease of
their space to billposters was affected by other people’s uses of nearby property. If a
streetcar route passed by or a nearby attraction drew crowds, the advertising value of the
space increased and the well-placed property owner could cash in. If, on the other hand,
the neighbors built a structure that obscured pedestrians’ and passengers’ view, the owner
of the now-hidden property no longer had any useful advertising space to sell. The one
point of agreement between billposting enthusiasts and billposting opponents was that
some regulation was needed.
The Associated Billposters lobbied effectively to ensure that new regulations
would secure the property rights that gave them a form of the audience attention
commodity to sell but would not bind so tightly as to restrict the reach of their market.
The billposters were appreciative of regulation that protected the sanctity of their
billboards or otherwise limited the ability of cut-rate competitors to operate. They did not
want license fees to be too high, but they did appreciate license fees that were high
enough to serve as an obstacle to entry by competitors who might try to undercut their
prices – and they also appreciated the recognition conferred by licensing that theirs was a
legitimate business. They did not want onerous restrictions on the placement or size of
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their billboards, but they did appreciate restrictions on affixing posters to walls and
fences.
Although the billposters were quick to see the nefarious hand of the newspaper
interests behind all efforts to limit the reach of the billposting industry, there were
reasons other than periodical publisher’s financial self-interest to object to the
proliferation of poster advertising. Members of groups such as the American Civic
Association opposed wonton billposting (and the more extreme members of the group
opposed all billposting) because they wished to restrain the reach of the market, not just
protect the newspapers’ share of the market. As the look of the cities changed rapidly and
disoriented long-term residents and social elites, they came to attach great importance to
aesthetic considerations (Municipal Affairs 1899, p.715). While waves of intra- and
international migrants poured into the cities and weakened the traditional elites’ hold on
social authority and political power, newly vulnerable elites desperately sought to
maintain the social geography of the city and the visible imprint of their power and
influence. The impetus behind the anti-billboard movement was the same as the impetus
behind the historic preservation movement, which also originated in the late nineteenth
century. Outdoor advertising was attractive to advertisers in part because of its
effectiveness at addressing the masses, some of whom were precisely the people
traditional elites wanted to make invisible.
Billboard opponents considered billboards a sort of pollution. A broad swath of
the upper middle class gained an appreciation of natural landscapes – they were selfconscious about it being a new taste – and took up the habit of going on tourist
excursions to wildish places. With only a very short lag, billposters followed them there
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bearing messages from eager advertisers. Hoping to bring a touch of the rural into the
cities, believers in the power of a wholesome environment to achieve social uplift were
able to direct a share of public spending to the construction of parks. The parks attracted
visitors… with billposters following hot on their heels. The public land of the park itself
could be and usually was declared off-limits to advertising, but the private property along
the approaches and perimeter could be papered over. Making money on the sale of
advertising space at a natural wonder or a city park was, in the reformers’ view, an
antisocial act. It was a combination of nature and public expenditure that created the
attractions that drew visitors, not any action on the part of the billposter or property
owner. Accordingly, any income the billposter or property owner derived from proximity
to natural beauty was an “unearned increment.” Reformers resented the something-fornothing rents the billposters raked in. Were they not “exacting a franchise from the
public”? Was not offending the eyes as much of a public nuisance as offending the ears
17

and thus equally subject to legal restriction? And reformers resented billposters even
more since the very act that secured the unearned increment despoiled the attraction that
made the unearned increment possible in the first place, an attraction that the reformers
appreciated for its non-market values (Kimball 1901, pp.101-105; Scribner’s October
1903, pp.507-508; Wight 1903, p.493; Woodruff 1907, pp.345-347). The billposter
following in the wake of Uncle Sam’s soldiers was to those high-minded citizens a
nightmarish vision (Kimball 1901, p.102).
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The examples of obviously intolerable and illegal noise nuisances reformers used as
analogies to rhetorically establish the nuisance character of billboards were, in fact, the
normal practice of street crying which had been a common selling practice until around
the time of the civil war (Laird 1998).
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Billposters could not help but be aware that they were not universally loved and
so, complementing their court appearances and lobbying efforts, they aggressively
courted public opinion. The Associated Billposters countered objections based on the
morally questionable content of billboards by self-policing – refusing to carry advertising
for the treatment of venereal disease, for example, or declining to hang posters containing
images in violation of current norms of sexual propriety (The Billposter-Display
Advertising June 1903, pp.12-13). During World War I they demonstrated their good
citizenship by donating space for the display of military draft announcements and food
conservation messages. (At least some prominent outdoor advertising firms expected
payback for their good citizenship and called in favors from government officials to
quickly regain nighttime lighting privileges for their illuminated billboards. Wartime
blackout orders had cut many hours of display time. In the aftermath of the war, they also
debated the possible public relations impact of turning the space that had been used for
wartime public service announcements over to their own self-interested anti-Prohibition
appeals (R.C. Maxwell Collection, Box 2, Hartman Center).) They countered aesthetic
objections by arguing that their business in fact beautified the city. They were fond of
before-and-after photos of derelict empty lots obscured by neatly maintained billboards
displaying artistic posters. They argued their case in the language of their upper class
reformist opponents; in 1922 the Poster Advertising Association published a booklet
entitled “Posters and the City Beautiful” (Poster Advertising Association 1922).
Billposters were keenly aware of the social class dimensions of the battle. The
Association’s journal occasionally ran satirical pieces about the reformers seeking to
constrain their business and the reformers were caricatured in class terms. Although
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reform activists were often women, the caricatures were of upper class men – men who
were implicitly feminized by the descriptions of their hyper-refinement and delicacy.
Resentment of Progressive reformers’ wealth, understandable coming from those with a
chance at becoming wealthy if only the reformers would stay out of their way, was
apparent in a satire mockingly sympathizing with a reformer made uncomfortable by the
hunger pangs inspired by the view of a poster advertising food seen through his
window… and then relieved of his discomfort by sitting down to his ample breakfast
18

(The Billposter-Display Advertising May 1900, p.16; November 1903, p.26). This satire
also makes visible a conflict in the valuation of urban real estate. For those leasing space
to billposters, the development of the market in the eyes of passersby increased the
income-generating value of their land. For many of those in view of the new billboards,
the altered surroundings lowered the aesthetic value of their homes and may well have
lowered the resale value. As billposters secured implicit property rights in the eyes of
passersby, exemption from advertising appeals became a kind of luxury good. Purchasing
exemptions from advertising appeals became a class-differentiating pattern of
consumption, particularly consumption of housing and of vacation travel.
As outdoor advertising gained in popularity among prosperous local businesses
and powerful national brand-name manufacturers, billposters acquired influential allies in
their struggle to keep outdoor advertising legally prolific. F.E. Fitch, a sharp strategic
18

As the billposting business grew, the most successful billposters grew to be quite
wealthy. The class animus felt by billposters toward reformers was replicated within the
ranks of billposters as the proprietors of more marginal plants watched the most
prosperous billposters engage in the conspicuous consumption rituals of social ladderclimbers. These prosperous billposters also tended to be the most influential within the
Association, and other members began to express doubts as to whether the Association
could really be trusted to represent their interests.
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thinker with a billposting plant in Albany, New York, reacted effectively to a new
ordinance introduced in the Albany Common Council in February of 1903 that would
have all but eliminated billboards from the city. The bill had the backing of a politically
powerful newspaper owner, but Fitch persuaded four of Albany’s leading businessmen –
who were also clients of his billposting services – to send a letter to all the local
businesses alerting them to the proposed new law and providing them with a form letter
to send to the Aldermen expressing their opposition. Three hundred businessmen signed
and mailed these letters, enough that the council decided to drop the measure (The
Billposter Display Advertising April 1903, pp.15-16). Inspired by Fitch’s success, Ed.
Fournier of North Yakima, Washington averted a proposed fifteen-fold increase in the
billposting license fee (along with a more-than-doubled theater license fee that had his
most important client threatening to close) with a petition delivered to the mayor (The
Billposter Display Advertising June 1903, p.17). When newspaper interests, fiscally
strapped city officials, or Progressive reformers tried to establish limits or increase taxes
and fees on outdoor advertising, the billposters’ political organizing was usually at least
as successful as the reformers’ – as the reformers themselves ruefully acknowledged
(Woodruff 1907, p.347). Frequently the billposters blocked the Progressives’ model bills
from even making the legislative agenda (Schultze 1984; Bailey 1987).
Municipalities under pressure from multiple angles experimented with the use of
a selection of regulatory tools, varying with the relative degrees of influence wielded by
billposting fans and foes in their town. Many sought some direct authority over
billposters’ persons by requiring billposters to be licensed – despite the new expense,
association billposters quickly came to appreciate licensing as it limited competition and
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the nuisance of small-scale snipers. Many municipalities, often the same ones, sought
direct authority over the billposting business’s effect on city space by writing rules
setting placement and construction specifications for billboards. The need for such rules
was often justified as a measure to protect health and safety. Every once in a while, a
billboard would indeed fall over, occasionally injuring or killing an unfortunate
pedestrian. Some cities required that billposters obtain a permit for each individual
billboard in their plant. Some imposed setback and size standards on billboard
construction, sometimes even applying such rules retroactively to existing structures.
Billposters protested that the safety justification for placement and construction standards
was a ruse, that the rules were more onerous than those for non-advertising construction
such as buildings and fences, and that the real purpose was to interfere with their ability
to carry on a legitimate (and often licensed) business. They cried foul when rules were
applied retroactively to already-existing structures, imposing a huge expense if
preexisting plant were to be brought up to new code. They howled especially loudly
when the size limitations imposed by municipal regulation were incompatible with
standard poster sizes making the largest billboards allowed by local law all but useless as
business assets. Many municipalities also experimented with indirect power over
billposters’ business activities by wielding the tool of taxation. Imposing taxes
specifically on billposters’ business activities and assets, usually the billboards
themselves, increased the cost of doing business and so could be expected to decrease the
scale of the business. In some cases the primary intent was probably to curb the volume
of outdoor advertising and any benefit to local government budgets was a very attractive
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side effect. In other cases, fiscal exigencies may have been the primary driver of billboard
taxation.
Billposters constantly tested the reach and rigor of the new regulations’
enforcement and frequently wound up in court. The intent of their testing was often to
probe a layer deeper and test the basic legitimacy of the regulations. Flouting regulations
and then arguing the case in court was a way to challenge the laws. New restrictions were
also challenged in court directly by billposters seeking injunctions against enforcement
before acting in defiance of the law. Though billposters may have at times been less than
entirely satisfied by the courts’ rulings, the cumulative effect of the hundreds of decisions
handed down over more than two decades, at times appealed through several levels of the
judiciary up to and including the Supreme Court, was that the rights of private property
owners to lease space to billposters, the exclusive property rights of billposters in the
billboard surfaces they built and maintained, and the rights of advertisers to place almost
any content they pleased on those surfaces received explicit government sanction.
When outdoor advertising was taken up by legislative bodies or by the courts, the
outcomes nearly always recognized and helped standardize the business of selling access
to the eyes of passersby. Widespread licensing of billposters clearly legitimated their
activities in the eyes of the state. With a combination of arguments for free speech and
the impossibility of legislating aesthetic values, billposters and their clients successfully
evaded any significant limitations on the content of billboard ads (Schultze 1984; Bailey
1987). Despite a reasonably extensive and organized resistance, the state collaborated
with industry to achieve this expansion of the market realm. Public space was now a site
for the appropriation of attention as a form of private, salable property.
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The anti-billboard reformers were caught in a contradictory position. They
objected to the extensions of the market realm that intruded on their attention, offended
their aesthetics, and excited their resentment. But there was a limit to how much change
they could really bring themselves to advocate for. As Richard Hofstadter put it, the
middle class citizen “was too substantial a fellow to want to make any basic changes in a
society in which he was so typically a prosperous and respectable figure” (Hofstadter
1972, p.210). Yet the billposter also thrived in this world.

Conclusion
Studies of the rise of mass consumer culture typically emphasize the development
and integration of markets for the new consumer goods and the new producer goods used
to make them. Such studies often attend carefully to the transportation and
communications infrastructure – railroads, telegraphs and telephones, postal service –
that made it possible. The then-new marketing practices are widely recognized and are
seen as necessary corollaries of market development. This is true enough, but the changes
in marketing consumer goods were also built on the development and integration of yet
another new market: the market for audience attention. The actions of manufacturers of
branded goods, retailers, periodical publishers, billboard owners and billposters,
advertising agents, and others, together with the actions of local, state, and federal
government created the fictitious commodity of audience attention and brought this new
market into being.
The audience attention market required property rights in attention. Property
rights in attention, in turn, require a degree of excludability, monopoly in the
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Chamberlinian sense. The billposting sector of the advertising industry achieved
excludability through the Associated Billposters’ aggressive pursuit of monopoly in the
narrower, more commonly used sense of the word. They went to great lengths to suppress
competition and secure a high degree of price setting power. When they were able to
exclude others’ posters from their billboards and offer advertisers credible guarantees of
display at agreed-upon locations for an agreed-upon period of time, the nature of the
transaction between advertiser and billposter changed; rather than an exchange of money
for the service of gluing posters to visible surfaces, it became an exchange of money for
access to the eyes of passersby. The price was proportional to the number of intercepted
gazes, not the cost of providing the service. Under this monopoly pricing regime,
billposters, especially in large cities, were positioned to secure large rents. They were
monopolists in the Schumpeterian mold, however. The constant threat posed by the
advertisers’ ability to substitute other advertising methods compelled billposters to keep
innovating if they were to keep claiming a share of the surplus.
The audience attention market also required mechanisms for the exchange of
attention. The Associated Billposters and billposting solicitors acted to generate a more
streamlined, centralized, but highly skewed flow of information about available billboard
advertising. The “Big List” of member billposters, official solicitors’ intermediation, and
the Promotion Bureau’s pamphlets increased advertisers’ ease of communication with
billposters – at least, with billposters belonging to the Association. By standardizing the
range of services offered and price scales, the Association limited the scope of
negotiations with advertising clients. This was, of course, to their own benefit, though,
ultimately, advertisers had to be satisfied enough with the service to keep buying.
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The realization of the value of audience attention was only achieved in the context
of an interlocked set of simultaneously complementary and conflictual relationships. For
example, manufacturers’ advertising expenditures were in large part an effort to lower the
selling costs absorbed by jobbers and retailers, yet they still relied on jobbers and retailers
to get the goods to the final consumers. Claude Hopkins was explicit about his role as an
advertising agent in lowering merchant’s fees. He advocated the use of advertising
campaigns featuring coupons to be redeemed at a retail store, thus pressuring retailers to
have the item in stock. Hopkins warned manufacturers not to double their selling costs by
spending on consumer advertising and also spending on jobbers’ distribution costs
(Hopkins 1966, pp.132-141). Advertisers therefore earned the share of their income that
came from manufacturers at the expense of jobbers and retailers, even as a large share of
their business still came from retailers. One portion of advertising professionals’ business
was devoted to squeezing retailers; the other portion of their business depended on
retailers thriving.
Just as advertising professionals played a role in both the horizontal and vertical
competitive struggles engaged in by advertisers, they themselves engaged in both
horizontal and vertical competitive struggles. Horizontal intersectoral struggle within the
advertising industry shaped the distribution of advertisers’ spending amongst purveyors
of advertising space in newspapers, magazines, billboards, streetcars, and direct-to-home
delivery. Hopkins assured manufacturers that clip-out coupons were more effective than
other advertising options, but he also had a clear interest in attracting advertising
appropriations to his agency for print media placements rather than allowing that
spending to be redirected to other forms of advertising. Billposters and publishers fought
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especially fiercely over advertising dollars and over the rules of market engagement by
which they fought. At the same time, each was engaged in vertical struggles with their
own suppliers and distributors. Purveyors of outdoor advertising space established
monopoly rents on the eyes of passersby but then had to pass on a portion of that as rent
paid to landowners. One of the benefits of local monopoly and national association was
the ability to hold down commissions paid to solicitors.
The struggles to shape the market and thrive in the market took place in a wider
context of social struggle over the appropriate reach of the market. Billposters achieved
sufficient excludability to secure monopoly rents on the sale of attention, but
excludability extended only to the borders of the billboard. It was enough to create a
19

market in a new form of property, but not enough to avert a tragedy of the commons.

For audiences, the clamor for attention could lead to sensory overload. “Has it come to
this?” The Newark Evening News asked in bold headline type over an illustration of an
intersection entirely overtaken by advertisements, with rooftop billboards doubling the
height of buildings and banners stretched across the streets (October 11, 1911).
Billposters would have been quick to point out the self-interest behind such
editorializing, but the question was – and remains – legitimate. Is it in fact acceptable for
attention to be appropriated and sold anywhere and everywhere it can be intercepted?
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Audience attention in fact fits Hardin’s classic model of the tragedy of the commons
quite well (Hardin 1968). It is rival, but excludable to only a very limited degree, and
each individual’s efforts to appropriate attention increase the difficulty of accessing
attention for all. The benefits of advertising are a least as dependent on the advertiser’s
share of attention relative to competitors as on absolute volume and many advertisers
become locked in an arms race with competitors – to the great benefit and delight of
advertising professionals (Mataja 1903).
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Commentators from outside the advertising profession, especially those of higher
socioeconomic status whose attention was most in demand and whose participation in the
material culture of the day was least dependent on what they could glean at low or no
cost, remarked despairingly on the sensory assault. They lamented the proliferation of
outdoor advertising degrading the landscape. They complained about the flood of junk
mail infiltrating their homes and demanding at least enough attention to distinguish it
from personal mail and discard it – while direct mail marketers attended ever more
carefully to efforts to make their mailings look like personal correspondence (Laird 1998,
pp.77, 220; Fowler 1900, pp.234-237). (Though it’s worth keeping in mind that
advertisers and advertising professionals themselves considered approximately half the
population to be too poor to be worth targeting (Marchand 1985, p.64) while those with
lower incomes published fewer opinion pieces in the New York Times and made greater
use of advertising ephemera to decorate their living spaces, so the reaction to the
explosion of advertising was certainly not univocal.)
Meanwhile, advertising practitioners commented on the difficulty of attracting
attention to their message and developed theories and strategies regarding both placement
and content to try to increase the effectiveness of their advertising efforts. Since the
supply of the raw resource of audience attention was unresponsive to the market (though
certainly growing for demographic reasons), all market-driven supply-side adjustments
had to take place through efficiency improvements on the part of advertising
professionals. Extensive strategies for accessing attention by intercepting eyeballs (e.g.
more placements in more newspapers, more posters on more billboards) were soon
complemented or even overshadowed by intensive strategies of commanding attention
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through more carefully targeted placements and carefully market-tested, effective
content.
This all had repercussions for the legions of consumers whose attention was so
eagerly sought and actively traded. The users of branded goods were never passive in the
process of meaning-making in their material culture, and manufacturers’ best efforts to
stoke demand did not always work as intended. Still, Strasser notes, “[a]s participants in
the branded mass market, consumers entered mutually dependent but unequal
relationships with large corporations.” Especially when paired with rising purchasing
power, consumer sovereignty looks like a kind of freedom but unequal power relations
remain. Strasser is not the only one to note that identifying as a member of the “class” of
consumers pushes considerations of class in the workplace to the background (Strasser
1989, pp.25-26). But people now had a third economic role – not just producers and
consumers but also, in part, products. Power was unequally distributed in the audience
attention market, just as in the labor and goods markets. The economic value of audience
attention was growing, but that value was realized by the suppliers of advertising, not by
audiences. For advertisers, access to audiences was a weapon in their horizontal and
vertical competitive struggles. For advertising professionals, access to audiences was the
basis of profitability. For both, achieving their ends depended on securing a degree of
monopoly control over audience attention. No matter how difficult advertisers found it to
get their messages heard, that was nothing compared to the difficulty of being heard
without the ability to buy the attention of an audience.
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CHAPTER 2
THE VALUE ANALYTICS OF ADVERTISING

Introduction
The creation of custom advertising content creates value. In my three-stage model
of communication – perception interception, content display, reception – this belongs to
stage two. In between the trade in gazes (which secures rents rather than generating new
value) and the monetization of brands (fictitious values which allow as-yet-unrealized
rents to circulate now) the creation of bespoke business-promoting speech-for-sale alone
is subject to the fundamental tradeoff between labor time expended on the production of
this commodity and labor time expended on that commodity.
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine advertising content as a produced
commodity. The argument begins by clarifying my use of the productive/unproductive
distinction in Marxist value analysis. I establish the commodity nature of advertising,
with an historical overview of how advertising speech took on a commodity form. I then
explore the labor process behind production of advertising and the class relations under
which this production takes place. Finally, I conduct a value analysis, focusing in
particular on the management of advertising creatives’ living labor to generate surplus
through compound labor, intensified labor, and the extension of the workday.

Value production in the advertising industry
To claim that anything in the advertising process could be value-producing bucks
tradition requires some explanation. The more traditional Marxist analysis of advertising
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holds much truth. Advertising is a cost of circulation in a modern capitalist consumer
economy. It is paid for out of the surplus of the sellers of advertised goods. But this all
considers advertising from the standpoint of the seller of advertised goods. From the
perspective of the seller of advertising services, advertising itself is the good for sale.
Advertising content is a commodity, and (unlike the audience attention traded through the
market in advertising space/time) not even a fictitious one. It is an item produced
specifically for sale. Its production is bound by the labor time trade-off: selling more
advertising content requires allocating more labor and producing more product.
The claim that producing advertising content produces value is not a claim that
advertising is a socially useful use value. We do not have to establish whether or not
advertising is socially useful (in whose judgment? by what standard?). For the creation of
exchange value it does not matter much what the product is good for and it does not
matter how it is used – or even if it is used. The creation of exchange value does not
require the production of a use vale that you or I or any particular analyst or observer
finds socially beneficial. The labor power expended on producing corn syrup is
productive of exchange value and surplus. But what is the corn syrup good for? It is a
critical ingredient in the chocolate pecan pie I make at Thanksgiving, a use value I would
be sad to lose. It also disposes of excess corn through our digestive tracts resulting in
rising rates of type two diabetes and other maladies. If someone finds the commodity
useful enough to buy it, the labor expended in its production is validated and the labor
value embodied is realized, even if the commodity is then used in socially destructive
ways. Productive of exchange value and socially beneficial are clearly different
assessments.
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Perhaps the best-known treatment of advertising from a Marxist perspective is the
chapter of Monopoly Capital that Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy dedicated to the subject
(1966). Although their work is important and admirable, my treatment of advertising
challenges theirs. There are two main flaws in their analysis of advertising. One is their
dismissal of the symbolic use values of commodities – I will have more to say on that in
Chapter 3. In this chapter, my bigger concern is their failure to look deeply into the
production of advertising. They fall into the trap of conflating the category “exchangevalue producing” with the category “socially useful.” If they don’t find an object or a
feature of an object to be socially useful (and they seem to have an austere aesthetic that
considers all elements of design that do not directly and exclusively serve objectively
definable functions to be unuseful) they consider the labor that goes into making that
20

feature unproductive labor. I am not overly concerned here with the use value of
advertising, but with the generation of exchange value. Use value matters only insofar as
someone must consider it useful enough to purchase it, regardless of what they do with it
or what the social effects may be.
The claim that producing advertising content produces value is also not a claim
that advertising is consumed productively. That matters for the purchaser but it does not
matter to the seller. The seller realizes the exchange value of the good at the moment
20

Baran and Sweezy construct an exercise in which they attempt to estimate the
proportion of labor that goes into making automobiles that is unproductive. The only
labor they consider productive is that which can be directly linked to the function of
getting the vehicle and all its contents from point A to point B. Hood ornaments, fins, and
other such filigree are not productive of any use value they will admit and so they
consider the labor that goes into making these features unproductive of exchange value.
But this substitutes a projection of the analyst’s own consumption practices for economic
analysis. Thoreau would presumably consider the entire car to be unproductive –
although he was never confronted with cars, he did argue, in Walden, that trains were a
waste and it was better to walk.
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payment is received, no matter what is done with it later. Some Marxist analysts, such as
Duncan Foley, argue otherwise. Foley (2013) argues that for labor to be productive it
must contribute directly to additional future accumulation. Productive labor must either
sustain the productive labor force by producing a wage good purchased out of productive
laborers’ V fund or it must produce an element of constant capital used in production. In
particular, if a good or service is purchased through a deduction from the surplus, it
cannot be productive – with this argument he specifically dismisses the potential for
advertising agencies to produce new value. The concern with whether or not a
commodity is consumed productively, however, leads into a reductio ad absurdum.
Following this principle, we cannot decide if the labor performed by the laborers at a
chair factory is productive or not until we know who buys the chairs. If the chair is
purchased by a productive laborer for home use, then the chair producers’ labor is also
productive. If the chair is instead purchased by a capitalist through a deduction from the
surplus and not used in new production, then the chair producers’ labor is recoded as
unproductive. But once the chair producers’ labor is recoded as unproductive, the labor
that went into producing all of their consumption goods also gets recoded as
unproductive. This in turn means that the labor that went into producing the consumption
goods consumed by the workers who produced the chair producers’ consumption goods
also gets recoded as unproductive, and so on. The concept of productive labor unravels.
Marx’s schematic division of the capitalist economy into department one,
producing means of production for sale to other capitalists and department two,
producing means of subsistence for sale to workers, simplified out an important category
of production. There are goods that belong neither to department one nor to department
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two. Although purchased by firms, they are not department one goods – they are not
consumed in additional future production. Neither are they department two goods – they
are not purchased by workers out of the consumption fund supplied by their wages, V.
These goods are, rather, purchased by firms and used to support or supply the context for
the production of new value. Resnick and Wolff (1987) call the distribution of the surplus
made to secure the conditions of existence for additional generation of surplus the
subsumed class process. The purchase of advertising services is an example of a
subsumed class distribution. Advertising is in this way like the manager’s desk chair. It is
an unproductive purchase for the buyer – that is, it enters the advertiser’s accounts as
neither C nor V. But it is nonetheless a commodity purchase. The producer of the
commodity creates and realizes value. Furthermore, the commodity of advertising content
is produced in large part in advertising agencies that are organized under capitalist
relations of production.

Advertising is an immaterial commodity
Advertising content, immaterial and amorphous as it is, is a commodity.
Intellectual property laws and advertising industry practice establish rights of ownership.
It is alienable from the producer: ownership of the content can be transferred from the ad
agency to the client through a monetary market transaction. And, in fact, it is produced
for sale in the market. Advertising speech is one form of speech-for-sale, but far from the
only form. Bookstores are full of speech-for-sale. So is the iTunes store. So is
Washington, D.C.’s K St. So is Broadway.
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All of these instances of speech for sale are part of a large and growing sector of
the global economy devoted to immaterial commodities. Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri call this shift toward immaterial commodities the postmodernization, or
informatization of production. Providing services and manipulating information occupy a
larger portion of the labor time of a larger portion of the workforce than in earlier phases
of capitalist development. The labor tasks “are characterized in general by the central role
played by knowledge, information, affect, and communication.” Economic modernization
meant a shift from agriculture to industry. Modernization not only brought about the
dominance of industry over agriculture according to quantitative measures such as
percentage of labor force employed and total value added, but also qualitatively
transformed production in all sectors of the economy, including agriculture. The
contemporary postmodernization of the economy, in which services and the manipulation
of information are coming to dominate quantitatively, is also bringing about a qualitative
transformation (Hardt and Negri 2000, pp.280-285).
However, not all instances of speech for sale submit to the same value analysis.
New value can be produced and realized only when production is subject to the rivalness
of labor time and the output is excludable. (See introduction.) In our digital age,
information can be reproduced at a marginal cost indistinguishable from zero.
Information can, as a matter of logic, be reproduced and resold without end, although
there are often legal restrictions on doing so. Many forms of entertainment are similarly
reproducible, as highlighted by fights over control of recorded music and producers’
efforts to control digital sharing. Analysis of information commodities usually focuses
on this aspect, arguing that since the marginal cost is zero, the “natural” price is zero.
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Therefore, all positive prices and profits must be understood as monopoly rents (e.g.
Texeira and Rotta 2012). Not all commodified speech fits this mold, however. The costs
of packaging and transmitting the information may not always approach zero. Even more
relevant to my purposes, some speech can only be sold once. New sales require new
output of new labor. Speech produced as a component of affective caring labor is of this
sort. So is advertising speech. An advertising agency cannot sell the same ad campaign to
multiple buyers. It offers what Faulconbridge et al. call a “bespoke business service”
(Faulconbridge et al. 2011, p.18).
The distinction between speech for sale that generates rents and speech for sale
that generates new value intersects with the distinction between commodified meanings
purchased by someone wishing to receive the purchased messages and commodified
meanings purchased by a person or firm wishing to send the purchased messages. A data
mining firm, for example, produces an information commodity to sell to those wishing to
receive the meanings they offer for sale. They have, and are willing to share with paying
customers, information they have gathered, compiled, and organized about consumer
tastes and Internet browsing history. The data mining company’s customers purchase the
information commodity in order to receive it. In this case, the output of the same labor
can be sold over and over (at least until the data are considered too out of date)
generating rents, but no new value. Speech purchased by those who wish to listen can be
subject to the rivalness of labor time and hence generative of new value only when it is
bespoke speech – the speech of a therapist or life coach, for example. An advertising
agency’s creative department, by contrast, produces meanings sold to those wishing to
send a message. Speech sold to those wishing to send the message can similarly be either
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bespoke or replicable. Because it is custom-made speech, advertising creatives’
commodified discourse cannot be reproduced at near-zero marginal cost and resold as
information can. Hallmark also sells speech to those wishing to send the message, but in
their case the only cost of reproducing the commodified speech is the cost of the paper
and ink; the same message produced by the same speech-producing labor can be
replicated almost without end.
Table 2.1 Categories of commodified speech
bespoke
replicable
sold to recipients

psychotherapy

marketing database

sold to senders

advertising content

greeting cards

Because it is made to order, advertising content is best understood as the valuecreating provision of a service, not the rent-seeking sale of information. To sell more
advertising content, the agency must elicit more labor to produce new content.

How Advertising Content First Entered the Commodity Realm
The content component of advertising communications did not begin to take on a
commodity form as early as access to eyeballs did. Even after participants in the market
were quite clear about the nature of their trade in gazes and advertising agents were well
established as column space merchants, the advertisers themselves continued to write
their own advertising copy for several more decades. But beginning toward the end of the
nineteenth century, crafting advertising content became a specialized profession.
Practitioners of this new profession adopted insights from the new academic field of
experimental psychology, conducted audience response testing, adapted the language and
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techniques of scientific management, and sold their services to advertisers whose public
face was no longer the face of their founder or proprietor. The new advertising
professionals’ not entirely spurious claim to communications expertise allowed the
creation of advertising content, and not just placement, to become a way to sell a
component of the communication process (Pope 1983; Laird 1998).
The division of labor first yielded a full-time copywriter in 1880 when department
store owner John Wannamaker hired John E. Powers to write copy to advertise
Wannamaker’s Philadelphia store. After several years of personality clashes
Wannamaker fired Powers, who then continued to write advertising copy full time as a
freelancer. Following Powers’s lead, a handful of other full time copywriters made
careers as freelancers during the late 1880s and early 1890s. That is, they became
independent petty producers of advertising speech (Fox 1997).
Into the beginning of the 1890s, advertising agencies continued to take little
responsibility for content and none had a full-time copywriter, but as 1900 approached
more and more of the labor of producing advertising copy moved into the agencies. In the
first decade of the 1900s advertising agencies began introducing art departments and took
over responsibility for the visual, nonverbal components of advertisements as well. By
1920 the division and shifting of labor was complete: advertising agencies produced the
content for the preponderance of advertisements produced on behalf of large
manufacturing and merchant enterprises. (Smaller enterprises and owner-managed
enterprises continued then to produce much more of their own advertising content and
still do so now.) Growing numbers of advertising agents identified their business as
primarily the creation of content, with placement as a corollary service – some even

84

advocated keeping the two activities, content and placement, separate (Fox 1997, pp.2527, 35-38; Laird 1998, p.42).
During the initial migration of copywriting into advertising agencies, the agencies
offered the service of crafting content as a deal-sweetener to attract advertisers to the
space-merchant side of their business. Collectively forswearing price competition, as the
advertising industry did fairly successfully, forced agencies to compete in other
dimensions. If they were not going to increase their volume of business by cutting their
commissions on placements, they needed another way to attract clients. This need
supplied the initial impetus for agencies to take on content creation. Since there was no
additional charge for the content creation, they had to cover the cost of producing content
out of the commission charged on advertising space. This exaggerated the economies of
scale advertising agencies could enjoy by serving several large clients instead of many
small ones – when serving a large client running a national campaign, the same content
could run repeatedly in hundreds of newspapers, earning a large commission that could
cover the wages of copywriters and artists and still turn a profit.
As long as advertising content was produced by the advertisers, and very often by
the founder-proprietor himself, the content was largely shaped by the tastes and egos of
these businessmen. They considered their advertisements to be projections of themselves
as much as they were sales tools. Accordingly, attempts to measure the advertisements’
effectiveness as sales tools were rare and haphazard. As firms grew, owner-managers
dwindled in number and the day-to-day decision-making was taken over by managers
who were salaried employees. This meant that the “I” behind the earlier style of
advertisement was now absent, shifting the emphasis to the sales tool function of the
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advertisements. Those now writing the ads, whether as employees of the advertised firm
or of the advertising agency, were under greater pressure to prove the value of their
professional services (Laird 1998, p.97, pp.257-260, Chandler 2002).
Advertisers were, of course, keenly interested in measuring advertising’s success
in commanding attention. Their sales revenues depended on it. Advertising professionals,
too, had an interest in demonstrating the effectiveness of advertising. Their revenues
depended on their ability to persuade advertisers that the service they offered was
effective. Demonstrating effectiveness required defining the purpose of advertising in
objective terms that were measurable, at least in principle, and then attempting to
measure advertisements’ performance according to those metrics. The advertiser’s end
goal, of course, was for advertising to lead to sales at least often enough to cover the cost
of running the advertisements. This cannot be directly measured – too many confounding
factors blur the picture – but both businessmen and academic researchers tried. In
particular, the use of various assessment tools measuring the more direct link between
advertisements and audience attention became common practice. Walter Scott Dill
celebrated the scientific turn in the advertising profession in The Psychology of
Advertising (second edition, 1910). “Advertising has as its one function the influencing of
human minds,” he explained, therefore its scientific basis is psychology. Beginning
around the year 1900, Dill noted approvingly, advertisers began to study psychology and
psychologists began to study advertising (Dill 1910, pp.2-3).
Out in the field, advertising professionals introduced new research practices. They
conducted field tests on advertisements by, for example, running different ads in different
markets and comparing the resulting sales trends. Variants of advertisements that called
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for a direct consumer response were keyed so that advertisers could determine which
styles of ads and which placements elicited the highest response rates (Dill 1910, p.1). In
the lab (or some other controlled research setting), researchers attempted to determine
which ads, and which qualities or characteristics of such ads, attracted and held attention
and left a permanent impression. Dill devoted a chapter of his book on the psychology of
advertising to “Attention Value,” attempting to answer the question of how much
audience attention an advertiser gets when paying for an ad placement. His conclusions
made note of the size and position but also the content of the advertisements (Dill 1910,
pp.157-176). Harlow Gale, a professor at the University of Minnesota, made advertising a
central concern of his research into attention and reasoning and his research produced
results that could be useful to advertising practitioners, even though he was not a
particular fan of advertising (Eighmey and Sar 2007, p.147).
Despite the efforts of advertising professionals and academics to measure
advertisements’ command of attention, these measurement efforts remained a gesture that
indicated quality rather than a precise quantification of units of attention sold. In the
previous chapter we saw that billposting was converted from a service paid for on the
basis of the labor involved in hanging posters to the sale of audience attention paid for on
the basis of how many gazes were intercepted. Measuring brains’ attentiveness is a more
complex task than counting the eyes whose fields of vision passed over the page or
poster. As a result, crafting advertising speech remained a service. Since there was no
standard way to measure units of attention, content creation could not command rents on
the basis of units of attention commanded. Even now, after an additional hundred years of
research in cognitive science, no one quite knows what the response to an advertisement
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will be. It remains difficult even to assess what the effect of an advertisement was,
despite the more detailed data and more sophisticated statistical tools at our disposal.
The research attempting to systematically describe and quantify leaned in the
direction of standardizing the sale of advertising content as an audience attention
commodity, much as accurate audits of newspaper and magazine circulation data were a
move to standardize the audience’s-field-of-vision commodity. Indeed, Claude Hopkins
was ready to declare the standardization, or at least the potential for standardization,
complete when he wrote Scientific Advertising in 1923. “The time has come when
advertising has in some hands reached the status of a science. It is based on fixed
principles and is reasonably exact” (Hopkins 1966, p.213). But his claim was premature
21

then and remains so ninety years later. As a result, the creation of advertising content
remains for the most part a commodified service. When offered as an independent
commodity, it embodies the value imbued by abstract labor on the basis of the time taken
to produce it.

The Creative Revolution in Advertising and the Unbundling of Commodified
Speech
As long as content and advertising space remained bundled as a package, the price
paid for content was constrained and distorted by the pricing of advertising space and the
agencies’ resulting commissions on space sales. Although content-crafting services were
aimed at increasing the agencies’ volume of business, advertisers who relied on
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He was especially misguided in his claim of “fixed principles.” Attracting and holding
attention depends largely on novelty. What successfully holds attention can therefore not
be fixed – once the novelty wears off attracting attention requires something new.
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advertising agencies for content were increasingly reluctant to entrust their business to an
agency handling the account of a competitor. Therefore, although it was initially
motivated by each agency’s drive to grow its share of the audience attention market, the
bundling of content and space put limitations on market share by forcing the space side of
the advertising business into monogamous relationships with advertisers within any given
product category.
Two related developments in the 1960s deepened the commodification of speech
as an independent item of trade while loosening some of the constraints on agencies that
resulted from the bundling. One was an increased emphasis on creative content. When
content creation was an adjunct to space sales and served primarily as a means of wooing
clients, other means of wooing clients – nicely wine-lubricated business lunches, for
example – could and often did substitute for creative content. For a complicated
combination of reasons, a number of advertising agencies in the 1960s substituted away
from the social relationships mode of attracting and holding business toward greater
reliance on creative content. Among the conjuncture of factors were the infiltration of the
industry by ethnic minorities who did not have the cultural capital to succeed on the
business lunch model and advertising industry workers’ search for outlets for their
creative drives. For a number of agencies, these internal shifts successfully intersected
with changes in advertisers’ standards for justifying their selection of agency.
At the same time, adman Marion Harper figured out a corporate structure that
could sidestep the conflict-of-interest constraint on agencies’ market share. He built the
first advertising agency conglomerate, called Interpublic. Interpublic served as a parent
company that could pool media-buying and financial functions while holding multiple
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subsidiary creative agencies with a large degree of creative independence. This allowed
Interpublic to hold competing accounts even though any individual subsidiary agency
typically could not (Lawrence 2002, pp.17-18). Harper’s innovation spread, and
consolidation of the industry accelerated after 1980. Indeed, his experiment in corporate
structuring proved so successful that in 2009, just six holding companies accounted for
$42.7 billion in revenues, about 10% of total global advertising spending, and each of
those companies employed between 14,000 and 90,000 people. Since then, two of those
six (Omnicom and Publicis) have merged. At the same time, a large number of very small
firms operate with a staff of 20 or fewer (Faulconbridge et al. 2011, pp.4, 15-17)
The developments in industry culture and in corporate structuring both
contributed to dividing off speech as an independent commodity in its own right rather
than an add-on to media purchases. Although commissions on media buys continue to
have some role in advertising agency compensation, fee-for-service and results-based
compensation have grown in importance.

The labor of producing speech
Producing speech surely qualifies as labor. It requires the use of human mind and
muscle to produce an effect on the world. The production of speech is an immaterial form
of labor, but that does not make it any less of a labor, any less capable of producing a
salable commodity, or any less capable of acquiring, if performed in the right context, an
aspect of abstract labor and hence producing new exchange value and surplus.
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The concrete labor of producing speech
All labor tasks have both immaterial (symbolic) and material (physical)
components and all products of labor contain both immaterial and material aspects. The
emphasis may differ but both for labor and for the resulting commodity, immaterial and
material are ends of a spectrum rather than discrete categories with a firm dividing line
between them. As Graeber reminds us, there is a material basis for all symbols: our brains
and books and electronics are physical objects (Graeber 2001). And Douglas Hofstadter
points out that the manipulation of symbols, in our private thoughts and in our
communications, produce material results: in his example, stargazers sharing information
about a predicted meteor shower physically go to an agreed-upon location to watch
together (Hofstadter 2007). Or, to point to an example more relevant to my topic, an
advertising campaign turns out to be highly persuasive and as a result acres of orchard
land are newly planted in pomegranates and gallons of pomegranate juice in distinctively
shaped, pint-sized bottles, are moved into our homes.
Hardt and Negri define immaterial labor as labor that produces immaterial
commodities (p.290). I find it useful, however, to maintain a distinction between the
labor process and the product. A labor process tending toward the immaterial extreme
emphasizes the manipulation of symbols by any physical action that accomplishes the
task while a labor process tending toward the material extreme requires specific physical
actions. This is not Cartesian dualism. Manipulation of symbols requires physical gesture
of some sort, as the bodily maladies associated with office work – e.g. carpal tunnel
syndrome – show. At the same time, physical action is informed by intellect (Rose 2004).
All specific labors fall at intermediate points between the extremes. To categorize the
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products of labor, we need to consider use value rather than labor process. An immaterial
commodity’s use value resides in the informational content; its physical form is purely a
vessel for carrying information and the information could be recoded to take on a
different physical form without substantively changing the commodity. A material
commodity’s use value is tied to its physical features while its signaling or symbolic
functions are minimal. In between the extremes are commodities such as fashion
clothing, jewelry, home décor… items whose specific physical form matters but whose
usefulness also depends on the encoded meanings they carry.
The location of the labor process along the immaterial/material axis need not be
tightly correlated to the location of the product of that labor along its own
immaterial/material axis. With the rise of robotics, for example, a labor process centered
on the manipulation of symbols can yield heavily material results. Conversely, physical
labor can produce an object laden with symbolic meaning – indeed the fact of a product’s
being handmade, rather than machine-made, can contribute to its symbolic meaning. The
intensely physical labor of dancing can be recorded for a music video and become a
component of an informational commodity that can be reproduced in multiple formats.
The concrete labor of producing advertising content, the work of employees
known as “creatives,” is primarily an immaterial labor producing an immaterial
commodity. (The language of the Marxist value theory tradition grew out of an industrial
era and so now produces some odd word juxtapositions: concrete immaterial.) The
physical components of the labor process and the physical forms taken on by the product
are purely vessels for the symbolic content. Hardt and Negri sort the forms of immaterial
labor into three categories.
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The first is involved in an industrial production that has been informationalized
and has incorporated communication technologies in a way that transforms the
production process itself. Manufacturing is regarded as a service, and the material
labor of the production of durable goods mixes with and tends toward immaterial
labor. Second is the immaterial labor of analytical and symbolic tasks, which
itself breaks down into creative and intelligent manipulation on the one hand and
routine symbolic tasks on the other. Finally, a third type of immaterial labor
involves the production and manipulation of affect and requires (virtual or actual)
human contact, labor in the bodily mode. (Hardt and Negri 2000, p.293)
As with the broad categories of material and immaterial, the boundaries between
subcategories within immaterial labor are blurry. Rational, analytical thought turns out to
be not so neatly separable from emotion meaning that analytical tasks and manipulation
22

of affect are not clearly separable. Emotion is often an indispensable route to the
rational (Hochschild 2003). Nonetheless, the distinction is helpful. Recognition of
affective labor is valuable, too, for its recognition of the emotional care work that has
typically been assigned to and performed by women, whether inside or outside of the
market realm.
Within Hardt and Negri’s taxonomy of immaterial labor, advertising fits best in
the third category, “the production and manipulation of affect,” and it requires (usually
virtual) human contact. Advertising professionals have long advocated the use of
emotional appeals and continue to do so (e.g. Maas 1986, Maas and Roman 1992,
Dusenberry 2005, Kaplan Thaler 2003). Contemporary research in cognitive science is
consistent with their emphasis on emotion, finding that emotional engagement opens up
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One of the typical characteristics of people who have suffered damage to the limbic
system of the brain, which carries primary responsibility for emotional matters, is that
they cannot carry out multi-step chains of logical deduction. Their ability to follow a
single link in a chain of reasoning is unimpaired and we might expect that because they
are quite literally dispassionate they would be able to reason more effectively than the
average. In practice, however, it seems that without emotional engagement they cannot
care enough to sustain the attention necessary for multi-step logical deduction
(Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998).
93

neural pathways and triggers responses advertisers are likely to want (Walsh 2002). The
affective labor of advertising professionals is, as Hardt and Negri say of affective labor
more generally, both economically productive and productive of human communications
– capable of generating social networks and community in surprising ways (Hardt and
Negri 2000, p.293). (See Chapter 3 on the role of consumer goods, especially branded
goods, in social networks.)
In Randall Rothenberg’s narrative of the creation of a Subaru advertising
campaign of the early 1990s, his observation of a production crew filming footage of a
car factory to use in a television ad moves him to comment, “[T]he line between …
commercial production and automobile production can grow quite blurry. Both, after all,
demand an initial concept. Both require mastery of complex machinery. One may
exemplify the information-era economy into which we are ostensibly moving and the
other may symbolize the industrial age from which we are passing, but both tasks call for
an awful lot of people to repeat a large number of mindless movements in order to
disgorge a fairly simple product in the end.” (Rothenberg 1995, p.243) Filming involves a
lot of tedious repetition. But in other ways, at other times, there are very different forms
of concrete labor taking place in the ad agency than in the car factory. Rothenberg also,
for example, depicts scenes of the chief copywriter working on the Subaru account at the
Wieden & Kennedy agency. Jerry Cronin, a man who disliked cars intensely, struggled to
produce words that could encourage people to feel good about going out to buy one. His
work required little in the way of specific movements and could not be done mindlessly,
though he often seemed to wish it could.
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The capitalist class relations of advertising speech production
We all spend a lot of time laboriously producing speech, but most of our efforts
are not productive of exchange value or surplus. Certainly there is plenty of classless
speech production. I chat with my neighbor on the sidewalk, talk with my brother on the
phone. Speech can be produced and sold by a petty producer in what Marx called the
ancient class process – the direct producer both generates and appropriates her own
surplus. A novelist produces and sells a manuscript to a publisher. A therapist in a
private practice produces and sells speech to patients. A fortune-teller sells speech to
clients.
Speech can also take place in capitalist class relations. A wage worker can
produce speech for a capitalist employer. This is a large component of many service
industries – the firm sells the customer an experience which includes scripted interactions
with wage workers, all of whom are alienated in the technical, economic definition of the
word and many of whom also feel profoundly alienated in an inward, psychological sense
(see, for example, Hochschild 2003, The Project on Disney 1995). Those employed by a
variety of firms in the communications industries also produce speech for a capitalist
employer: reporters for news media, staff writers for television shows, and so on.
The work of producing speech becomes value-producing labor when the speech
produced is produced for sale whether by a petty producer or a wage worker. The same
legal (and other) tools that define and defend information as salable property establish the
potential for speech-producing labor to take place under capitalist class relations. If the
speech produced can be owned, then it can be owned by someone other than the
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producer. Indeed, it can be appropriated at the very moment of its production. The
production of speech can therefore generate a specifically capitalist surplus.
In order to sustain capitalist relations of production, it helps an awful lot to limit
the access to C goods in some way or another. Very high minimum start-up costs often
suffice. This is part of what makes industrial factories such a congenial environment for
capitalist relations of production. The advertising industry does not work in quite the
same way as heavy manufacturing. Advertising workers are often highly compensated,
and the start-up costs are not prohibitive. Furthermore, since the excludability of ideas is
always incomplete and under challenge, the complete transfer of intellectual property is
never easy. When you sell an idea, you don’t forget it. When an idea is appropriated at
the moment of its creation, the direct producer does not forget it. This makes the class
positions in advertising fluid. Disaffected workers can leave and try to set up their own
shop. Indeed, that seems to be the most common way new agencies begin. “The
advertising industry,” Mark Tungate observes, “resembles a slide of amoeba under a
microscope, with elements constantly breaking off and reforming.” (Tungate 2007,
p.152) Sometimes when the direct producers of advertising content leave their employer,
they try to take their past ideas and clients with them. Although they are in breach of
contract if they do, sometimes they get away with it. (And other times not.) (See, e.g.
Rothenberg 1994, pp.125, 202, Tungate 2007) Many of those now in a position to
appropriate the surplus generated in an ad agency started their careers generating surplus.
Indeed, they may still be generating surplus. The owner-manager-worker has not
disappeared.
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Because the relations exist to make advertising a capitalist commodity, the salable
property of the agency, the advertisements produced have the dual nature of all
commodities and the work of its direct producers both has the dual nature of all work
done under capitalist class relations. A commodity has a use value, deriving from its
particular qualities and its particular uses, and it has an exchange value, deriving from the
fact that as an item available for exchange, it has a price that describes it in terms of
general equivalence with all other commodities. The dual nature of the commodity
emerges from the dual nature of labor. Any particular labor process is different from all
others. Concrete labor refers to the particularities of a given labor process; concrete labor
produces use values. Abstract labor is the aspect of labor that equates all labor; the
quantum of abstract labor embodied in a commodity produces its exchange value.

The value and the price of advertising
In practice, advertising agency compensation is usually a combination of the old
commission on media purchase scheme handed down from the nineteenth century, feefor-service arrangements, and some contemporary agency compensation schemes also tie
rates to sales results. But the real underlying exchange is the sale of commodified speech
produced by commodified speech-producing labor power. The commission on media
buys is a holdover from an earlier era (as is the name “advertising agent”). Results-based
compensation is a technique for ensuring that the agency’s interests are aligned with the
advertiser’s interests and also gestures toward making content, like space, a commodity
form of audience attention, but audience responses are too complex and unpredictable to
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be the full basis for compensation. These are filigree on the basic exchange of money for
speech.
Since advertising speech is a commodity produced under capitalist relations of
production, its value can be understood as C + V + S: constant capital (material inputs
and means of production) plus variable capital (labor power) plus surplus.

C-goods
Even as the Internet and the splintering of broadcast media have fragmented and
scrambled the old communication channels, it remains the case that the single costliest
component of almost all advertising campaigns is the purchase of access to audience
attention. Purchasing a few square inches of advertising space in the print edition of the
New York Times is not the same thing as purchasing thousands of small scraps of
newsprint. Purchasing a few square inches of advertising space in the online edition of
the New York Times is not the same thing as renting a little bit of server space. The Cgood produced by a media outlet for sale to advertisers is not just the physical
embodiment of the ad, but the attention of the audience. A media company produces
news or entertainment or whatever attracts the attention of an audience, and they sell
access to that audience’s attention to the advertisers. Historically, access to audience
attention was the first component of the advertising process to become commodified.
(See Chapter 1.) The original advertising agencies, beginning in the U.S. in the 1840s,
concerned themselves only with the purchase and resale of advertising space. Much
advertising agency billing still follows the format established more than a century and a
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half ago: a media purchase plus a percentage fee for the agency out of which the agency
funds its operations and generates a profit (when profitable).
The mass media sells advertising space/time as a commodity. The use value of
the advertising space/time is access to the attention of the public. What the mass media
directly produces – news and entertainment, TV shows and articles and radio broadcasts
– is not the commodity they sell to advertisers. What they produce is, rather, the means
of production of the commodity – audience attention – they sell. The price of audience
attention is proportional to the size of the audience (with adjustments made for the
desirability of the audience’s composition). Nathaniel Fowler in 1900 described the value
of advertising column space in a newspaper or magazine this way: “Space in any
periodical is a sort of patented commodity, and if it is good for anything it cannot be
purchased for less that the patentee’s price, and that price may be based on intrinsic value
and it may have added to it the royalty of exclusiveness” (Fowler 1900, p.364).
Translating that idea into the categories of Marxian value analysis shows Fowler’s
analysis to be consistent with my own argument. The price of audience attention is
determined by the value of the advertising space (the C+V+S generated in the production
of the periodical that attracts readers, roughly equivalent to Fowler’s “patentee’s price”)
plus a monopoly premium (“the royalty of exclusiveness”) because the publisher has at
least a temporary, limited monopoly on the attention of readers. For marginal sellers of
audience attention, such as the country route billposters considered in Chapter One, the
price they can command may just barely realize the value generated, but for large-scale
dealers the monopoly rent may make up the bulk of their revenues. This means that for
the capitalist advertising agency, the purchase of the indispensable c-good of audience
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attention involves the payment of a monopoly rent to another capitalist, the seller of
attention.
The physical C-goods required for an ad agency are basic modern office goods,
possibly with more audio-visual razzmatazz. Most of the rest of what goes into a finished
advertisement is most often subcontracted to companies or independent freelancers
specialized in film production, film editing, photography, audio production, etc. Whether
in-house or contracted out to suppliers, advertising takes on physical forms: print ads in
newspapers and magazines, billboards, radio advertisements, television spots, banner ads
on and pop-up ads affiliated with websites. The work of physical production and its
contribution to the total value of the commodity is well understood. The portion of the
value of a newspaper advertisement that is derived from production of its physical form
comes from C-goods such as cameras, props, ink, paper, printing presses and from the
living labor of models, photographers, layout artists, printers. Because of the range of
suppliers, the complete roster of people associated with any given advertisement may
occupy a tremendous variety of class positions. Annie McDermott was an independent
supplier of props for television advertisements specialized in soap scum and grime effects
for cleaning product commercials. Because of her concern that others might steal her
formulas for producing photogenic goop and sludge, she would spit into her bottles
before bringing them to the set so that the enzymes in her saliva would break down some
of the components, foiling attempts to reconstruct the recipe through a laboratory analysis
(Rothenberg 1995, p.252). She was able to maintain the ancient class process and
continue self-appropriating her own surplus through protecting proprietary information,
which also allowed her to secure rents as part of her revenue stream.
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V + S: Living Labor in the Ad Agency
The twinned aspects of commodities (exchange value/use value) and of labor
(abstract labor/concrete labor) are in constant contradiction with one another. The process
of commodity exchange is a process of reducing an infinite variety of unlike things to a
general equivalence. But this process is never fully completed. Variety and difference can
be muted, but not eliminated. The exchange value of a good can never tell us everything
we need to know about it. This is as true of labor power as of any other commodity. The
sale of labor power as a commodity aims toward the elimination of difference, but people
remain a heterogeneous bunch and the labor of one person is usually an imperfect
substitute for the labor of another.
At the simplest level of analysis and the highest level of abstraction, any labor
hour performed by any worker is assumed to be equivalent to any other hour performed
by any other worker. In a workday of equivalent length, one worker will generate as
much value (v+s) and receive as much value (v) as any other worker. Holding to the
assumption of the equivalence of all worker-hours, unless the employer can reduce the
cost of v-goods the only route to the generation of greater surplus is the extension of the
working day. When wages are set by the day rather than by the hour (as was common in
Marx’s place and time, Western Europe in the mid-nineteenth century), the number of
hours’ work required to produce a value of v remains the same, so the extension of the
working day adds more work hours devoted to the generation of s. If the rate of
exploitation (s/v) is 100% and then the workday is expanded from 10 to 11 hours, the rate
of exploitation increases to 120% and the mass of surplus rises from 5 to 6 labor hours
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per worker per day. Marx called this absolute surplus; more hours of surplus labor are
performed as an addition to the workday.
But the equivalence of all worker-hours assumption can be relaxed to allow the
labor theory of value more flexibility and allow it to describe a wider range of the world’s
great variety. Workers can work with greater or lesser intensity of effort, whether from
internal drive or external compulsion. To describe this difference, high intensity work can
be accounted for as equivalent to a greater number of work hours than the actual number
of clock hours devoted to the work. The workday becomes denser. For example, starting
from a base of average work intensity, a ten percent speed-up would mean that each
worker generates an hour and six minutes worth of value during each hour measured by
the clock. If v remains unchanged (and this can easily be the case even if paid hourly
rather than by the day), the worker produces a value of v faster, leaving more of the day
for surplus generation – and the surplus is generated at the faster rate of the denser
workday. If the rate of exploitation (s/v) had been 100%, after a ten percent increase in
work intensity the rate of exploitation would be 120%. In an 11 hour workday, for
example, the mass of surplus produced would increase from 5.5 to 6.6 labor hours per
23

worker per day. This is relative surplus; the value of labor power is produced faster
leaving a greater proportion of the workday for the production of surplus.
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The workers now generate 11 hours of labor value in 10 hours. Suppose they work an
11 (clock) hour day both before and after the speed up. Before, they worked 5.5 hours of
necessary labor and 5.5 hours of surplus labor. After the speed up they produce the value
of their labor power in only 5 hours and their remaining 6 hours of work produce surplus.
The rate of exploitation is now 6/5 = 1.2. And because each clock hour is worth 1.1 hours
of labor value, the mass of surplus they produce would increase from 5.5 to 6.6 per
worker per day.
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The workday can also be made denser by the skill of the workers, as distinct from
the intensity of their work effort. The combined variation of innate abilities, general
education, and job-specific training and experience results in variation in the hourly
output of different workers even when given identical inputs and tools. Just as a clock
hour of work performed at high intensity may produce more than an hour’s worth of
labor value, a clock hour of work performed by a highly skilled worker may produce
more than an hour’s work of labor value. Skilled workers can command a higher wage,
so their workday generates both more v and more s than the average. Both are scaled up
in equal proportion. This is compound labor; during the time than an average worker
produces a value of v + s and receives v, the skilled worker can produce n*v + n*s and
receives n*v (n>1).
Advertising creatives are highly paid because their talents are rare and desirable.
Their talents are rare because the creation of effective advertising is extraordinarily
demanding. As Sut Jhally notes, it is harder than creating a good movie or book: not only
does effective advertising have to hold the audience’s attention, as a good movie or book
does, but it must also inspire a specific course of action in response (personal
conversation). The necessary talent is hard to find. John Philip Jones explains the failure
of most advertising campaigns by blaming inadequate creative work. And why is the
work not good enough? “The most obvious creative deficiency is that there is simply not
enough creative talent.” (Jones 2004, p.49) Mary Wells Lawrence remembered of her
years running an agency, “No matter how hard we searched, no matter how much money
we paid – and we paid extraordinary salaries – we were never uniformly talented. No
agency is. There isn’t enough talent in the business. The knowing use of enablers, who
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are not talented enough but are sweetly willing, is one of the darker sides of creative
business.” (Lawrence 2002, p.118) Their talents are desirable because they can be used to
generate exchange value. They generate exchange value for the advertising agency that
employs them and sells the speech they produce on the job. Advertisers are eager to buy
the advertising creatives’ speech because of the likelihood that their speech will help to
increase sales and hence generate exchange value for the advertiser.
Advertising creatives’ abilities are rare enough and the product of their labor is
valuable enough that their labor can be understood as compound labor. Both their labor
power and the product of their labor exchange at a price that is several times higher than
is typical for many other laborers. The creatives’ high pay is not a sign of a low rate of
exploitation; their high pay is in proportion to the high surplus appropriated by their
employers. And compound labor need not occur in isolation. The patterns of generating
absolute and relative surplus through the extension of the workday and the intensification
of work effort still hold. A skilled worker performing compound labor can work an
additional hour in the day without additional pay, generating n*v + n*(s+1) in total value,
including an additional absolute surplus of n and resulting in an increased rate of
exploitation. A skilled worker can work at higher than average intensity, using fewer than
v hours to generate the value of her labor power, n*v. This generates relative surplus and
also increases the rate of exploitation. A skilled worker produces a surplus even if the
wage of n*v is large.
The claim of exploitation calls to mind long hours in oppressive working
conditions for minimal pay. Advertising professionals typically work long hours under
quite attractive working conditions, and some are rewarded with enviably high salaries.
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The claim that advertising creatives are exploited workers employs the term
“exploitation” in a narrow, technical sense. Their work lives may not be experienced as
miserable drudgery but they still generate exchange value in excess of what they are paid.
The buyer of advertising creatives’ speech-producing labor power sets them to work,
generally taking care to manage the labor process to generate high output, and sells the
product of their labor for a sum greater than they paid for the labor power. Therein lies
the exploitation, even in the presence of comfy couches and company cafeterias.

The abstraction of concrete labor
In the early twentieth century, scientific management attempted to analytically
break down all (material manufacturing) jobs into units that could be used to describe any
(material manufacturing) job. Tacit knowledge, specialized skill, and creativity were
stripped away from many workers and concentrated in the activities of management. This
deskilling made workers in any job more and more interchangeable with workers in any
other job. To the extent that scientific management achieved its aims, the tensions
between concrete and abstract labor in industry were addressed by the abstraction in
practice of concrete (physical, material) labor (Braverman 1974).
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Hardt and Negri believed the
informatization of the economy to be making concrete labor more abstract in a different
way. They write, “We should note that one consequence of the informatization of
production and the emergence of immaterial labor has been a real homogenization of
laboring processes.” In Marx’s time, the concrete labor of the tailor and the weaver
differed markedly, they argue; abstract labor was an abstract concept. “With the
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computerization of production today, however, the heterogeneity of concrete labor has
tended to be reduced… The labor of computerized tailoring and the labor of
computerized weaving may involve exactly the same concrete practices – that is,
manipulation of symbols and information.” Instead of specialized, relatively inflexible
tools, we have the computer as a universal tool “or rather as the central tool, through
which all activities might pass. Through the computerization of production, then, labor
tends toward the position of abstract labor” (p.292).
Viewing the abstraction in practice of concrete labor as a phenomenon of
computerization commits two errors: it forgets the important precedent of scientific
management of physical labor and overlooks the heterogeneity of mental labor.
Computerized tailoring and computerized weaving both involve the same concrete
practices of manipulation of symbols and information, but at that level of generality, we
could as easily say that hand tailoring and hand weaving involve the same concrete
practices – manipulation of thread primarily with gestures of the arms and fingers. A
worker’s skill at manipulating symbols appropriately for one production process may not
transfer at all well to another. It is often in the most highly automated production
processes that employers are the most discerning about the specific prior training and
experience of their employees.
When the commodity being produced is discourse and the creativity of the
workers’ concrete labor is essential to the production of the use value – without which the
exchange value cannot be realized – the tension between concrete and abstract labor
cannot be addressed with the principles of scientific management. (Interestingly, early
twentieth century advertising professionals did take inspiration from scientific

106

management, but they tried to apply those principles to getting audiences to do what they
wanted.) Nor does informatization resolve the tension between concrete and abstract
labor. The fact that the advertising creative and the civil engineer both spend their
workdays manipulating symbols in no way reduces the concrete specificity of their tasks.
It remains the case that labor acquires its abstract aspect only through the market. The
same concrete tasks performed outside the reach of the market have no affiliated aspect
of abstract labor. The division of labor within the advertising agency certainly created
plenty of deskilled employment, but the question here is how the tension between
concrete and abstract labor is addressed for workers whose job title is, quite literally,
“creative.”

Management of Creative Labor
Standardization and routinization are inimical to creativity. Adam Smith tempered
his paean to the benefits of the division of labor with an admission that working long
hours on a standardized repetitive task is mentally deadening. The creation of advertising
therefore cannot be subjected to the same routinization of the labor process, even as it
remains the case that the product is subject to the reduction of commodities to a monetary
equivalent. If human resources management in industry is a field whose goal is to
facilitate the numbing of workers’ minds by finding ways to overcome the resistance of
workers to the mind-numbing conditions of their work (Braverman 1974), the
management of the labor of advertising creatives is directed towards preventing the
numbing. Ad agency leadership has among its central goals the development of a
workplace culture and environment conducive to creativity.
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Fostering an appealing company culture and work environment makes the agency
attractive to prospective employees and allows the agency to hire selectively. Hiring
highly skilled workers gives a firm access to those workers’ compound labor. Mary Wells
(later Mary Wells Lawrence) remembers that in the 1960s she was dying to work at
Doyle Dane Bernbach because, she says, everyone was dying to work there (Lawrence
2002, p.4). The legendary David Ogilvy was similarly besieged by people angling for
employment because he had a similar reputation for encouraging creativity – couches for
copywriters, an agency cafeteria to encourage serendipitous encounters among employees
(Maas 1986, pp.43-60). When Wieden and Kennedy was still fairly new, in the early
1990s, account director David Luhr said, “All Wieden & Kennedy is, is an environment.
That’s the most important thing we own. An environment for doing great work.” As a
result of this reputation for a congenial work environment, Dan Wieden and David
Kennedy were continually courted by advertising workers wanting in (Rothenberg 1995,
pp.217, 300-301).
Layered on top of the scaled-up surplus generated by compound labor, the
advertising agency may draw absolute surplus out of its workforce by an extension of the
workday. Mary Wells Lawrence writes of the long hours she expected of her employees:
I welcomed them [new clients] as if I were the Mother Superior of Lourdes and
persuaded my fellow workers that we had been given divine insights – all we had
to do was work overtime. We worked endless hours and I looked upon anyone
who left the agency before eight or nine p.m. as a traitor – an attitude that was
nurturing and animating at Wells Rich Greene but didn’t help me in my longdistance life with my family in Dallas. (Lawrence 2002, p.60)
Nurturing, animating, and, she might have added, absolute surplus-generating.
The same attention to an attractive work environment that attracts workers
capable of performing compound labor can also intensify the work effort and generate
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relative surplus. While all the attention people in charge of running agencies give to
creating a fertile work environment may have corollary benefits for employees, it also
increases their generation of surplus. “Creating a fertile universe for your staff is the only
way to ensure future creative and financial success,” Robin Kaplan Thaler writes as she
explains how employees are encouraged to “bring their whole being to work” with the
result that “most people feel more accepted here than in previous jobs” (Kaplan Thaler
and Koval 2003, p.222). It is a neat trick, making them feel emotionally unalienated from
their labor process while continuing to alienate them from the economic value they
generate.
It is a neat trick, but not easily accomplished. Some of Arlie Russell Hochschild’s
insights about emotional labor can be adapted to this case. Ad creatives do not have direct
personal contact with consumers, but do work to produce an emotional state. They can
feel estrangement, potentially painful internal divisions. How much do they or can they
believe in what they say on the job? David Ogilvy insisted he did not and would not ever
advertise a product he did not believe in (Ogilvy 1983). If true, that is the privilege of the
successful agency founder and CEO. Most advertising agency employees have a much
weaker right of refusal. James Othmer chose to open his memoir of a career in
advertising by evoking the job’s challenge to the ad creative’s sense of self with a barrage
of questions from supervisor to worker about his ability to work on accounts for
objectionable clients such as tobacco companies. Phil Dusenberry sometimes waxed
enthusiastic about the product he was selling – Ronald Reagan, for example – but other
times he remained silent on the question of whether he believed in the products or not,
instead focusing on the intellectual/creative thrill of the process, finding a solution to a
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selling problem. Hey, we can keep selling Snickers by presenting it as a good solution to
hunger, but we can also sell Snickers by presenting it a good cure for boredom! Brilliant
insight! In his book he betrays no sign of concern over whether it is good for consumers
to be persuaded that mindlessly eating candy bars is a good response to boredom, but
perhaps he or someone else working on the account felt some qualms. Kaplan Thaler and
Koval write about bringing employees’ emotional selves to the workplace in order to
work more effectively at managing the emotions of consumers – and as founders and
CEO/Chief Creative Officer and Chief Marketing Officer of their firm this may not be
troubling to them. But the question of what use an employer makes of employees’
emotional work – does the employee’s management and display of emotion become part
of the job, converting it into value-producing emotional labor? – and what identity crises
it may spawn for the employee apply. Susan Linn adopts the phrase “Pontius Pilate
Plight” to describe the split between standard professional practice and personal values
felt by some of those who work in marketing (Linn 2004, p.22) and there are certainly
some who leave advertising jobs because they decide that they can’t stand trying to sell
people things they don’t need.
Posing another challenge to an advertising firm attempting to draw surplus out of
creative workers, a culture that celebrates the artist as a heroic individual creator can do
little motivate creative workers who are economically alienated from the product of their
labor and who remain largely anonymous even when their creations become ubiquitous.
Who created the frogs croaking Bud-Weis-Er? Or the polar bears drinking Coca-Cola?
Or, a century ago, the Quaker Oats man? But, in at least partial compensation for
invisibility outside the field, there is widespread recognition of authorship and the
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possibility of prestigious rewards within the advertising industry. Advertising agencies
spend a considerable sum of money (up to a half a million dollars) to enter their
employees’ work in competitions each year (Tungate 2007, pp.244-247). This serves
multiple functions for the agency. The possibility of public recognition from peers can
motivate employees (intensify their effort, generate relative surplus). A track record of
winning awards can attract desirable employees (expand access to compound labor). An
impressive trophy shelf signals creative skill and is attractive to potential clients.
Recently, agencies have added some new tools for sustaining and managing
creative workers. Robert Saville, co-founding partner and creative director of Mother
advertising agency in London described how Mother provides a setting for employees to
do self-directed work:
[P]art of the encouragement of keeping and encouraging creativity in an
organization has to be to find a framework where people can express their
creativity. Salman Rushdie worked in advertising at one point, so did Ridley
Scott, so did Alan Parker… Our job really is to try and make sure that people are
able to explore their creativity in different ways, sometimes on their own behalf,
to pursue their dream of writing a book, or making a comic or creating an event,
and sometimes in association with clients. And clients want to know that they’ve
got access to those people, so they want to find a place which is sympathetic to
making sure that there’s the right environment for those people to come, because
creativity has phenomenal value.
Saville wants to harness the creative drive, rather than set up employment at Mother in
opposition to the urge to create, forcing workers to leave to go pursue those ideas
(Williams 2010, p.113). The KesselsKramer agency, with offices in Amsterdam and
London, similarly encourages self-directed work and then provides a sales venue online
and in a gallery associated with the agency. (Williams 2010, pp.204-5) (This is not
completely new. Decades ago, Mary Wells Lawrence, in her desperation to keep a
particularly valuable creative mind working at her agency, financed the production of a
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movie he wanted to make (Lawrence 2002, pp.126-130). But that was rather an extreme
case.)

Conclusion
Advertising speech produced in an advertising agency is speech with the status of
a commodity. It is recognized both in practice and by law as property. It is alienable. It
can be exchanged for money. Many analyses of informational commodities focus on nonrival information, information that can be replicated and resold without end. The same
market research report can be sold to Hertz and Enterprise. Some informational
commodities’ usefulness to the purchaser is undiminished or even augmented when
others have access to the same information. In these cases the sellers of information are
driven to try to police their customers’ post-purchase behavior and limit the second-hand
circulation of the information. Advertising speech, however, is rival. The purpose of
advertising speech is differentiation, which means that the advertising campaign sold to
Hertz cannot also be sold to Enterprise.
Since advertising speech is rival, exchangeable, alienable property, it is a
commodity whose production is bound by the fundamental labor time trade-off.
Producing more advertising speech for sale requires allocating more labor time to its
production. Therefore the value flow realized in its sale is newly produced exchange
value derived from productive labor: concrete speech-producing labor which is twinned
with an aspect of abstract, value-producing labor. The setting that enables trade in
commodified speech also enables the commodification of speech-producing labor power.
Producing speech can be – and, in most advertising agencies, is – a concrete labor
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activity carried out under capitalist relations of production. The value of the speech
produced can therefore be analyzed with Marx’s tripartite division of a commodity’s
value. The inputs and exhausted means of production pass on their value unaugmented
(c). The living labor of advertising creatives adds new value, which is divided between
the wage paid to the creatives (v) and a surplus appropriated by their employers (s). Some
advertising workers are highly compensated, but their high wages derive from their
performance of compound labor. Their higher-than-average compensation does not come
at the expense of the employer’s surplus but rather comes twinned with a large surplus.
And layered on top of the scaled-up v and s of their compound labor, advertising agencies
are managed with an eye toward generating both absolute surplus (from a long workday)
and relative surplus (from an intense work effort).
The employees of J. Walter Thompson or Wieden and Kennedy speak, but the
words they speak on billable company time are not theirs. And the words they speak are
not just communications; they are also commodities. The exchange value of those
commodities is, similarly, not theirs. What remains theirs is their discourse-producing
labor power. As concrete labor, it is highly specialized, highly skilled, very rare, and
often fetches a very high price. Nevertheless, it contains an aspect, too, of abstract labor
subject to the logic of capitalist class relations. As well rewarded as it may be, and even if
experienced by the laborers as gratifying, creative work, it produces exchange value and
yields a surplus.
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CHAPTER 3
THE USE VALUE OF ADVERTISING

Introduction: Advertising and the Capitalist Enterprise’s Conditions of Existence
A capitalist enterprise can only persist in a context that meets its necessary
conditions of existence, but the context is not independent of the firm itself. The
enterprise is always engaged in efforts to shape its context at the same time that it is
engaged in efforts to survive and thrive within its context. Advertising is one of those
context-shaping efforts; the use value of advertising is to secure the enterprise’s
conditions of existence. The intended targets of advertising include the economic
conditions of existence, comprising both class processes (fundamental and subsumed)
and nonclass economic processes; political conditions of existence; and social or cultural
conditions of existence. The pursuit of any of these conditions of existence cannot be
isolated from the others. The economic context affects the political and cultural contexts;
the political context affects the cultural and economic contexts; and the cultural context
affects the economic and political contexts (Resnick and Wolff 1987).
In the economic realm, advertising can aim to influence the behavior of
consumers, competitors, or employees. When aiming at consumers, advertising can
attempt to increase demand, which facilitates accumulation by allowing surplus value to
be realized on a larger scale. Advertising can also aim to make demand less elastic,
enabling the enterprise to enjoy monopoly pricing power and realize nonclass revenues.
The enterprise can expect that influencing consumers will influence competitors’
behavior indirectly, but the advertising can also aim to have a direct influence on
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competitors. Advertising is also one of the weapons in the struggle between manufacturer
and merchant, both through the signal of consumer demand and directly. Similarly, the
enterprise can expect that influencing consumers will influence capital markets indirectly,
but advertising can also directly target investors in capital markets. When we draw the
analysis inward from the enterprise’s market context to the internal production process,
we find that advertising can act as a tool of labor discipline, contributing to the renewal
of the fundamental class process of labor exploitation (Hadar 1966; Jones 2004; Resnick
and Wolff 1987; Tungate 2007).
Advertising can try to influence the political process and secure the enterprise’s
political conditions of existence. This is clearest in the case of lobbying, which is just
advertising with a very narrowly defined target audience. But purchased persuasive
efforts of the kind more traditionally labeled advertising and disseminated through the
purchase of media advertising space/time can also pursue political ends, aiming to
influence policymakers or to influence citizens to pressure policymakers.
In the cultural realm, advertising is one of the influences on the culture of
consumption. Any given advertisement makes a narrow set of claims about a specific
product and tries to shape the cultural discourse in such a way that particular meanings
and associations become attached to that product. In the aggregate, advertising speech
presents a model of how consumer goods in general are incorporated into the culture.
Advertising is never the only intervention in meaning making, but its prominence makes
it powerful (Jhally 1987). To the extent that an advertisement contributes to a general
consumption culture compatible with capitalism, it has an element of public good to it –
if the public in this case is restricted to capitalists. At the same time, to the extent that an

115

advertisement contributes to depleting audience attention and giving audiences practice in
filtering and resisting advertising speech, an advertisement has a negative externality.
(What exactly is considered negative about the externalities of advertising differs with
perspective, of course. For capitalists, audiences schooled by earlier advertisements to
resist advertising messages is a negative externality; for parents being nagged to buy toys
and junk food, signs that their children have learned a little more resistance to advertising
messages would be most welcome (Kirschenbaum and Bond 1998; Linn 2004).)
Interventions in each of these realms interact with all the others in complex ways.
Influencing the cultural practices that make use of consumer goods (cultural realm)
influences the market demand for those goods (economic realm of circulation).
Influencing the economic realm to successfully increase revenues and profit margins may
alter public perceptions directly and also fund additional advertising that will influence
political and cultural conditions. And so on. Branding is a particularly densely woven
example of the interrelations among all these realms and the contribution of advertising
to influencing them all (Resnick and Wolff 1987, pp.207-213).

The Enterprise’s Economic Conditions of Existence
One of the enterprise’s economic conditions of existence is that, in general, on
average, over time, revenues must at least equal outlays. This does not have to be true
during every period, but if revenues are consistently less than outlays, the enterprise goes
bankrupt and ceases to exist. We can categorize the firm’s revenues by the class or
nonclass origin of the source. We can categorize its outlays, or distributions, to use

116

Resnick and Wolff’s term, according to the conditions of existence those payments aim to
secure (Resnick and Wolff 1987, pp.208-210).
As a result of the fundamental class process, the exploitation of productive labor,
the enterprise receives surplus value. If the enterprise provides conditions of existence for
other capitalists to exploit labor and receives payment in return, there will also be
subsumed class revenues on the revenue side of the ledger. Lastly, the enterprise may
also receive nonclass revenues, such as payments made out of workers’ wages over and
above the labor value of the goods sold. Importantly for the analysis of advertising,
monopoly pricing on goods sold to anyone other than direct appropriators of the surplus
yields a nonclass revenue equal to the increment of price above value.
On the expenditure side of the ledger, the distributions may be categorized
according to a complementary scheme. Distributions to secure the fundamental class
process – and there may be many! – are categorized as subsumed class payments, !SC.
Distributions to secure subsumed class revenues are labeled !X. Distributions to secure
nonclass revenues are labeled !Y. Resnick and Wolff constructed the following equation
to summarize the class and nonclass revenues the enterprise receives and the distributions
made to secure each of these revenues:
SV + SCR + NCR = !SC + !X + !Y

(1)

Of course, surplus value received may be more or less than the subsumed class
distributions made in pursuit of surplus, subsumed class revenues may be more or less
than the !X distributions made in their pursuit, and nonclass revenues may be more or
less than the !Y distributions. Sometimes revenues are received without any distributions
needed to secure them; other times distributions meant to secure a particular stream of
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revenue may fail. The equality may not even hold in the aggregate, but if the left hand
side is less than the right, this represents a crisis for the enterprise (Resnick and Wolff
1987, p.209).

Basic tools of value analysis
I will consider here the manufacturers of a final consumption good purchased by
workers. If the good sells at its value, the manufacturers receive a revenue of c + v + s on
the sale of each unit. (I will use lower case letters for the per-unit value, upper case for
the aggregate. So c multiplied by the number of units is C, etc.) If the good sells above its
value, the manufacturer receives an additional value flow, and since it is received from
workers, it is a non-class revenue (ncr). In Baran and Sweezy’s analysis in Monopoly
Capital, they did not distinguish clearly between surplus value and value flows resulting
from monopoly power. They described labor exploitation and monopoly power as both
contributing to the pool of surplus (Baran and Sweezy 1966). This conflation obscures
some important differences in the two sources of profit. Surplus value produced by
surplus labor arises in the production process. Monopoly pricing is a market
phenomenon. A firm’s ability to generate surplus is largely dependent on the relative
power of capital and labor whereas the firm’s ability to generate revenues from monopoly
pricing is largely dependent on the relative power of the firm and its actual or potential
competitors, the firm and its customers.
Edward Chamberlin’s Monopolistic Competition (1933) makes an important
contribution to theorizing price-setting power in the realm of circulation. Chamberlin’s
central argument is that the standard model of monopoly is a better approximation of
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most producers’ reality than is the model of pure competition and that the best
approximation of all is a hybrid occupying an intermediate point on a continuum between
the two extremes. Markets resembling the neoclassical model of pure, perfect
competition – that is, one with many producers producing indistinguishable goods, each
one of whom must act as a price-taker who can reliably dispose of the firm’s entire output
at the going market price – are very rare. However, the pure theory of monopoly in which
sellers face an invariant, downward sloping demand curve for a good with no available
substitutes and can set price (or choose quantity) at will for their profit-maximizing ends
overstates the case. Most sellers sell goods that are distinguishable from others, so the
competition is not pure competition, but for which there are substitutes, so neither is there
pure monopoly.
Each producer, therefore, faces a market distinct from that of all other producers
and confronts an individual demand curve whose parameters are set by the availability of
substitutes and their prices. In the limiting case at the competitive extreme, there are so
many sellers with goods that are so nearly the same that any one seller is responsible for a
miniscule fraction of the total output. Additionally, every seller has equal ease of access
to every potential buyer, and vice versa, and buyers choose only on the basis of price.
Each seller therefore has no pricing power but also has no excess inventory problem: the
individual demand curve converges toward a horizontal line. In the limiting case at the
monopolistic extreme, there are no remotely near substitutes for the good in question and
the seller can therefore set the price at will but must take the resulting demand-limiting
consequences (Chamberlin 1962, pp.17, 65-68).
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Except, of course, that even a producer as near as possible to the purely
monopolistic end of the spectrum does not face an exogenous, invariant demand curve.
Instead, as Schumpeter among others has pointed out, stoking demand for their unique
output is one of monopolists’ indispensible activities (Schumpeter 1942). Chamberlin,
too, devoted considerable attention to the question of selling costs. Chamberlin
distinguished between costs of production and selling costs by defining production costs
as costs incurred in the process of fulfilling demand whereas selling costs are costs
incurred in an effort to change the demand curve (1962, p. 117).
With some assumptions about a functional relationship between selling costs and
changes in the demand schedule and accurately calibrated profit maximizing behavior, a
unique equilibrium price can still be defined. With any remotely adequate admission of
uncertainty into the analysis, however, Chamberlin’s theory of price splinters into the
kaleidoscopic proliferation of possibilities recognized by Keynes (1964) or G.L.S.
Shackle (1972). Price, and hence value for those who do not distinguish between the two,
has no reliable determinants. Maximization remains a lovely dream.
Chamberlin treats price and value as synonyms. (Chamberlin subtitled his book
“A Reorientation of the Theory of Value.” Doing so emphasized his departure from the
theory of perfect competition but also announces his identification of value with price as
a market phenomenon.) Although drawing some insights from Chamberlin to analyze
market price, I maintain a conceptual distinction between price and value. And, as class is
my entry point into value analysis, I will categorize outlays and revenues according to
their relation to the fundamental and subsumed class processes rather than, as Chamberlin
did, in relation to consumer demand. Whatever the price of a good is in a particular case,
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we can decompose the price into its value components, constant capital, variable capital,
surplus value, subsumed class revenue, and nonclass revenue: c + v + sv + scr + ncr
(Resnick and Wolff 1987).

Advertising Outlays Part I: Persuading consumers
One use value of advertising is to sell more goods. Despite saying many other
24

things that complicate the claim, advertising professionals say over and over that selling
more goods is the only aim of advertising. Since realization of embodied labor value
cannot be assumed, advertising may be one of the actions the enterprise takes in order to
realize surplus value generated in one production period and enable the continuation of
the fundamental class process in the next. By shifting the demand curve outward
advertising may even enable the production and realization of surplus value on an
expanded scale. To the extent that advertising achieves this, it can be considered a
subsumed class payment – one of the many claims on the surplus that also secure the
conditions for the continued existence of surplus.
Advertising also aims to reduce price sensitivity. The enterprise may convert the
increased demand into higher prices instead of higher volume (Jones 2004). To the extent
that advertising enables the enterprise to enjoy pricing power and charge a price higher
than value, it secures the conditions of existence for revenues in addition to embodied C,
V, and SV. In the case of a consumption good sold to workers, the additional revenue is a
nonclass revenue and so the expenditure on advertising that secures monopoly pricing
power can be categorized as one of the Y outlays.
24

e.g. “Clients advertise with one overriding objective: sell more stuff” (Dusenberry
2005, p.86).
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Indeed both things can happen at once. Assume a starting point at which goods
are selling at a price equal to value, point A in figure 3.1. Then suppose a successful
advertising campaign shifts the demand curve outward. The increased demand can
translate into an increased scale of production and realization of exchange value at the
same price (point B) in which case the advertising budget can be considered entirely a
subsumed class payment. Alternatively, the increased demand can translate into increased
price at the same scale of production (point C) in which case the advertising budget can
be considered entirely a Y-expenditure, spent to secure monopoly pricing power, yielding
a nonclass revenue. But the result could also be anywhere in between points B and C in
which case the advertising outlay is partly a subsumed class payment and partly a Y
expenditure. (Indeed, the resulting price and quantity could even lie on the demand curve
outside segment BC or, if the enterprise does not take full advantage of existing demand,
below the demand curve.)
P
C
p2
ncr{
p1
s{
v{
c{

A

B
demand2
demand1

q1
q2
Q
Figure 3.1 Increased Demand Yields New Revenues
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Advertising Outlays Part II: Communicating with Competitors
Persuading consumers will influence competitors, too. Customers will change
their behavior, which will change market conditions, and competitors will respond to
altered market signals. Sometimes, however, advertising is created with a direct influence
on competitors in mind. Indeed, Jones posits that advertising decisions consider the
competition first, customers only later. Phil Dusenberry described the advertising
campaign created when McDonald’s decided to add pizza to the menu this way: “They
were trumpeting their huge investment in pizza as much to intimidate Pizza Hut as to
signal to Wall Street that they were committed to being a hot growth company again.”
(Presumably the ads were also intended to persuade customers to buy pizza.)
Dusenberry’s advertising agency, BBDO was working for Pizza Hut and designed a
retaliatory advertising campaign that denigrated McDonald’s pizza. The campaign was
counted a success: McDonald’s backed out of the pizza market. “Our Patriot missiles had
knocked down Mickey D’s Scuds,” Dusenberry crowed in his memoir (Dusenberry 2005,
pp.152-153). The communicative goal of the advertising can be for competitors to
respond immediately and directly to the signal in the advertising, not just to the change in
25

consumer behavior influenced by the advertising.

Advertising that communicates to competitors directly reverses the chain of
influence. Instead of influencing competitors through consumers, the ads influence
25

Public advocacy advertising sometimes takes an analogous approach, attempting to
influence public officials directly in addition to encouraging constituents to pressure
officials. Sometimes an advocacy group will even show an advertisement to the
government or corporate officials whose behavior they want to change before
broadcasting the ad to sway public opinion. If the targets agree to change, the advocacy
group may agree not to air the ad – essentially public-spirited blackmail. e.g. Mayor
Dinkins of New York City and water quality (Kirschenbaum and Bond). Hershey’s and
child labor. (Green America Quarterly fall 2012)
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consumers through competitors. The individual enterprise’s market conditions depend on
consumers’ choices within a given choice set and on the choice set itself. Advertising can
persuade consumers to make a particular choice out of the available options and as the
enterprise and its competitors respond to those consumer choices, the choice set they
present to customers shifts. Advertising can also directly persuade an enterprise’s
competitors to change the choice set they present to consumers, which then necessarily
results in consumers making different choices. When McDonald’s withdrew from the
pizza market, Pizza Hut had to contend with fewer potential close substitutes.
Both communicative channels can be active at once. Consumers and competitors
can both receive and respond to the advertising signal at the same time. These two
communicative targets of advertising are simultaneous, not substitutes. And in both cases
the resulting exchange value revenues for the enterprise that successfully stokes demand
can be a combination of additional surplus value and additional monopoly rents (which
are typically nonclass revenues), meaning that the outlays on advertising can be
considered a combination of subsumed class distribution and Y distribution.

Advertising Outlays Part III: Advertising and the relationship between
manufacturer and merchant
The relationships among manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and consumers are
intricately braided together. Manufacturers communicate directly to consumers through
consumer advertising, but very often rely on distributors and retailers as intermediaries
between initial production and final sale. Manufacturers interact directly with
intermediaries, but also rely on the demand signals retailers get from consumers to help
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make their case for shelf space. Just as advertising can simultaneously influence
consumers and competitors, advertising can simultaneously influence consumers and
distribution chain intermediaries (Jones 2004; Maas and Roman 1992; Strasser 1989).
Advertising that communicates directly to consumers, when persuasive, alters the
demand signals that retailers get from consumers. Manufacturers’ practice of intensively
cultivating this channel of communication dates to the late nineteenth century. Through
much of the nineteenth century, manufacturers had approached distribution as a push:
they sold to wholesalers, the wholesalers’ drummers (salesmen) pushed goods to
merchants, who then had to be relied upon to promote the goods to consumers. Late in
the century, modernizing marketers shifted to a demand pull strategy. Over and over,
advertisements exhorted consumers to ask for Cottolene (or whatever)… accept no
substitutes… send your grocer’s name and address to the manufacturer if he does not
stock this product. When it worked, customers walked into a store requesting the product
of a specific manufacturer and the retailers then had to stock that product to satisfy their
customers. When it didn’t work, the grocer would tell the customer, we don’t have Brand
X, but Brand Y is just as good, and the customer would accept the substitute (Laird 1998,
Strasser 1989).
Evidence of consumers’ brand loyalty is still a persuasive argument for retailers to
stock a particular brand. Not carrying the favored brand risks losing customers. As an
additional advantage of carrying the brand, brand advertising relieves retailers of some of
the duties of salesmanship. Manufacturers will sometimes add extra inducements for
retailers to supply shelf space by giving the local retailer a mention in locally placed
brand advertisements or by delivering ready-to-use in-store promotional displays. A
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strong brand is a near-guarantee of strong, steady sales, which is attractive to retailers
(Jones 2004).
However, manufacturers bargain with merchants over the size of merchants’ fees,
too, not just shelf space. Whatever benefit retailers derive from stocking strong brandname products comes at the cost of reduced bargaining power and lower merchant fees.
Manufacturers who invest in strong branding can, branding consultant Scott Davis says,
“maximize channel influence” (Davis 2000, p.181). That is, they are in a position to
dictate how their products move through the distribution chain and to retain a hefty share
of the surplus and monopoly pricing premia.
Ideally, manufacturers and retailers both want the product to be in stock already
when the customer walks in wanting it. So although manufacturers’ advertisements have
to persuade consumers to buy, they also have to persuade retailers that consumers will
want to buy. It is not enough for the manufacturer to have confidence in an upcoming
advertising campaign or for the manufacturer even to demonstrate to retailers after the
fact that the advertising successfully stoked demand. The retailers have to believe
beforehand that the advertising campaign will be effective. Car manufacturers need their
dealers to approve of the manufacturers’ advertising (Rothenberg 1994, p.112). Soft drink
companies have to keep bottlers happy (Dusenberry 2005, p.246).
Intermediaries are therefore important direct recipients of advertising messages,
not only recipients of indirect signaling through consumers. Manufacturers choose
content and placement that they believe will be noticed by and be persuasive to
merchants. Maas and Roman advise manufacturers to pay attention to retailers as
intentional targets of the advertising: “The local supermarket manager may never see
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your commercials on TV but will notice a big poster across the street from the store”
(1992, p.56). To the extent that advertising successfully increases the manufacturer’s
power to bargain for lower merchant fees, it reduces one type of subsumed class
distribution that the manufacturing firm must make. (On the other hand, merchant’s
advertising can cultivate customers’ loyalty to the store rather than to the manufacturer’s
brand and position the merchant enterprise to increase the share of the surplus it can
command.)

Advertising Outlays Part IV: Advertising and the Management of Labor in the
Production Process
Some advertising is as much a form of internal communication as it is an external
communication. As in all cases, the communication can be channeled indirectly through
consumers to employees and simultaneously communicate directly to employees.
Advertising communicates directly to employees in ways that can motivate and
discipline. Businesses with strong brands tend to have higher levels of self-reported
employee job satisfaction and fewer instances of disruptive labor conflict (Davis 2000,
pp.7, 122-123, 230; Lindemann 2010, pp.114-115). Advertising can also necessitate new
means of labor discipline that complement the advertising in order to align employee
behavior with the consumer expectations aroused by the advertising. As early as the
1890s, Nathaniel Fowler urged merchants to be sure their store clerks were familiar with
the firm’s advertising so that the clerks would know the expectations customers were
prompted to bring with them to the store (Fowler 1900, p.481). As the service industry
grows and as even firms that produce material goods sell a brand experience, the labor
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discipline function of advertising magnifies in importance. More jobs require the
affective, interpersonal labor of representing the brand to the consumer.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the car-rental agency Avis ran a famous campaign that
highlighted their status as number two in their product category with the theme “We try
harder.” Phil Dusenberry marvels at the advertising insight that produced this campaign:
“The slogan not only positioned Avis beautifully as the appealing underdog to the
category leader, Hertz. It not only made a national virtue out of being number two. But
the campaign did triple duty by inspiring Avis employees. They were proud to be known
as the people who try harder. If you could have measured Avis employee morale at the
time, the needle would have flown of the meter” (Dusenberry 2005, p.104). The only
problem with Dusenberry’s analysis is that his assessment of the effect on Avis employee
morale is entirely conjectural. Mary Wells Lawrence, who had direct knowledge of the
creation and execution of the campaign tells a more complicated story: “Nobody was
more surprised than they were to discover they were Number Two and trying harder than
Hertz.” Some were furious about the demands the ad claims put on them. “It was nipand-tuck for a while whether the dealers would go along with the new image and the
expectations. ‘I couldn’t even get a job at Hertz,’ one of them told me. ‘Now you people
tell me I am better than Hertz? That I try harder than Hertz? Are you crazy?’ But in the
end they did go along, and the wonders never ceased” (Lawrence 2002, p.7).
Arlie Russell Hochschild’s study of the emotional labor of flight attendants
conducted in the 1980s reveals how, for service workers, consumer advertising indirectly
disciplines employees. The advertisements set passengers’ expectations for service,
meaning the ads “subtly rewrite job descriptions and redefine roles.” The flight

128

attendant’s smile is advertised as part of the package that comes with the plane ticket. At
times, the ads sexualize the smile. “As one flight attendant put it: ‘You have married men
with three kids getting on the plane and suddenly they feel anything goes. It’s like they
leave that reality on the ground, and you fit into their fantasy as some geisha girl. It
happens over and over again.’” Even when not sexualized, the advertised smile can
“inflate the expectations of passengers, and therefore increase their right to feel
disappointed. Ordinary niceness is no longer enough; after all, hasn’t the passenger paid
for extra civility? As every flight attendant knows well, she can expect to face
surprisingly deep indignation when her expressive machine is idling or, worse yet,
backfiring”. But the employee discipline exercised by advertising through setting
consumer expectations cannot work in isolation. In order to match flight attendants’
behavior to passenger expectations, flight attendants attend regular, intensive training in
the management of emotion (Hochschild 2003, pp.90-95).
Although most pronounced in service industries, the internal communications
function of advertising is not limited to service industries. Mary Wells Lawrence tells the
story of a corporate campaign she worked on for Ford. Ford was in trouble in 1979 and a
complete turnaround would take a long time. “We thought the only meaningful
contribution that corporate advertising could make at that critical hour would be to
produce a wave of fresh confidence in Ford among Ford owners, new car buyers,
Washington critics, the press, and, most important of all, among those downtrodden souls
who were sitting in those dark offices at Ford.” Her agency, Wells Rich Green got the
Ford account on the basis of this pitch. They then created the promised advertisements.
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Ford executives loved them and at Henry Ford’s suggestion they played the advertising
music (an inspiring march) in the halls at Ford offices (Lawrence 2002, p.218).
That, apparently, took care of managers. What could the corporate campaign do to
enlist the line workers in the Ford overhaul? American auto workers were not highly
regarded in public opinion. The advertising campaign enlisted line workers as spokesmen
for the company, emphasizing their commitment to quality. Television advertisements
featured real workers in real plants. “Every time we filmed a worker in his home plant the
quality of workmanship at that plant shot up. It was as if the whole plant had gone on
stage and declared it was personally responsible for the quality coming out of the Ford
Motor Company. Plant managers fought to have commercials made in their plants
starring their workers” (Lawrence 2002, pp.218-226).
The success of the internal communications function of advertising is as uncertain
as the external communications functions. For advertising to discipline service workers
by setting customer expectations, the advertising must successfully shape customers’
views and then their employees must respond to customers as their employer intends;
either step of this mechanism could break down. Additionally, the second step requires
additional internal communications beyond the advertising campaign. Hochschild
describes the intense initial and continuing training required of flight attendants, training
intended to shape their on-the-job performance to the specifications that the
advertisements promise (Hochschild 2003). Even when skipping the intermediary of
consumers as conveyers of the message, internal communications purchased from outside
advertising or branding consultants and received directly by employees can be just as
unpersuasive as advertising directed outward sometimes is. Branding consultants
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regularly develop mission statements for firms, but 77% of employees in the U.S. say
they don’t think the mission statements match the way their companies actually operate
(Conley 2008, p.11).

Advertising Outlays Part V: Advertising to Influence Capital Markets and Secure
Financial Conditions of Existence
Access to credit is often critically important for an enterprise’s survival. Just as
firms purchase the aid of advertising agencies to communicate with those they encounter
in their production and distribution chains – consumers, retailers, and employees – they
also purchase the aid of advertising agencies to communicate with investors.
David Ogilvy wrote that one of his main purposes in writing Confessions of an
Advertising Man, which was in effect an advertisement for his agency, Ogilvy, Benson &
Mather, was to prepare the way for an initial public offering of stock in the company
(Ogilvy [1963] 2003, p.15). He is not the only one to use advertising to try to influence
financial market activity. Whether making an IPO or seeking to raise capital for a
company that is already publicly traded, firms who depend on capital markets do not
wish to leave the decisions of the capital markets to chance. Instead, they purchase the
attention of investors by purchasing ad space in targeted publications, ad time on Sunday
morning news shows, billboards in the financial district. Mark Tungate writes that one
significant beneficiary of the 1990s dotcom boom was the outdoor advertising industry
who supplied the billboard spaces for “dotcom companies [to plaster] their
incomprehensible logos all over town. … British dotcoms ask[ed] their media buyers to
concentrate on sites in the City in order to raise their profile among the financial
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community” (Tungate 2007, p.214). They wanted investors as well as consumers to have
warm and familiar feelings about their company.
Through a combination of the warm feelings investors have about the brand and
the predictable pricing and sales volumes resulting from consumers’ warm feelings,
advertising and other branding strategies contribute significantly to stock market
performance. David Aaker and Bob Jacobson found that a measure they called brand
equity influenced stock market returns almost as much as reported earnings (Davis 2000,
pp.xi-xii). Other studies comparing the stock market performance of companies with
strong brands to those without found that a portfolio of businesses selected on the basis of
brand strength consistently outperformed the rest of stock market and did this at lower
risk. In mergers and acquisitions, a brand can be a very large component of the price of
the firm, often the largest single asset (Lindemann 2010, pp.14-17).

Political Conditions of Existence
Advertising represents more than a distribution (measured in value terms)
securing a revenue (also measured in value terms). Advertising’s economic effects are
never isolated from its political and cultural effects. Directly and indirectly, advertising
does more than secure economic conditions of existence; it influences, and is in turn
influenced by, politics and culture.
A great deal of the communication that firms purchase in an attempt to secure
favorable political conditions is created by lobbying firms, which are, in effect,
advertising agencies specializing in a very narrowly defined target audience. But other,
less specialized advertising agencies also sometimes get a piece of the action. Phil
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Dusenberry recalls that the campaign his agency, BBDO, designed for DuPont won
awards. “But more than anything else, it changed people’s impression of DuPont,
particularly among the key constituencies we were aiming for: Wall Street as well as
Washington, other businesses as well as consumers.” Aiming for the political and
business elites meant, among other things, purchasing spots on the Sunday morning talk
shows (Dusenberry 2005, pp.135-137). Similarly, Mary Wells Lawrence’s wrote that the
goal of a Ford corporate image campaign she worked on in beginning in 1979 was “[t]o
convince Wall Street, Washington and everybody else that the Ford Motor Company was
alive and well” (Lawrence 2002, p.223). Communicating to “Washington” was an
explicitly acknowledged purpose of the advertising campaign, alongside communicating
to capital markets, competitors, and consumers.
Political candidates and organizations such as political action committees often
purchase advertising in an attempt to sway voters or stoke constituents to pressure their
elected officials on some particular issue; sometimes an enterprise or business group will
do so, too. During the past several years, Massachusetts voters have been urged by
businesses communicating through broadcast advertising to take concrete political action.
We were asked, for example, to call lawmakers to express our opinions on proposed
“right to repair” legislation which requires car manufacturers to provide independent
mechanics with the information necessary for them to make repairs, weakening the
monopoly position of authorized dealerships. (The law passed.)
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Cultural Conditions of Existence: Advertising and the Social Meanings of Goods
When advertising speaks to consumers and tries to persuade them to buy, it is
aiming to achieve an economic condition of existence – sales revenue. But persuasion in
the service of this economic end is simultaneously the pursuit of cultural conditions of
existence. Asking people to buy means asking them to make a meaning for the good in
their material culture. As Daniel Bonner, chief creative officer at advertising agency
AKQA says, “[W]hen it [advertising] was good it would influence culture. It would
change people’s opinions” (Williams 2010, p.7).

Consumption has a ritualistic element; it is a part of the social fabric. Material
goods therefore have symbolic as well as physical use values. One of the uses of goods is
to communicate – the goods we purchase, use, display, and give as gifts are the
vocabulary in a system of social communication. In Mary Douglas and Baron
Isherwood’s words, “[G]oods are part of a live information system.” We deploy them in
our construction of an identity and our presentation of ourselves to others; we consume in
order to belong. Even when the act of consumption occurs in private, the social meanings
of the good influence the experience of consumption (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, pp.
10, 74-77). Without any observers and without any intention of reporting the act of
consumption to others, purchasing and using a good allows us to feel connected to a set
of symbolic associations. As Mary Douglas admits, taking this view of consumption
goods must analytically strip away some real features of consumption goods – food also
provides biologically necessary calories, vitamins, and minerals for example, but it is
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worth deemphasizing the physical properties of goods in order to see the social function
of consumption with increased clarity (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, pp.59-62).

Since consumption goods are markers of relationships among people and a
channel of communication amongst people, there is a potential fetishism of use values
that runs parallel to the fetishism of exchange values. Marx argued that the exchange
value of capitalist commodities derive from the social relations of their production, but
since these commodities appear on the market stripped of their context their exchange
values comes to appear to be innate features of the commodities themselves. Attributing
the exchange value to the product rather than to its production history is a form of
fetishism. Marx never settled on a fully articulated theory of consumption. At times he
treated use values as though they were self-evident features of the specific, concrete
commodity. Other times he noted the socially embedded, relative nature of consumption.
Anthropologists such as Mary Douglas, Marshall Sahlins, and David Graeber analyze the
ways in which goods are used to both mark and (re)produce social relationships and so
reveal that attributing a use value to a commodity in isolation from its social context is as
fetishistic as is attributing an exchange value (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, Sahlins
26

1976, Graeber 2001).

Advertising professionals take this anthropological view of consumption.
Advertisements that evoke a group identity have largely displaced advertisements that
talk about the qualities of the product (Jhally 1987). If the social signaling function of a
26

All three, in turn, draw on the work of prior scholars in the anthropological canon. I
cite these three in particular because Douglas explicitly aims to engage with the
economics discipline’s attempts to theorize consumption while Sahlins and Graeber
explicitly engage with Marx and the Marxist tradition.
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product is not yet developed and the anthropological theory of consumption seems poorly
suited to analyzing demand, advertising will aim to make the anthropologists’ analysis
more apt. Kenneth Roman and Jane Maas in their primer How to Advertise explain the
distinction between low-ego involvement goods, for which the anthropological view of
consumption is least applicable, and high-ego involvement goods. Low-ego-involvement
consumption decisions involve things that are not intimately tied to our self-image or the
social image we want to project. High-ego-involvement decisions are those that we
believe do make statements about ourselves. The advertiser’s aim is to move all goods
toward the high-ego involvement end of the spectrum. They quote branding consultant
Steve Arbeit: “Our objective is to raise the level of ego involvement, and to guide the
consumer decision into brand loyalty” (Maas and Roman 1992, p.6).
The anthropological view put forth more than thirty years ago in Douglas and
Isherwood’s classic The World of Goods is corroborated by modern cognitive science.
Pepsi is consistently chosen over Coke in blind taste tests. Pepsi made much of this result
in their “Pepsi Challenge” advertising campaign beginning in the 1970s – when they
weren’t telling young people they belonged to the Pepsi generation. (The Pepsi
generation theme persisted for a startlingly long time. Some members of the first Pepsi
generation had grandkids who heard the same come-on from PepsiCo (Dusenberry 2005,
p220).) This blind taste test result was confirmed much more recently in research
conducted by Baylor College of Medicine professor Read Montague, a neuroscientist. In
the next stage of his experiment, he ran a non-blind taste test. Coke won 75 percent of the
time. Why should that be? What about the total experience of the sight plus taste of Coke
appeals more than the sight plus taste of Pepsi given that taste in isolation favors Pepsi?
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Brain imaging showed that seeing the Coke label activated brain areas that are active
when thinking about self-image and cultural identity. That response to the brand
association overrode the direct sensory input of taste. Drinking Coke fulfills a social role
that Pepsi, no matter how it tastes, has not been able to take on (Conley 2008, pp.156-7).
Sut Jhally describes the role of advertising as analogous to religion – providing a
structure of meaning, an ideology. In his analysis, symbolic use values have fulfilled their
potential to become fetishistic. There are cases, though, for which it might be more
accurate to consider advertising an instance of the practice of magic. David Graeber
distinguishes between religion and magic by identifying what is understood as the source
of power or meaning. In religion, power and meaning are understood to come from some
source external to human activities and the social process – God (singular) or the gods. In
the case of magic, everyone understands that the power and meaning derive from human
activity (Graeber 2001). Despite the fact that the individual creators of advertisements are
most often unknown to the viewers of ads, everyone understands fully that
advertisements are the creations of people. In our postmodern culture of references,
mash-ups, and ironic remove, the knowingness of magic may be displacing fetishism.
Still, no matter how self-aware we are of the source of social meanings, to take part in the
social meaning we need the good and to get the good we must buy. A Snuggy costs the
same amount whether you wear it while cuddled up on the couch as the ad depicts or
whether you wear it with a wink and smirk while out on a pub crawl.
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Interrelations Among the Conditions of Existence – The Case of the Brand
The enterprise’s economic, political, and cultural conditions of existence can be
teased apart analytically, but they occur simultaneously and interdependently. When an
enterprise’s advertising activity aims at one condition of existence, it necessarily also has
repercussions for the others. The realization of exchange value, which typically holds a
privileged position in the enterprise’s list of aims and often holds a privileged position in
our analysis, depends on the political processes that set the context of production and the
rules of exchange and on the cultural processes that structure the desire to acquire. The
brand as both a cultural and an economic artifact illustrates this simultaneity particularly
well.
A brand is a legally recognized piece of intellectual property based in the
symbolic use value the branded good holds for consumers. The symbolic use value is a
cultural prerequisite for sales and therefore for the enterprise’s economic survival. The
brand channels the cultural process of generating symbolic use values toward economic
ends – both through sales revenues and attracting investment in capital markets.
Meanwhile, establishing the brand as a business asset depends on a political process of
defining and defending property rights. The private property status of a brand helps to
channel the desire to participate in social communication into flows of value for the brand
owner and also contributes to shaping the terrain on which the process of social
communication takes place.
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The use value of the brand for consumers
Brands have a functional use value for consumers. We have seen that material
goods have symbolic as well as physical use values, and a brand can be a powerful
symbol. Indeed, the power of the symbol can have measurable physiological effects, as in
the case of over-the-counter pain medications. Brand-name drugs are demonstrably more
effective in reducing the experience of pain than chemically identical generics (Jones
2004, pp.23-24).
John Philip Jones describes a measurement technique for quantifying the use
value of a brand to the consumer. The measurement is derived from a comparison
between a blind test and a named test. The brand with the largest market share is nearly
always preferred in a blind test and it is preferred by an even wider margin in a named
test. As a result you can disaggregate the preference into the proportion attributable to
physical attributes, which Jones calls functionality and the proportion attributable to the
symbolism and associations of the brand, which Jones calls added value. For example, if
a product is preferred by 48 percent of the sample in a blind test and is preferred by 60
percent of the sample in a named test, the total preference is due 80 percent (i.e. 48/60) to
product functionality and 20 percent to added value. With packaged food, the added
value is typically about 20 percent, but added value tends to be higher for toiletries and
proprietary drugs (Jones 2004, pp.22-23).

The exchange value of the brand and its use value for the enterprise
For the firm, brands have the use value of attracting value flows in money form.
Branded goods that can deliver added symbolic use values along with the product’s
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physical properties sell higher volumes at higher prices than goods without the added
value. Successful brand advertising yields horizontal shifts in the demand curve and also
reduces the price elasticity of demand. Manufacturers want low price elasticity, “and
there is good evidence that advertising does this job effectively.” As a result, “large,
27

successful brands have prices at least 10 percent higher than their category average”
(Jones 2004, p.25). The firm can sell more units at higher prices and both their sales
volume and their prices are usually enviably stable. A firm’s investment in advertising
(and other components of brand-building) can yield increased surplus, increased nonclass revenues, and greater predictability.
Brands, as a result of a long-unfolding political process, have the status of
intellectual property and are treated as a business asset. Because the brand is property, the
value-attracting use value of the brand for the firm can be sold or leased in a monetary
transaction. When sold, the brand has an explicit price. (And money is used as a means of
exchange.) When a brand is licensed rather than traded the use value of the brand is
loaned to another – and because of the nonrival nature of information, the licensor does
not give up the use value of the brand even during the period of the licensing contract.
Rather than an outright sale in which ownership of the brand is relinquished and its full
fictitious value is realized at once, licensing offers the use of proprietary features of the
brand to licensees and can generate rents – called royalties in this case – for the brand
owner. Major League Baseball licenses team names and logos to apparel manufacturers,
for example, while still also using the brand to sell stadium tickets and make radio and
television broadcast deals. Worldwide, licensing deals in 2008 were estimated to total
27

This is measured by effective prices, taking into account promotions, coupons, and
sales.
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US$187 billion. The licensee typically pays a royalty ranging from five to fifteen percent
of the wholesale price on each unit sold, allowing the licensor to earn returns on the
brand asset without any significant additional capital investment (Lindemann 2010,
28

p.96).

29

Even when not traded, the brand can be assessed for its monetary equivalent .

(Money in this case is used as a measure of value without any exchange taking place.)
The most widely accepted method of assessing brands depends on the price premium and
the high degree of predictability in sales. The assessed value of the brand is the net
present value of that portion of future revenues attributable to the brand. That is, calculate
the price premium commanded by the branded good over the price commanded by an
undifferentiated substitute, estimate the future volume of sales, and calculate the present
value of expected future revenues resulting from the price premium (Davis 2000, Jones
2004, Lindeman 2010). How much those high-degree-of-confidence predictions of sales
volumes and revenues are worth to the company can be summed up in a single number,
the value of the brand. Dusenberry writes, “That figure is, in essence, a measure of
loyalty, of people’s emotional attachment to your brand” (Dusenberry 2005, pp.172-3). It
is also, of course, a measure of people’s willingness and ability to pay. The brand owner
has to care more about “share of wallet” (Lindemann 2010) than about mindshare. Brand
consultancies such as Interbrand and BrandZ use this present value calculation to make
lists of the world’s most valuable brands.
28

Licensing can also be used as a tax-dodging tool for multinational enterprises: they
arrange for subsidiaries in high tax jurisdictions to pay royalties to branches of the
multinational in jurisdictions with lower tax obligations. By arranging the ownership and
use of intellectual property just so, they can minimize the overall tax bill (Lindemann
2010, p.97).
29
The assessed value of the brand influences the stock market valuation of the firm as a
whole. See the end of section two above on advertising and the firm’s financial
conditions of existence.
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Table 3.1 Assessed brand values
Interbrand
BrandZ
rank
brand name
assessed value rank
brand name
(in millions of
$)
1
Apple
98,316
1
Apple
2
Google
93,291
2
Google
3
Coca-Cola
79,213
3
IBM
4
IBM
78,808
4
McDonald’s
5
Microsoft
59,546
5
Coca-Cola
6
G.E.
46,947
6
AT&T
7
McDonald’s
41,992
7
Microsoft
8
Samsung
39,610
8
Marlboro
9
Intel
37,257
9
VISA
10
Toyota
35,346
10
China Mobile
11
Mercedes-Benz 31,904
11
G.E.
12
BMW
31,839
12
Verizon
13
Cisco
29,053
13
Wells Fargo
14
Disney
28,147
14
Amazon
15
HP
25,843
15
UPS
16
Gillette
25,105
16
ICBC Bank
17
Louis Vuitton
24,893
17
Vodafone
18
Oracle
24,088
18
Walmart
19
Amazon
23,620
19
SAP
20
Honda
18,490
20
MasterCard
Sources: Millward Brown 2013, Interbrand 2013

assessed value
(in millions of
$)
185,071
113,669
112,536
90,256
78,415
75,507
69,814
69,383
56,060
55,398
55,357
53,004
47,748
45,727
42,747
41,115
39,712
36,220
34,365
27,821

Spending on advertising that contributes mightily to the creation and maintenance
of a brand is an investment in the creation and maintenance of the brand as a business
asset. Different estimations of brand values can vary widely, but, despite sometimes
wildly inconsistent assessments depending on the precise methodology of the assessor,
top brands are hugely valuable assets. For many companies, the brand is (or the brands
are) their largest single asset. The most highly valued brands are worth billions or even
tens of billions of dollars. (See table) However, the assessed value or the sale price of a
brand bears no necessary relationship to the advertising and marketing labor that went
into its creation. It does not have an exchange value related to an “embodied” quantum of
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(largely immaterial) abstract labor, but only a market price determined entirely by other
factors, such as the degree of monopoly pricing power and projected sales. The purchase
of a brand is not the purchase of a commodity embodying abstract labor.
Instead, the value of the brand is a fictitious value. Those billions of dollars of
assessed brand value – the present value of an expected future value flow – appear in the
firm’s assessed value now, they can potentially be realized in the sale of the brand now,
but no productive labor has yet been performed and no labor value has been realized.
This is what makes the brand a fictitious value. Not only is the brand’s value a fictitious
value in the sense that it is based on a projection of future revenues, but it is by definition
based on future revenue flows that will never be backed up by productive labor. The
brand assessment calculates only the monopoly price premium. Part of what makes
fictitious values unstable (in addition to the impossibility of knowing the future) is that
financial instruments can be crafted on the basis of future value flows that are far
removed from productive labor. Indeed, Google ranks as one of the top brands and earns
revenues almost entirely on the basis of a high degree of monopoly power in the audience
attention market – Google receives about one third of all online advertising spending
(Interbrand 2013, p.14). And yet, in an intriguing contradiction, the instability of
fictitious values is held at bay by branding. Branded goods have more predictable future
sales than unbranded. The value of the brand depends on expected future monopoly rents,
but a perception of reduced risk also enters into the pricing.

The creation of a brand is never complete. A brand identity is always a work in
progress, cultivated by the brand owner but ultimately given existence only by the lived
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consumer culture practices of those who deploy brands in their social signaling and those
who respond. A great deal of advertising addresses people who are already regular
consumers of the advertised good, maintaining rather than growing the brand’s customer
base. This is in part a resignation to the realm of what is possible in the attention market –
audiences’ perceptual screening makes already-existing users more likely to notice the
ads (Davis 2000, Jones 2004). But it is also a recognition that the brand only continues to
exist as long as people continue to (re)create and receive the brand’s meanings.
Continually re-enlisting consumers in their work of social communication is a necessary
condition for the brand to persist. This cultural work, taking place largely outside of the
fundamental class process, is necessary for the brand owner’s continuing realization of
exchange value through product sales and the validation of fictitious value (an economic
matter).

The Enterprise’s Balance Sheet – Some Numerical Examples
Informational advertising
One function of advertising – one that advertisers often invoke in defense of the
practice and that neoclassical economists applaud – is to disseminate information (e.g.
Hadar 1966, p.137, Stigler [1960] 1968). The classical model of a market assumes
complete, perfect, costless information for all agents interacting in the market. Classical
demand theory assumes, furthermore, that consumer preferences are exogenous (Katzner
2006). Of course, information is not complete, perfect, and costless. If, by chance, there
are consumers with an exogenous preference for thneeds sitting around thinking to
themselves, “I need a thneed, but I don’t know where to get one,” while there are thneed
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sellers sitting around with unsold inventory, some informational advertising – “Thneeds
available for purchase now at the Thneed Emporium at 101 Main Street!” – can help
those supply and demand curves meet in the same plane. This is commonly called “Here I
am!” advertising. The billboard by the side of the highway that says “Ma’s Diner Exit 8
Turn Right ! Mile” is the archetype of advertising that serves this function. In this case
advertising can be a feature of a market in which commodities sell at their value; we can
consider this a narrowly defined perfect competition, keeping the assumption that
commodities trade at their values and that consumers are never persuaded to change their
preferences, but dropping the fantastical assumption of perfect information.
By circulating information, advertising facilitates the sale of commodities, and
hence the realization of appropriated surplus. Payment for this use value of advertising
can be considered a subsumed class payment: it is paid for out of the surplus and secures
a necessary condition of existence for the appropriation of surplus. In the modeled world
in which goods trade at values but information carries costs, the enterprise’s balance
sheet contains SV on the revenue side and SCadvertising (along with any other subsumed
30

class distributions) on the expenditure side.

30

One of the roles of merchants is, similarly, to circulate information. This is why
merchants are indispensable and earn a fee for their intermediation. Historically,
SCmerchant and SCadvertising have been partial substitutes for one another; among
manufacturers’ goals for advertising spending is often to diminish their dependence on
merchants to disseminate information and attract consumer attention, thereby
strengthening their bargaining position in relation to merchants and allowing them to
negotiate decreased merchant fees.
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Persuasive advertising
There is no reason to suppose that advertising is uniquely isolated from
determinants of demand. An analytical separation between the circulation of information
and persuasion is common in the literature, but highly artificial. Facilitating circulation in
order to meet demand and influencing the shape of demand happen at the same time. (I
will presume in the following examples that advertising increases demand, but there is
always the possibility that advertising may be dissuasive.)
As discussed in Section 2 and illustrated in Figure 3.1 above, if advertising
increases demand and producers meet the higher demand with higher output and sell the
output at its value, the additional revenue generated as a result of the advertising’s impact
on demand is all additional C, V, and S. (This is represented by a move from point A to
point B in Figure 3.1.) In this case, the advertising is a subsumed class distribution – it
secures a condition of existence for (increased) realization of surplus. If, however,
producers do not increase output, higher demand translates instead into a higher price.
(This is represented by a move from point A to point C in Figure 3.1.) In this case, the
additional revenue generated as a result of the advertising is a nonclass revenue. But
attracting that NCRdemand increment of value may not come free. The advertising, then,
becomes a Y expenditure – it secures a condition of existence for the generation of
nonclass revenue.
The following examples consider a simplified hypothetical case in which two
firms compete in the market for a single product type; one firm advertises and the other
does not. A variety of possible outcomes are illustrated.
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Increased demand for the product type
Consider first the case in which advertising increases the demand for the product
type in a market featuring multiple evenly-matched sellers. All sellers have identical
costs of production, enjoy equal market share, and make products that are
indistinguishable in a blind taste test – or at least, if distinguishable, score equally.
Suppose that one firm purchases an advertising campaign that successfully increases
consumer desire for the product type but the advertising does not persuade consumers to
differentiate between different firms’ products. In this case total market demand will
increase. The increased demand could generate increase in the volume of sales, which
would generate increased total surplus. Alternatively, the increased demand could
translate into a constant sales volume but an increased price, generating a new NCR. Or
the outcome could be a combination of both.
Since the advertising spurred demand for the product type but did not inspire
brand loyalty, we will assume that the increased demand is met in equal shares by both
sellers in the market. This is not ideal for the firm paying for the advertising. Their
actions will increase both their revenues and their expenses while their competitors will
enjoy increased revenues without increased expenses. Consider these simple examples of
a market with two firms. They have identical production costs and identical market
shares. One firm then decides to advertise; the advertising successfully increases the
demand for the product type.
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Case 1: Both firms maintain the same output, but charge a higher price. The new revenue
from advertising is therefore a NCR and the spending on advertising is a Y expenditure.
Both increase their rate of profit, but firm 2 increases the rate of profit more.
Firm 1
expenses
C
V

SC

Y

revenues
C
V
S

NCR
0

price / qty
#uv unit
price
10
3

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

no 10
10
ads
ads 10
10
Firm 2
expenses
C
V

3

0

10

10

10

3

2

10

10

10

3

10

8

0.320

SC

Y

revenues
C
V
S

0

price / qty
#uv unit
price
10
3

profits
total
profit
7

NCR

profit
rate
0.304

no 10
ads
ads 10

10

3

0

10

10

10

10

3

0

10

10

10

3

10

10

0.400

3.3

3.3

In this case, Firm 1 succeeds in increasing both total profits and profit rate (from 7
to 8 and from 0.304 to 0.320 respectively). However, Firm 1’s competitive position has
weakened. Firm 2’s increases in total profits and profit rate (from 7 to 10 and from 0.304
to 0.400) outpace those of Firm 1.

Case 2: Both firms maintain the same output, but charge a higher price. The new revenue
from advertising is therefore a NCR and the spending on advertising is a Y expenditure.
Firm 1’s volume of profit rises but because of the high cost of the advertising relative to
the increased price, the rate of profit falls. Meanwhile, Firm 2 becomes more profitable
by both measures.
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Firm 1
expenses
C
V

SC

Y

revenues
C
V
S

no 10
10
ads
ads 10
10
Firm 2
expenses
C
V

3

0

10

10

10

0

price / qty
#uv unit
price
10
3

3

3

10

10

10

2

10

SC

Y

revenues
C
V
S

NCR

no 10
ads
ads 10

10

3

0

10

10

10

0

price / qty
#uv unit
price
10
3

10

3

0

10

10

10

2

10

NCR

3.3

3.3

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

6

0.231

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

9

0.391

In the second case, a total advertising expenditure of $3 in the market as a whole
generated total additional revenue in the market of $4. If the spending on advertising and
the resulting revenues had been divided proportionally among all participants, advertising
would have paid off for everyone. In this case, however, firm 1 paid 100% of the
advertising expenses but received only 50% of the increased revenues, reducing the total
volume of profits and the profit rate. This is the reason that advertising for
undifferentiated (or barely differentiated) products is done by a trade group when and if it
is done at all. Individual cotton farmers do not generally advertise cotton fiber, but Cotton
Incorporated, a trade group of cotton growers and importers, does. Some milk advertising
attempts to differentiate by brand, but the milk advertising that became most deeply
embedded in the culture – the “Got Milk?” campaign – was purchased by the California
Fluid Milk Processors. In this way, individual firms’ spending on the ads is in rough
proportion to each firms’ revenues resulting from the ads.
The risk that spending on advertising could benefit competitors is also the reason
for trademark protection. It is no coincidence that manufacturers lobbied hard for new
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trademark legislation at exactly the time that advertising was multiplying its importance
in their marketing strategies. They could only capture the full benefits of product
differentiation and brand loyalty if they could limit the ability of close imitators and
outright counterfeits to siphon off a portion of the returns to advertising. Manufacturers
wanted, and still want, to capture all of the additional revenues generated by the increased
demand spurred by the ads they pay for. Brand owners use trademark infringement
lawsuits, private investigators, and public police forces (to whom they may pay a special
subsidy)

31

to go after counterfeits (Conley 2008, pp50-52).

Case 3: Both firms respond to increased demand with increased production. Price
remains the same, but quantity increases. The new revenue from advertising is therefore
an increase in total S, and the spending on advertising is a subsumed class distribution.
Firm 1’s total profit rises, but profit rate falls. Firm 2’s total profit rises, profit rate stays
the same.

31

In New York, for example, the city police force has a counterfeiting task force.
“Members” pay $3,500 for the counterfeiter-busting services, and could be asked for
more if the budget runs out.
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Firm 1
expenses
C
V
SC

SCads

revenues
C
V
S

no 10 10 3
ads
ads 15 15 4.5
Firm 2
expenses
C
V
SC

0

10

10

10

price / qty
NCR #uv unit
price
0
10
3

3

15

15

15

0

SCads

revenues
C
V
S

no 10
ads
ads 15

15

3

10

3

0

10

10

10

price / qty
NCR #uv unit
price
0
10
3

15

4.5

0

15

15

15

0

15

3

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

7.5

0.200

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

10.5

0.304

Firm 1’s $3 advertising campaign attracts 10 new purchases, but those new
purchases are evenly divided between Firm 1 and Firm 2. Firm 1’s return on their $3
investment in an advertising campaign is $15 in new sales, of which $5 is new surplus,
out of which they must pay the $3 advertising bill plus $1.50 in other SSCP… only a
$0.50 increase in total profits. Firm 2, meanwhile, gets an additional $3.50 in profits
without any outlay for advertising.
Next consider the case in which a firm advertises and successfully attracts new
users of their product type, but attracts all those new users to their specific brand. Their
sales increase while their competitors’ sales remain the same.

151

Firm 1
expenses
C
V
SC

SCads

revenues
C
V
S

no 10 10 3
ads
ads 20 20 6
Firm 2
expenses
C
V
SC

0

10

10

10

price / qty
NCR #uv unit
price
0
10
3

3

20

20

20

0

SCads

revenues
C
V
S

no 10
ads
ads 10

20

3

10

3

0

10

10

10

price / qty
NCR #uv unit
price
0
10
3

10

3

0

10

10

10

0

10

3

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

11

0.224

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

7

0.304

This case is identical to the previous case, except that Firm 1 gets all the new
sales. $3 is spent on advertising and attracts 10 new purchases at $3 per unit. The
advertising makes Firm 1’s per-unit selling costs higher than Firm 2’s, therefore lowering
their profit rate. However, the increased volume of sales is enough to increase the total
volume of profit. Instead of spending $3 on advertising to generate only $0.50 in
additional profits, as before, Firm 1 spends $3 and generates $4 in additional profits.

Increased demand for the specific brand at the expense of competitors
Advertising may fail to increase demand for a product type but increase demand
for a specific producer’s output. Consider the case, common in wide swaths of the
economy, in which a firm’s advertising can raise that firm’s sales only at the expense of
their competitors. The successfully advertised firm’s new customers are customers lost to
the competition. General Mills sells more boxes of breakfast cereal while Kellogg’s sells
fewer. Or vice versa.
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Suppose that Firm 1 spends $3 on an advertising campaign and attracts 5 new
purchases. Those are sales that are lost to Firm 2. If Firm 2 did not predict the drop in
demand for their product, they will face a realization crisis, as shown here:
Firm 1
expenses
C
V
SC

SCads

revenues
C
V
S
10

price / qty
NCR #uv unit
price
0
10
3

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

no 10 10 3
ads
ads 15 15 4.5
Firm 2
expenses
C
V
SC

0

10

10

3

15

15

15

0

7.5

0.200

SCads

revenues
C
V
S

profits
total
profit
7

profit
rate
0.304

no 10
ads
ads 10

-8

-.348

15

3

10

3

0

10

10

10

price / qty
NCR #uv unit
price
0
10
3

10

3

0

5

5

5

0

5

3

Firm 2 has to make a choice about how to resolve their realization crisis. They
could advertise to win back the lost sales. In that case both firms would wind up with
balance sheets that look like this:
expenses
C
V
SC
ads 10

10

3

SCads

revenues
C
V
S

3

10

10

10

price / qty
NCR #uv unit
price
0
10
3

profits
total
profit
4

profit
rate
0.154

They would again be evenly matched, but now both have increased their selling costs
without increasing their volume of sales, therefore reducing both total profits and profit
rate. Concern with the waste of advertising in competition over market share dates back
more than a hundred years. Each competitor is forced to advertise to defend their market
share against encroachment by heavily advertised competitors. The result, it seems, is
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higher prices and lower profits, a loss for both consumers and manufacturers (though a
gain for advertising professionals). (See, e.g. Mataja 1903.) Because this struggle over
increments of market share is the most common market situation, much advertising is
what John Philip Jones considers defensive advertising, maintaining market share in the
face of competitive challenges (Jones 2004).
Perhaps the best that can be said for this form of competition is that it holds price
competition at bay, and cutthroat price competition can be ruinous for the firms involved.
In the example, Firm 2 could try to sell off the excess inventory by cutting the price.
They could sell at a price below value. If they dropped the price as low as $2.30 and if
they were able to sell all 10 units at this price, they would just barely be able to cover
their costs, but would fail to realize enough surplus to return a profit. If their desperation
to dispose of their output pushed the price lower than that, they would lose money on
every sale.
In the previous example, the advertised firm increased their volume of sales, and
their advertising expenditure in is therefore a SC. In fact, however, branded advertised
goods typically sell at higher prices than unadvertised goods of the same product type.
The market bifurcates into Cheerios and dozens of nearly indistinguishable supermarket
house brands of o-shaped oat cereal (Jones 2004, pp.24-25). In this case, the advertising
generates a non-class revenue, so it should be considered a Y expenditure. In the
following example, Firm 1 used their advertising to raise prices without losing volume
while Firm 2 continued to sell at the same volume and price. In this hypothetical case,
Firm 1 increased both their total profit and their profit rate as a result of the advertising.
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Advertising and the residual use value retained by the ad’s creator
The capitalist relations of production within the advertising agency transfer
ownership of the ideas from the creative worker to the agency; the market exchange
between advertising agency and client transfers ownership of the ideas from agency to
client. (See Chapter 2.) From the perspective of the general public viewing the ads, the
original authorship of advertisements is almost always entirely obscured. However,
within the advertising industry, traces of authorship remain. Despite the legal transfer of
intellectual property, the originators of the ideas retain a residual use value, different
from the use value obtained by the purchaser.
For the advertising creative worker, a portfolio of past work is an important
component of a job application or performance review portfolio. It is important for an
advertising creative worker’s bargaining position to be recognized as the author of
successful work. They will need this portfolio to be considered for a job and to bargain
for wages. Sometimes, on the basis of the work that appears in an ad campaign, an
advertising creative working at one agency will be recruited by a different agency and
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offered higher wages to defect. If an advertising creative chooses to break away from
employment with an existing agency to start his or her own agency (and therefore move
into a position of appropriating, not just producing, surplus), that portfolio of past work is
essential for attracting clients. The ideas advertising creatives produce have a selfpromotional use value for the creatives themselves, even though they have no legal
ownership of those ideas. The ideas advertising creatives produce contribute to
determining the exchange value their labor power commands and may enable them to
become surplus appropriators.
For the advertising agency, a portfolio of past work done at the agency is
important both as a sales tool and as a labor recruitment tool. Not only is a portfolio of
past work presented to potential clients to be assessed on its merits according to the
potential clients’ own judgment, but the advertising industry has a busy calendar of
competitions and awards ceremonies at which creative work can be judged by panels of
experts. Mark Tungate notes, “Advertising agencies love receiving awards because these
shiny hunks of metal and glass are tangible proof of their most ephemeral asset –
creativity.” Erik Vervroegen, creative director of TBWA/Paris explains that clients know
they need creative work to attract and hold attention in a setting where continuous,
conflicting demands are made on the public’s attention. Awards are understood to be
evidence of creative excellence, so agencies like to have such evidence to present to
potential clients. In addition, agencies compete for the best creative talent as much as
they compete for clients. Or rather, agencies compete for the best creative talent as one
component of their competition for clients. Awards help attract talent – the best people
want to work at the best agencies. Many agencies consider the potential competitive
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advantages of a glittering awards record to be so powerful that they are willing to spend
large sums of money – in some cases up to half a million dollars a year – to enter the
competitions (Tungate 2007, pp.244-247).

Brief Critique of the Neoclassical Approach
In the neoclassical microeconomic tradition, the firm’s decision to advertise is
approached as an optimization problem. If the market price of the advertised good is
above the marginal cost of its production and if advertising can increase sales, advertising
can increase profits – provided that the additional revenues outstrip the expense of the
advertising itself. A rationally profit-maximizing firm finding itself in such a situation
will therefore choose to advertise (The New Palgrave 2008, p.32; Hadar 1966). If we
suppose that the effects of advertising persist over time we can complicate the
mathematics and make it a dynamic optimization problem rather than the simpler static
version (Sethi 1977), but the core idea is the same.
There is a grave inconsistency in the axioms underlying models of advertising as
an optimization problem. Advertising only makes sense when participants in the market
do not have perfect information. (That is, all the time.) Optimization, however, requires
perfect information. (I suppose we could reconcile this contradiction by saying that firms
know everything but consumers do not, but in that case we have to assume that the
people who work at firms forget a large portion of what they know when they stop at the
supermarket on the way home from work.) Unfortunately for would-be optimizers, there
is no clear relationship between advertising expenditure and consumer behavior. Some
advertising appears to be effective, but advertising’s effects are not sufficiently

157

predictable or quantifiably ascertainable to be susceptible to optimization. John
Wanamaker famously remarked that he was quite aware that half of the money he was
spending on advertising was wasted, but since he didn’t know which half that was he
intended to continue to spend his accustomed full amount (Laird 1998, p.27). David
Ogilvy made an even more extreme (and even more self-serving) assessment of
advertising at large – ninety-nine percent of it, he said, sold nothing – though he claimed
better-than-average results for the advertisements he crafted (Ogilvy [1963] 2003).
Neither theoretical nor empirical contributions to the economics literature show
anything resembling a consensus regarding how to understand advertising’s influence
over consumers. Despite marketers’ extensive self-analysis and their eager adoption of
all relevant resources from psychology and cognitive science to assess advertising’s
effects on human brains, no one knows before an ad is created and run what its impact
will be. Indeed, even after the fact no one can say for certain what its impact was. Even
in the current regime of constant digital surveillance of online behavior, with the ability
to track precisely which ads Internet surfers had in their field of vision and which they
clicked on and which items they purchased, it is still extremely difficult to calculate an
advertising return on investment with enough confidence to exclude an ROI of zero. (And
it is likely in many cases that the ROI is negative, sometimes significantly so.)
Optimization in advertising is clearly a quixotic pursuit (Lewis and Rao 2014).
For those building models on the presumption that advertising persuades
consumers through informationally vacuous emotional appeals, proceeding to analyze the
firm’s advertising decisions as the rational solution to an optimization problem is doubly
inconsistent. If consumers are subject to persuasion, surely so are the managers or
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owners, or whoever makes advertising decisions. Advertising agencies advertise
themselves, too.
The presumption that the firm is a cohesive unit pursuing profit maximization also
contradicts the reality that the firm is not a singular entity; it is an aggregation of people
who often have conflicting beliefs and agendas. Pamela Walker Laird is right to
emphasize that it matters who within the firm makes decisions about advertising (1998).
The use-value of advertising for the firm considered as a whole is not necessarily the
same as the use-value of advertising for the people within the firm who direct advertising
activities. Therefore, we can also ask about the use value of advertising for the people
within the firm making advertising decisions. For an owner-manager who considers the
firm an extension of himself, advertising may have an ego-stroking use value. For a
manager justifying and defending her position at the firm, advertising may have a use
value related to office politics.

Conclusion: Making the Decision to Advertise, Securing Conditions of Existence
Enterprises making the decision to advertise are simultaneously striving to survive
within the context they face and to reshape their context to better suit their purposes.
Advertising can take intentional aim at securing economic, cultural, or political
conditions of existence. And these are all interrelated. Whether intentional or not, the
effects of advertising can have repercussions in all realms.
The operation of advertising within the audience attention market and the
influence the results of attention exchanges wield over all other markets redirect value
flows throughout the economy. Advertising helps to secure capitalist (and sometimes
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non-capitalist) firms’ political and financial conditions of existence. All of this makes
advertising an important player in shaping the production and distribution of the surplus
at the micro and macro levels.
Advertising is one of the clearest bridges between economic activity and the
construction of ideology. Any single advertisement taken in isolation makes a narrow set
of claims and a limited persuasive pitch: This product will improve your well-being! Buy
it! Taken as a whole, and despite internal contradictions (Colgate and Crest can’t both be
the uniquely best toothpaste), advertising is an inescapable player in the creation of an
ideology compatible with capitalism. It makes corporate brands into familiar, reliable,
widely shared cultural reference points. We can hardly imagine who we would be
without them. Regardless of whether or not any specific advertisement can be
definitively credited for any particular sales, advertising can be seen as a collective
ideological intervention of the capitalist class, one of the ways capital secures the cultural
conditions that enable the continued appropriation of surplus.
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CONCLUSION
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN THE CULTURAL COMMON

“Collective representations are the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out
not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have
associated, united and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations
have accumulated their experience and their knowledge.”
– Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p.29

The Cultural Commons
A culture is a kind of common. The cultural common comprises both meanings
and attention; it provides the basis for social communication and at the same time is
created and recreated through the process of social communication. In contemporary
capitalism, however, the cultural realm has been incorporated into the economic realm in
such a way that the common nature of culture is disintegrating before our eyes.
Informationalized capitalism (Hardt and Negri 2000, pp.280-1) carves private property
out of the cultural common in a dizzying array of ways.
A culture, among many other functions, supplies a pool of shared meanings. Like
other common-pool resources, these can be both means of subsistence and means of
production. We draw on the cultural common to meet the basic human need of making
our lives comprehensible to ourselves and to others (subsistence) and we draw on the
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cultural common for material to rearrange and recombine in the generation of new
meanings (production). New meanings may augment or displace old, enlarging and/or
reshaping the common. The shared-meaning aspect of the cultural common differs
critically from the standard model of the common, which is defined by being rival but not
excludable. Meanings, unlike pastures and fisheries, are strengthened rather than depleted
with use.
There is another complementary facet to the cultural common, and that is the
shared pool of attention. A meaning belongs to the cultural common only to the extent
that the meaning is deployed in social communication, the extent to which knowledge of
that meaning is widely shared, the extent to which anyone pays attention. Both collective
and individual human survival depend on our bestowing our attention in particular ways.
Our collective life requires us to share some objects of attention; without a cultural
common setting a basic framework of thought “all contact between [human] minds would
be impossible, and with that, all life together” (Durkheim 1966, p.30). For an individual,
social isolation, the lack of attention from other people, can be deadly. And attention,
unlike meaning, is rival. Like pastures and fisheries, our capacity to attend can be
overextended and depleted.
The cultural common is now interwoven with commodity forms. The most
immediately recognizable commodity type, a material consumer good produced for sale
on the market, pervades the material culture of a capitalist society. Goods, including
goods exchanged as commodities, “are part of a live information system” and are
deployed in social communication, therefore material commodities are among the inputs
into the production of the cultural common (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, p.10). Units of
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a common pool resource can be extracted and sold – the fish in the water is a part of a
common pool resource system but the fish in the net of the commercial fisherman is a
commodity (Ostrom 1990, p.30). Similarly, our collective capacity to pay attention to one
another is part of a cultural common pool resource system but the attention that is
intercepted by communications media and sold to advertisers is a commodity (Jhally
1987). When not consumed or sold immediately, units of a common pool resource can be
extracted and used as inputs in a production process, and then the output can be sold
(Ostrom 1990, p.30). We all draw from the common pool of culture to make new
meanings for our own use, but some producers of new meanings – novelists, lobbyists,
and advertising creators, for example – produce those meanings for sale. Lastly, the
common pool resource system itself can be privatized. Just as the village common can be
enclosed, passing from the status of common pool resource to private property, so, too,
can pieces of the pool of shared meaning be privatized. Through copyrighting, meanings
produced as commodities to be sold to audiences, such as novels, can retain their private
property status even when they become widely shared cultural reference points. Through
branding, meanings associated with a product or company that are (re)produced broadly
through social communication become private property. In the case of copyrights, the
meanings in question begin as commodities but can pass into cultural common (i.e. the
public domain) when the copyright expires. In the case of branding, the meanings are
produced in the cultural common and then privatized.
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The Privatization of the Cultural Common
Over the last hundred and forty years or so, the United States has seen an
aggressive move toward the privatization of both the meaning and attention components
32

of the cultural common. We have discovered, in fact, that we never had a common; we
had only an ungoverned open access resource, which has now been privatized. From the
last few decades of the nineteenth century to the present, both meaning and attention have
been the object of primitive accumulation on a stunning scale. The components of culture
and of social communication have become commodities rather than common-pool
resources.
33

A culture is simultaneously (re)produced and consumed through the process of
social communication. We can think of successful communications in three stages: The
first communicative task is to gain access to attention by intercepting the perceptual field
of an audience, usually eyes or ears. The second task is to hold the gaze or ear and
convey… something – an impression, some piece of information, an emotion. In the case
of communication originating with an advertiser, the goal is often to convey some sense
of familiarity with a specific product and its use. Lastly, if the first two tasks are
achieved, the audience will have received and retained an impression, which will have
become a social fact, an element of social communication. In the case of consumer
goods, this impression is a brand identity. Advertisers and marketers call this impression
left by communications “mindshare.”

32

My study centers on the U.S., but this movement is not unique to the U.S. A crossnational comparative study would probably illuminate some interesting things about the
ways in which the privatization of the cultural common figures in capitalist development.
33
Consumed in the sense of being used, but in this case not necessarily used up.
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The commodity version of the first part of the communications task, access to
attention, is advertising space. When an advertiser buys advertising space (or, in
broadcast media advertising, advertising time), the purpose of the purchase is to gain
access to audience attention (Jhally 1987). When this transaction takes place, units of
attention have been extracted from the common pool resource system of our collective
capacity to attend and sold in commodity form. Beginning in the late nineteenth century,
the businesses of selling newspaper, magazine, billboard, and streetcar advertising space
were modernized, standardized, and greatly expanded. Advertisers, advertising agents,
and suppliers of media advertising space negotiated means of quantifying and verifying
attention units – typically the number of gazes intercepted. By 1920, advertisers could,
with a relatively high degree of certainty, purchase access to the eyes of desired
audiences in a nationally integrated market in access to audience attention. When
broadcast media emerged after 1920, first radio and then television were also
incorporated into the attention market. In the last twenty years, the Internet, too, has been
tamed into a site for the appropriation and sale of audience attention – the reason that
most of what we do online is free is that we are the product. (Commenting on a recent
rise in the Nasdaq, reporter Rana Foroohar matter-of-factly, without seeming to imply
any radical critique, called the boom the result of a land grab, where the “land” being
grabbed is eyeballs (The Takeaway, November 26, 2013).) The measurement of attention
units has been renegotiated to incorporate information about time spent on a web page
and click rates.
There are a variety of commodity versions of the second part of the
communications task, most falling under the wide umbrella of intellectual property.
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Intellectual property rights make it possible to sell or lease communicative content. A full
history of the development of intellectual property in the U.S. is beyond the scope of this
paper, but the expansion of property rights in information and ideas is undeniable. Some
have already identified the new property rights as a contemporary immaterial analogue of
the land enclosures that accompanied the emergence of capitalism in Britain centuries
ago and there is a growing literature calling for the treatment of knowledge as a common
(Hess and Ostrom 2005). Even when cultural artifacts hold private property status, the
cultural common necessarily supplied inputs – they always draw from the common
whether or not they contribute to the common. The once reasonably predictable
progression of initially-copyrighted artistic content into the public domain has been
halted and even reversed. Some content has been clawed back out of the public domain
and re-privatized. The Supreme Court’s October 2011 decision in the case of Golan v.
Holder affirmed that copyright protection can be applied to something that was
previously unprotected – (the long-dead composer) Sergei Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf
34

was among the resulting losses to the public domain (Ginsburg 2012).

Widely shared

cultural reference points are a piece of a common culture, but very often do not, in
economic terms, belong to the cultural common. Access is for paying customers and
pirates only.
The third stage of social communication, the impression that remains in the mind
of the audience, takes on commodity form as a brand. With the passage of trademark
laws (pushed hard by manufacturing interests and their advertising industry allies) in the
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court ruled in Association for Molecular Pathology, et
al., petitioners v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. that genes could not be patented, so the
Court’s stance on privatization of the knowledge common has limits (Thomas 2013).
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1880s, then revised and expanded repeatedly since, the impression left in our minds by
the interaction of advertising and social communication about goods became legal,
salable property. Legal decisions in England in the eighteenth century had explicitly
determined that goodwill could not be salable legal property because goodwill was
produced by customers and the customers were not owned by the business in question, so
their goodwill could not be sold by the business (Strasser 1989, p.43). The legal status
achieved by trademarks in the U.S. as a result of the new laws passed in the 1880s meant
that goodwill became salable after all. This meant in turn that customers, or at least their
attention, impressions, cognitive and emotional relations to the symbols associated with
brand identity, could be sold. The breadth of the protection accorded to privatized
meanings has increased. When trademark protection began, the standard for identifying
infringement was the potential for customer confusion: is it likely that customers
intending to buy brand X would mistakenly purchase brand Y? Outright counterfeits are
still a major concern for brand owners, but the protections offered to branded meanings
have expanded to include dilution: is it likely that the attention and set of mental
associations enjoyed by brand X will be altered by the branding and marketing of brand
Y (Arvidsson 2006, p.6)? Branding thus not only commodifies resource units drawn from
the cultural common, it privatizes portions of the cultural common resource system itself.

Some Consequences of the Commodification of Communications for the Creation of
a Common Culture
The consequences of the commodification of communication for the creation of a
common culture are complex and contradictory. During some periods, in some contexts,
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commodified communications contributed to the construction of widely shared meanings.
When a large proportion of the population both is accessed by the same attention buyers
and has access to the same purveyors of privatized meanings, we can have a broad
pseudo-common. Even in a regime of cultural private property we can find
commonalities in talking about the local sports team or the popular TV show around the
proverbial water cooler. However, when the population is sorted into smaller attention
batches, we have fewer common cultural reference points.
In social and political units larger than an everyone-knows-everyone tribe,
conceiving of the community is an act of imagination. Benedict Anderson describes the
newspapers’ contribution to the generation of imagined communities around the turn of
the twentieth century, the period of the emergence of modern nationalism. The
experience of reading something that you know that people you don’t know are also
reading produces, he argues, an awareness of shared experience, shared belonging to a
common social unit. This is doubly so when, as in the narrative structure of newspaper
reporting, the shared reading material tells stories about the common social unit. The
newspaper does not just report the fate of nations; it creates the nation as a coherent
entity with a singular fate (Anderson 1991; cf. Hofstadter 1972, p.187 on the same
phenomenon on the city level). Anderson focused on the editorial content of newspapers
read by audiences who were interested purchasers of the content. However, an important
part of the common experience of newspaper readership is exposure to the same
advertising, belonging to the same bulk order of audience attention sold by newspaper to
advertiser. The shared experience of having our attention sold to the same buyers is a
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source of commonality, much as is the shared experience of selling labor power to
industry as a member of the working class, for example.
Indeed, the two commonalities can work in conjunction to strengthen the sense of
shared culture and shared destiny. In The Labor Question in America Roseanne Currarino
shows how important the ability to fully participate in a shared consumer culture was to
Guilded Age labor organizers and social reformers. Given that the dominant culture was
already becoming privatized, full citizenship required the purchasing power to buy in, so
demanding the right of access to consumer culture through the market was an urgent goal
(Currarino 2011). Making a New Deal, Lizabeth Cohen’s study of industrial labor in
Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s, finds that shared participation in American mass culture
was an important contributor to the construction of working class consciousness and the
ability to organize. Immigrants’ children who spoke English, watched the same movies,
listened to the same radio shows, and bought the same brand name goods at the same
chain retail stores could imagine and create a multiethnic community of working class
solidarity in ways that their parents had not been able to (Cohen 1990).
But the commodification of audience attention also contains a contradictory
tendency toward fragmentation. The dominant trend in contemporary information
capitalism is for the economics of attention selling to splinter the pseudo-common.
Sellers of advertising space increasingly sell not just access to our eyes but information
about what we are likely to respond to. Advertisers do not want to throw money away on
purchasing access to the eyes and ears of audiences who are unlikely to respond, so the
sellers of attention race to provide more and more information about us to advertisers and
sort us through finer and finer sieves so that the advertising can be more and more
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precisely matched to its target. Even in traditional print media, many magazines have for
decades been selling subscriber information to advertisers and printing multiple versions
of each issue so that different advertisers can purchase access to different subscribers
(Maas and Roman 1992, p.91). The proliferation of television channels and radio stations
yields more narrowcasting than broadcasting and digital TV delivery opens the way for
individuation even within audiences for the same shows (Dureau undated). The most
developed extremes are to be found online where the technologies of digital surveillance
35

yield millions of personalized internets guiding us to different content and showing
each of us a different set of algorithmically targeted advertisements (Pariser 2011).
We attend most readily to content that is already comprehensible in our given
frame of reference. This creates a self-reinforcing loop: since attention is most effectively
held by ideas that are already familiar and advertisers most often want to purchase just
those audiences who are most likely to pay attention to the advertisement, we are
increasingly sorted into smaller and more disjoint batches for sale to advertisers (Pariser
2011; Jones 2004). Those who sell audience attention by generating attractive content
that will draw our eyes and ears respond to advertisers’ demands by generating finely
differentiated content in order to achieve the sorting. Others, such as Google, who do not
create content but who instead act as curators occupy the tremendously powerful role of
gatekeepers to audience attention. They direct us to differentiated content and deliver our
gaze to advertisers along the way. The broad pseudo-common possible under a privatized
and centralized, broadcast-dominated cultural regime (think The Ed Sullivan Show)
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Since 2009, Google has been “personalizing” search results. The algorithm that
produces your search results takes into account not only the search terms and features of
the sites returned, but also data on your web browsing history.
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splinters into many distinct pseudo-commons with fewer areas of overlap (think
YouTube or Facebook). Each imagined community grows smaller and more
homogenous, while the members of different pseudo-commons become
36

incomprehensible to one another.

The intensely active and competitive market for our attention depletes our
capacities. As early as the 1890s the advertising trade press was full of articles
concerning advertising saturation and the difficulty of cutting through the clutter, and the
scarcity of attention has been a consistent theme in the advertising literature ever since.
There are more demands on our attention than we can accommodate, and some demands
have more money behind them than others. Decades after the experiences of World War
II orphans demonstrated that infants given adequate nutrition, hygiene, and shelter
nonetheless died without the affective labor of a caregiver’s attention (Gerber 1998),
Sherry Turkle’s research finds that modern children are in desperate competition with
Internet-enabled devices for their parents’ attention (Tippett 2012). Our epidemic of
attention deficit disorder is as much a phenomenon of the cultural economy as it is a
result of individual neurological quirks.

Consequences of the Commodification of Communications for Freedom of
Expression
The dominant modern conception of freedom of expression begins with the
metaphor of the free market. Although it was written in dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell
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This attention sorting, along with geographic residential sorting and gerrymandering,
contributes to the extremes of political partisanship that have all but halted the federal
government’s ability to carry out the functions of governance.
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Holmes’ opinion in the case of Schenk vs. United States in 1919 became the foundation
for contemporary free speech theory. He wrote (quoted in Bollinger 1986, p.18),
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas –
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. (emphasis added)
Even as metaphor, the marketplace of ideas conception of free speech has some troubling
implications and inconsistencies. There is a contradiction at its core: using the law to
restrict expression that an overwhelming majority of us consider to be harmful, e.g.
advocacy of genocide, would itself be a form of expression, but we deny ourselves the
use of the expressive (and coercive) capacity of the law up until the very moment the
speech is materially acted upon. The marketplace of ideas model treats ideas as through
they were fully separable from the people who think them, and people as though they
were distinct from the ideas they hold, which leaves us with a very thin conception of
personhood. The presumption that the best and truest ideas will win out in competition is
dubious. (Bollinger 1986, Radin 1996) But the free marketplace of ideas also has some
undeniable strengths as an ideal, especially in its protection of minority viewpoints from
direct government censorship, which provides for both individual self-expression and the
possibility that currently unpopular viewpoints will prove persuasive and lead to social
change.
However, as the marketplace of ideas becomes literal rather than metaphoric, the
contradictions of the ideal magnify, the strengths wither. To the extent that speech
becomes a commodity, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech becomes a form
of consumer sovereignty. If we consider speech and attention to be commodities rather
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than acts of political and social participation through which both the individual and the
collective are constituted, the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizen’s United decision has an
internal coherence (Kennedy 2010). Anyone can launch into the discursive sphere as
much speech as they can pay for and buy access to as many eyes and ears as they can
afford. Limitations on spending and limitations on speech become one and the same.
(The best way to get rich off the U.S. political process – now an even better road to riches
than before – is to make campaign advertisements.) Speech-as-property also grants
speech rights to any entity that can make a purchase, even non-persons. The protection of
commodity speech is indispensable to the legal fiction of corporate personhood.
The privatized, branded cultural pseudo-common not only amplifies the speech of
big spenders, but also constrains and suppresses noncommodified expression. No matter
how much advertising speech and access to audience attention a brand buys, the brand
becomes a social reality only when given meaning and granted attention in social practice
(Arvidsson 2006). The social communications work of making a brand is a new kind of
doubly-free labor – free as in no-monetary-cost to the brand owner and also free as in nodirect-supervision or compulsion. A brand owner eagerly cultivates and appropriates the
economic spoils of free (as in no-monetary-cost) expression that produces meanings and
draws attention beneficial to the brand. But the brand owner will go to great lengths to
suppress, or at least drown out, expression that damages the brand. This can mean
countering the expression of brand haters, who denigrate the brand or try to shift the set
of mental associations coupled with the brand name for some particular purpose – such as
fair trade activists working to draw attention to the conditions under which the branded
good is produced. Brand owners will also, however, sometimes go to great lengths to
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suppress the speech of the brand’s greatest enthusiasts. When Adidas enthusiasts, through
their consumer cultural practice, built up a fashion association with the brand, Adidas
pursued an expensive and aggressive advertising campaign emphasizing the use of their
shoes as athletic gear rather than as a fashion accessory (Tungate 2007, p.200). Under the
privatized cultural pseudo-common, meaning-making contributions that are not
compatible with the private property rights and profitability of existing ideas and brands
are suppressed. Brands have limited tolerance for creativity; they encourage us to
construct a social identity through our choices from the menu of options they provide
rather than through generation of our own new contributions to the range of the possible.
When speech and brands are property, equal protection of free speech rights for
all is impossible. Sometimes property rights conflict and any resolution necessarily favors
one party’s property rights over the other (Friedman 2003). This is what happens when a
trademark infringement case is decided. For example, thanks to the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 2006, Victoria’s Secret successfully prevented a small adult novelty shop
owner from continuing to use his own name – Victor – in the name of his store because,
they said, the store name “Victor’s Little Secret” was too close to “Victoria’s Secret” and
infringed on their brand identity (Barrouquere 2010). Too, when speech is produced
under capitalist relations of production, the speech rights of the direct appropriator of the
speech (and, after sale, those of the purchasers of that speech) take precedence over the
speech rights of the direct producers. Once the cultural common is privatized, access to
the cultural means of subsistence and production is structured by the rules of the market,
where money is the measure of value.
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(Re)Constructing a Cultural Common
The power of the marketplace of ideas conception of freedom of expression has
limited our ability to confront the consequences of the literal marketplace of ideas. We
need, instead, a conception of freedom of expression that recognizes the problem of
commodified communications. We need communicative, cultural practices that will help
us to imagine a community as large as our real interdependencies. We need to construct a
cultural common to which all have equal access – a voice, like a vote, should belong by
right to every person, to be exercised without budget constraints, and our conception of
voice must include access to ears. We might begin by returning to the economic model of
the common.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri are hopeful about the possibility of a new
common and an informational communism. With immaterial labor, cooperation is not
imposed as in earlier forms of labor, they explain,
but rather, cooperation is completely immanent to the laboring activity itself. This
fact calls into question the old notion (common to classical and Marxian political
economics) by which labor power is conceived as ‘variable capital,’ that is, a
force that is activated and made coherent only by capital, because the cooperative
powers of labor power (particularly immaterial labor power) afford labor the
possibility of valorizing itself. Brains and bodies still need others to produce
value, but the others they need are not necessarily provided by capital and its
capacities to orchestrate production. Today, productivity, wealth, and the creation
of social surpluses take the form of cooperative interactivity through linguistic,
communicational, and affective networks. In the expression of its own creative
energies, immaterial labor thus seems to provide the potential for a kind of
spontaneous and elementary communism (Hardt and Negri 2000, p.294).
The community produces and what is produced is community. Private property, they
conclude, “becomes increasingly nonsensical in this context” (ibid., p.302). What their
account overlooks is that even as some labor power becomes decommodified and
capital’s role in orchestrating the production of some (especially immaterial) use values
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diminishes, the commodification of our attention and personal information intensifies and
the enclosure of shared meanings accelerates. (To be fair, this is much clearer now, in
2013, than it was in 2000.)
The communication networks Hardt and Negri celebrate require material support.
As currently constituted, the primary way in which exchange value is extracted from
communications networks is through the mining and sale of users’ personal information
and attention. Advertisers then purchase this information and attention to cultivate the
creation of brands. The decentralization of the communications network, it turns out, is
not necessarily democratizing. The content that comes to our attention and the audiences
we find for our speech are selected on the basis of what will make for a profitable trade in
attention and meaning. This can result in even less generation of commonality than the
old broadcast communication model. Though certainly different, networked culture can
be just as biased toward constructing capitalist ways of knowing. And the ways of
knowing that we construct become private property harnessed to the process of
accumulation.
The material support for networks could be managed differently, however. The
technology is not deterministic – it did not automatically generate a common, but neither
is the current private property regime inevitable and final. Plenty of time,
experimentation, and “cooperative interactivity” have gone into incorporating each new
communications technology, including the Internet, into our social reality and there is no
reason to think our capacity to experiment and change is spent.
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Conclusion
In our current informationalized capitalist context audience attention is available
as a commodity, speech is available as a commodity, and speech that has successfully
commanded attention is monetized as brands. We still participate in noncommodified
speech and attention, and some mindshare still belongs to the common, but these
everywhere confront and interact with their commodified counterparts. Through
extraction of attention and enclosure of meaning, the cultural common is diminished and
depleted.
The creation of private property rights in the basic components of communication
and culture is informationalized capitalism’s version of primitive accumulation. The
earliest waves of cultural primitive accumulation in the U.S. began in the era of U.S.
industrial capitalism’s most rapid development – as late-nineteenth-century industrial
capitalists attempted to deal with the realization problem of mass production they pushed
to commodify access to attention through a standardized market for advertising space and
they pushed to establish brands as property. Since then, these forms of property, access to
eyes and mindshare, have become central to informationalized capitalism. Rosa
Luxemburg’s argument that primitive accumulation is never finished is vividly illustrated
once again.
We have not tended to think of culture as property, but when the means of
meaning-making confront us as commodities, we must. But a private property regime is
not the only property regime possible. What might it look like to treat the cultural
common as a common-pool resource system? We can make no a priori prescription for
how the cultural common should be managed. As Elinor Ostrom argued, “‘getting the
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institutions right’ is a difficult, time-consuming, conflict-invoking process” (1990, p.14).
The fact that common property will have to be clawed back from a private property
regime will only make the conflict more acute. Difficult, time-consuming, and conflictinvoking as it may be, learning to collectively govern the cultural common is our urgent
task.
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